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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In the last few years alone, calls for transparency by consumers have grown 
louder. No longer are consumers willing to sit back and allow firms to make ‘closed 
door’ decisions that benefit the company (and its executives) at the expense of consumers 
and society.  This dissertation begins to answer the call for a greater understanding of 
transparency from both practitioner and academic perspectives.  In particular, this 
dissertation focuses on systematically developing a succinct definition of perceived firm 
transparency, developing a valid measure of transparency, and empirically testing 
antecedents and consequences of transparency.   
Two studies were conducted to develop the transparency scale following a 
thorough review of the transparency literature across six fields.  Study 1 was dedicated to 
scale development and validation for the transparency construct.  Study 2 was dedicated 
to further validating the transparency scale and testing its psychometric properties and 
validity.   
The complete proposed model was tested in Study 3 utilizing scenarios in a 
between-subjects design with a student sample.  Study 4 further tested the proposed 
model in a slightly more ecologically valid setting with a more diverse sample.  Studies 3 
and 4 showed that transparency has significant direct impact on reducing skepticism, and 
increasing trust, attitude toward the firm, and purchase intention; and these impacts are of 
substantial magnitude.  Studies 3 and 4 also tested a few antecedents of perceived firm 
transparency including perceived firm reciprocity, perceived consumer effort, and 
 v 
 
negative information.  Reciprocity and consumer effort both had a significant impact on 
perceptions of firm transparency in Studies 3 and 4, and negative information impacted 
perceptions of transparency in Study 3 only.   
At its core, transparency means that a firm is perceived to be open and forthright 
with stakeholders.  This dissertation shows that stakeholders reward firms for being 
transparent; and those rewards come in the form of decreased skepticism and increased 
favorable attitudes toward the firm, trust, and purchase intention.  Managers can focus on 
increasing perceptions of transparency by providing stakeholders with opportunities for 
mutual conversations, by making it easy for stakeholders to learn about the company and 
its offerings, and by sharing more negative information about itself.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past two decades consumers have become increasingly skeptical and “on 
guard” against firms’ persuasion attempts (Darke & Ritchie, 2007).  This phenomenon 
has been recognized in marketing literature.  For example, an influential model in the 
marketing literature, Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM) (Friestad & Wright, 1994), 
has consumer skepticism as a key concept and is based on the idea that consumers have 
theories about a firm’s persuasion attempts.  The Reputation Institute (2009) also 
indicates that consumers are increasingly unwilling to give firms the benefit of the doubt.  
Companies like Enron, WorldCom, Andersen Consulting, Xerox, and others that have 
had a lack of openness and forthrightness with stakeholders have even further increased 
consumer skepticism and decreased consumer confidence that firms operate within the 
constraints of social and ethical norms (Hein, 2002).  Instead, consumers are increasingly 
skeptical and distrustful of business practices in general and of advertising in particular 
(Darke & Ritchie, 2007).  This dissertation explores the role of transparency in reducing 
levels of consumer skepticism and influencing marketplace behaviors.  Transparency is 
defined here as:  
the extent to which a stakeholder perceives a firm’s conduct is open and 
forthright regarding matters relevant to the stakeholder. 
 
In an environment in which consumers are on guard against persuasion attempts, 
it is necessary to better understand different approaches to reducing consumer skepticism.  
The approach-avoidance model (Knowles & Linn, 2004) of persuasion implies there are 
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two ways that firms can create change with the target of persuasion.  The approach or 
Alpha strategy creates change by overt tactics such as increasing the attractiveness of the 
offer to the target of persuasion, for example, by providing extra incentives (such as 
limited time offers). However, these strategies can be ineffective when consumers are 
aware of them because they may use their persuasion knowledge to avoid such persuasive 
tactics (Campbell & Kirmani, 2008).  Covert marketing (such as advertorials and product 
placements) is another example of Alpha strategies in which the attractiveness of the 
offer is increased by concealing the persuasion effort altogether.  However, covert Alpha 
strategies have obvious legal implications including ramifications from the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC).  Ultimately, both overt and covert marketing tactics may only further 
increase consumer skepticism and decrease trust. 
An alternate solution is that firms can take into account consumer skepticism in 
their persuasion attempts instead of trying to overtly or covertly get around it.  One way 
that firms can do this is through Omega strategies. Omega strategies decrease resistance 
and increase receptivity toward the persuasive message (Knowles & Linn, 2004).  Omega 
strategies include such tactics as removing resistance and skepticism to the message, and 
redefining the relationship as a dyadic, cooperative interaction and conversation rather 
than a one-way persuasive message.  This dissertation presents transparency, in which 
firms are upfront with and revealing of themselves to stakeholders, as a key Omega 
strategy to increase persuasiveness of their marketing messages and to decrease consumer 
skepticism of overt persuasion attempts. 
Practitioners and managers seem to agree that, in general, consumers tend to be 
skeptical of overt persuasion attempts.  This can be seen by the large amounts of 
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academic research into covert marketing (Ashley & Leonard, 2009; Wei, Fischer, & 
Main, 2008) in which marketers try to get around consumer skepticism by hiding 
persuasion attempts, and also by the prevalence of these tactics in the marketplace 
(Kaikati & Kaikati, 2004).  However, these types of techniques seem to be perceived as 
underhanded and tend to backfire unexpectedly (Kaikati & Kaikati, 2004) causing a 
decrease in: brand trust (Ashley & Leonard, 2009), brand commitment (Ashley & 
Leonard, 2009), emotional attachment (Ashley & Leonard, 2009), attitude toward the 
brand (Cowley & Barron, 2008; Wei et al., 2008), and purchase intention (Ashley & 
Leonard, 2009). As a result, it is necessary to explore alternate marketing approaches to 
reducing consumer skepticism which are ultimately more favorable to the firm.  An 
alternative to covert marketing is firm transparency.   
In this thesis, the construct of transparency is introduced as a potentially 
important key antecedent to reducing consumer skepticism.  According to the literature 
stream grounded in the Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM; Friestad & Wright, 1994), 
when persuasion attempts of a firm are salient to the consumer, the consumer reacts with 
resistance, or coping behaviors of which consumer skepticism is one type. From an 
academic standpoint, transparency is an important area to study because it extends the 
PKM (Friestad & Wright, 1994) beyond explaining what causes consumer persuasion 
knowledge to become salient (Campbell & Kirmani, 2000)  and how consumers cope 
with persuasion attempts (Kirmani, Campbell, & Iacobucci, 2004), to better 
understanding how firms can reduce coping behaviors such as consumer skepticism.  
Academically, this dissertation also addresses the call by Darke and Ritchie (2007) to 
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develop a strategy for dealing with distrustful consumers in the marketplace by 
presenting transparency as one means to reduce consumer skepticism. 
From a practical standpoint, transparency is an important area to study because it 
has the potential to change the way consumers perceive marketers and their persuasion 
attempts.  Firms will not fully benefit from marketing efforts until firms improve their 
reputation from antagonistic to cooperative.  The implication of this change is that it can 
begin to change the naïve theories that consumers have about firm behavior in the 
marketplace.   
When Transparency May be Especially Important 
Based on this author’s suppositions, it is suggested here that transparency may be 
especially beneficial to firms under several different circumstances: when industry 
transparency is low, when the firm is managing corporate reputation crisis events, for 
products in which quality assessments are difficult, when all brands in the product 
category are viewed by consumers as being similar on important attributes, and when 
there is minimal information to form judgments.  Following is a discussion of each of 
these five circumstances. 
 
When Industry Transparency is Low 
It is surmised that when consumers perceive an entire industry to be lacking in 
transparency then this perception will translate to individual firms as well, especially 
when consumers have little experience interacting with the firm. Similarly, findings by 
Darke and Ritchie (2007) found that one advertiser’s credibility can be affected simply 
when consumers are distrustful of other advertisers (Darke & Ritchie, 2007).   Hence, 
perceptions of an industry as a whole may be used as input in developing trait inferences 
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for and attitudes toward individual firms. Currently, industries plagued with a lack of 
transparency and consumer distrust certainly include the financial and automobile 
industries and the public sector.  Other industries that may be perceived as lacking 
transparency based on past transgressions, unethical behaviors, crisis cover-ups, and 
general closed-door operations, include the pharmaceutical, diamond, toy, bank, oil, and 
healthcare industries.  It is easy to see there are numerous industries that could benefit 
from increased perceived firm transparency. 
 
In Managing Corporate Reputation during Crisis Events 
Transparency may be especially important when a firm’s corporate reputation is 
at stake.  Sometimes events occur causing stakeholders to be more skeptical and further 
question a firm’s trustworthiness.  Such events, from a firm’s point of view, might be 
termed a ‘crisis’ event if the event causes stakeholders to strongly react to it.  Firms must 
respond to crisis events publicly in order to manage its corporate reputation.  A firm that 
either does not respond to a crisis or stalls in responding will probably be perceived as 
lacking openness and forthrightness.  Following are few examples of how firms and 
brands have reacted to their own crisis events and subsequent consumer reactions.  These 
examples illustrate that transparency may be especially important during a crisis situation 
in managing corporate reputation.  The first example is of the oil company, Exxon, whose 
drunken ship captain accidentally crashed his vessel dumping 10.8 million gallons of oil 
off the coast of Alaska causing extraordinary wildlife and ecological damage (Cutler, 
2008; Holusha, 1989).  It took Exxon’s CEO, Lawrence Rawl, six days to come out in 
front of the public and be open about the spill (Klara, 2010). The Exxon catastrophe, to 
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this day, is used as a public relations example of what not to do when managing crisis 
events (Holusha, 1989).  Although the public could have integrated other factors into its 
assessment of Exxon’s corporate reputation, practitioners seem to converge on the idea 
that a firm must quickly be open and forthright with the public in order to minimize 
damage to a firm’s corporate reputation (Cutler, 2008; Holusha, 1989; Klara, 2010); 
hence, transparency is required in the event of a crisis.   
Celebrity brands have crisis events too, like Martha Stewart with insider trading 
(Anonymous, 2002) and Tiger Woods with infidelity (Hendershot-Hurd, 2009).  Both of 
these celebrities engaged in a “no comment” strategy lacking transparency and 
subsequently potentially caused longer term negative effects to their corporate reputations 
as compared to had they engaged in immediate transparency.  According to an article in 
PR News magazine, had Stewart opened her records on day one, come clean and 
forthrightly answered questions from the media and investigators, chances are we 
wouldn’t have enough coverage to analyze (Anonymous, 2002).  In sum, crisis events 
may be best solved with transparency. 
 
For Product Categories that Make Quality Assessments Difficult 
It is proposed that transparency will be especially important to firms selling 
products or services in which consumers find it difficult to make quality assessments.  
Categorizing products as either hedonic or utilitarian provides a useful schema to predict 
when transparency is especially important.  It is proposed that transparency will be most 
beneficial to firms when products are seen as hedonic as compared to utilitarian.  The 
reason for this is because with hedonic products, benefits are more subjective and thus 
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may require consumers to make a quality assessment comparing benefits communicated 
by the firm to expectations that the actual benefits received will be the same as those 
communicated.  Additionally, it is suggested that in the absence of experience or capacity 
for cognitive processing, consumers may seek cues through the firm’s forthrightness and 
openness that the product or service actually delivers the promised benefits that the firm 
communicates.  Products that fit into this category may include luxury automobiles and 
watches, video games, MP3 players, and music CDs.  Most all services fall under this 
category as pre-consumption quality assessments are difficult to make due to the 
intangible nature of services.  Examples include fancy restaurant meals, travel packages, 
massages, and salon services to name just a few. 
 
When All Brands in the Product Category are viewed by Consumers as Being Similar 
on Important Attributes 
It is suggested that transparency may be especially important to a firm when 
consumers perceive the product as being undifferentiated from competing products, such 
as commodity goods.  All else being equal, consumers should want to buy from 
transparent companies rather than non-transparent ones.  When products are 
undifferentiated, then shifting from selling based on product attributes to firm attributes 
(i.e. transparency) may provide a competitive advantage. Firms can aim for perceived 
firm transparency at the level just slightly ahead of its competitors to gain a competitive 
advantage.   
 
When there is Minimal Information to Form Judgments 
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Finally, regarding the nature of a firm’s stakeholders, transparency may be 
especially important when there is minimal information to form judgments.  In the 
absence of knowledge about the firm’s products, consumers may look for any favorable 
cue about the product or firm in forming evaluations, of which transparency is one.  
Consumers may also look for cues that the firm will be open and forthright past the first 
few initial encounters. 
Scope of Transparency 
It is not the contention of this dissertation that firms should be completely 
transparent.  That is neither practical for firms, nor is it demanded by consumers.  An 
assumption of this dissertation is that consumers are reasonable with regard to how much 
transparency is required by firms.  For example, firms may be expected to be closed with 
regard to information that might breach security, safety, or confidentiality of its 
stakeholders including employees, investors, and customers.  In some circumstances, it 
may also be reasonable to expect a firm to be closed when its competitive advantage is at 
risk by being transparent.  For example, internal operations processes that cut operating 
expenses, such as supply chain efficiencies, may provide a competitive advantage and 
thus consumers may feel that this lack of transparency is acceptable.  Patents also provide 
a competitive advantage, such as the Coke formula, and thus may be overlooked by 
consumers in evaluating firm transparency.   
It is also important to emphasize that this dissertation focuses on transparency 
from the consumer perspective rather than transparency from the firm perspective.  
Therefore what is within the scope of this dissertation is investigating antecedents and 
consequences of consumer perceptions of firm transparency.  What is outside the scope is 
investigating transparency from the firm’s perspective such as antecedents that may lead 
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to a firm increasing its transparency behaviors.  Investigating transparency from the firm 
perspective would be an interesting extension of this dissertation as future research. 
 
Research questions and objectives 
To explore transparency in the context of reducing consumer skepticism, this 
dissertation will address the following research questions:  
1. What do consumers’ perceive as transparency?  
2. What are the consequences to the firm associated with consumers’ levels 
of perceived transparency?   
3. What is the process by which transparency impacts important marketing 
constructs such as consumer skepticism, perceived trustworthiness, 
attitude toward the firm, and purchase intention? 
This dissertation includes the following specific objectives: 
1. To define transparency, establish its scope, and clearly delineate how it 
is different from other similar constructs. 
2. To develop a measure of transparency and establish its psychometric 
properties including convergent and discriminant validities. 
3. To empirically test the impact of transparency, perceptions on 
consumer skepticism and other important marketing constructs such as 
perceived trustworthiness, attitude toward the firm, and purchase 
intention. 
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Organization of Dissertation 
Chapter 2 provides a background of transparency research in various contexts 
including business-to-business, business-to-consumer, and business-to-supplier. Because 
little research for this construct exists in the marketing domain, the literature review is 
drawn from six other domains including accounting, information technology/information 
systems, political science, management, and communications.  The resulting work from 
chapter 2 is a list of emerging themes in the academic and practitioner literature which 
for defining, conceptualizing, or referring to transparency.    Chapter 2 also discusses 
constructs and concepts that are related to, but distinct from, transparency.  Chapter 3 
includes a review of the qualitative research that was conducted in order to validate the 
themes of transparency.  The resulting work from chapter 3 is a final definition of 
transparency from which a conceptual framework of transparency is developed. Chapter 
4 proposes a framework of transparency and conceptualizes the process by which 
transparency impacts important marketing constructs.  Chapter 5 discusses the process for 
developing the final transparency scale. Chapter 6 tests the proposed hypotheses in the 
theoretical model.  Chapter 7 provides a general discussion, managerial implications, 
limitations, and suggestions for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There are several objectives for this chapter.  The first objective is to provide the 
reader with a background on the concept of transparency. Although this construct has 
been touched on in marketing literature, it has not yet been explicitly defined, and thus, 
this dissertation will draw from literature streams such as finance, accounting, 
information technology, political science, management, public health, and 
communications to provide a more thorough review of this construct.  A summary of the 
literature is provided in Table 1.  The next objective for this chapter is to determine the 
emerging themes from academic and practitioner literature.  A summary of the major 
themes is provided in Table 2.  The third objective is to clarify what makes this construct 
different from other existing constructs and a summary is provided in Table 3.  
Constructs will be identified which are similar to transparency and this dissertation will 
delineate their similarities and differences.  Resulting from this work is some insight as to 
potential antecedents and consequences of transparency suggested by existing literature 
and the author’s own qualitative research. 
Transparency Definitions 
According to Webster’s Dictionary, transparency is a quality of an entity which 
allows light to pass through it (House, 1998b).  It has been only in about the last few 
years that the term “transparency” has become a buzz word used by consumers, critics, 
practitioners, academics, government officials, and non-government watch-dog 
organizations in the context of describing organizations.  However, what is meant by 
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“transparency” is often inconsistent, sometimes vague, and mostly confused with other 
constructs such as disclosure and honesty; the academic literature is no different.   
According to the guidelines for creating good construct definitions as set forth by 
MacKenzie (2003), a good definition includes specifying the construct’s conceptual 
theme in unambiguous terms such that it is clearly distinguishable from other constructs 
(MacKenzie, 2003).  Specifically, a good definition ought to start with the construct name 
followed by “is” and then the definition or description, such as “transparency is…”.  
However, a review of the transparency literature reveals that most conceptualized 
definitions of transparency replace “is” with “referred to” or “achieved by” which either 
does not provide a concrete, rigorous definition or defines the construct in terms of its 
antecedents.  Additionally, most authors (Eggert & Helm, 2003; Hofstede, 2003; 
Hultman & Axelsson, 2007) conceptualize transparency in terms of information 
exchanged or provided to the public, which is not transparency but rather disclosure.  To 
disclose is to make known or public (House, 1998a).  In spite of the literature’s short-
comings in rigorously defining transparency, it provides some insight, none-the-less, into 
what might be important definitional elements of consumer perceptions of transparency. 
Unless noted otherwise, the transparency literature discussed in this chapter is 
theoretical, and thus we are left without measured scale items for this concept. In a few 
cases, which will be pointed out in the literature review, authors have attempted to 
empirically measure a construct which they’ve called “transparency”, however, either 
their conceptualization differs from the one presented here or the definition and 
measurement of the construct does not hold up to Mackenzie’s (2003) guidelines for 
proper construct definition and measurement.   
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Article Selection 
Articles were found by searching the term “transparency” in Google Scholar, 
ABI/Inform and ProQuest databases.  Transparency had to be a major topic of discussion 
in the article in order for it to be included in the coding procedure.  This resulted in 
approximately 39 articles from both academic and practitioner literature and from 
marketing, finance, accounting, information technology, political science, management, 
public health, and communications fields.  Transparency definitions presented in each 
article were then coded into categorical themes.  Some articles included multiple 
definitions or descriptions of transparency which yielded 48 definitions that were coded 
into themes.  Table 1 provides a summary of the transparency literature discussed in this 
section.   
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
 
Table 1: Summary of Literature 
Author (Year) Study 
Type 
Context Objective Main Contribution Transparency Description 
Marketing Academic Literature 
Murphy, Laczniak, 
and Wood (2007) 
 
Conceptual paper 
Ethics in 
Relationship 
Marketing 
Discusses relationship 
marketing from a virtue 
ethics perspective.  
Transparency is seen as an 
overarching virtue that is 
essential/needed at all stages of 
relationship marketing. 
Transparency described in terms of 
openness and clarity of 
communications. 
Lazarus and 
McManus (2006) 
Management of 
customer 
relationships 
Explores transparency as 
an approach in the 
management of 
organizations and 
customer relationships. 
Transparency is needed to: create in-
depth relationships, for product 
innovation, and to create a sense of 
trustworthiness 
 Transparency is defined in terms 
of  1) openness, candor, free flow 
of information and 2) dialogue with 
stakeholders. 
Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy (2004) 
 
Conceptual 
Co-creation of 
value  
Explores the concept of 
value and co-creation 
based on interaction 
between firm and 
consumer. 
Consumers create value through their 
experiences with the firm; 
transparency is key element necessary 
when interacting with consumers; 
consumers create value through their 
experiences with the firm.  
Transparency is providing access to 
information. 
Eggert and Helm 
(2003) 
 
Empirical 
B2B buyer/ 
supplier 
Introduces relationship 
transparency to the 
buyer/supplier literature 
and investigates its 
impact on business 
relationships.  
Vendor transparency delivers value to 
the customer, increases customer 
satisfaction, and ultimately leads to 
favorable behavioral intentions. 
Transparency is an individual's 
subjective perception of being 
informed about the relevant actions 
and properties of the other party in 
the interaction. 
Hultman and 
Axelsson (2007) 
 
Case Study 
B2B buyer/ 
supplier 
Explores the concept of 
transparency 
Transparency can vary based on a 
firm's level of disclosing 
technological, organizational, supply, 
and cost/pricing information. 
Transparency is defined in terms of 
"the ability to 'see through' and to 
share information that is not usually 
shared between two businesses. 
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Author (Year) Study 
Type 
Context Objective Main Contribution Transparency Description 
Hofstede (2003) 
 
Conceptual Paper 
Supply chain Defines transparency  A prerequisite to transparency is 
knowing what information 
stakeholders need and providing it in a 
way so the meaning is understood. 
Transparency of net chain is the 
extent to which all the net chain's 
stakeholders have a shared 
understanding of, and access to, the 
product-related information that 
they request, without loss, noise, 
delay, and distortion. 
van Dijk, Duysters, 
and Beulens (2003) 
 
Conceptual working 
paper 
Supply chain Conceptualizes 
transparency from a 
strategic alliance 
perspective 
Transparency is subjective from the 
point of view of the observer; an 
observer’s perceived transparency of 
the system can be influenced by the 
degree to which access to information 
and a learning opportunity is provided 
by the system to the observer; 
Transparency will be perceived as low 
when: 1) the observer has not defined 
what s/he is interested in learning 
about, 2) the system isn't able or 
willing to provide the requested 
information, or 3) the information 
provided isn't what was requested 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transparency is the extent to which 
properties of a system are 
observable to the observer.  
(table 1 continued) 
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Author (Year) Study 
Type 
Context Objective Main Contribution Transparency Description 
Marketing Practitioner Literature 
McKay (2008) 
 
Trade magazine 
article 
CRM (Data 
management) 
Explores the concept of 
transparency from both 
CRM philosophy and 
CRM data management 
systems perspectives 
Transparency is showing information 
to customers in a convenient manner 
and the focus should be on 
information that the customer wants. 
The author proposes transparency is 
"behind" loyalty, retention, and 
customer devotion, but it doesn't 
guarantee trust.  CRM systems should 
integrate all customer data so any 
contact employee has the ability to see 
customer interactions with the firm. 
Transparency is letting customers 
know what's happening. 
Blackshaw (2008) 
 
Trade magazine 
article 
Branding Discusses six drivers of 
brand credibility 
including trust, 
authenticity, 
transparency, listening, 
responsiveness, and 
affirmation. 
Transparent brands are those which 
much (or at least the most relevant) 
information and data are known about 
it. 
Transparency described as 
openness and visibility: "let the sun 
shine in", "easy to learn", "easy to 
discover", "no secrets".   
AMA (2010) 
 
Ethics guidelines 
Marketing Provides ethical 
guidelines to marketers. 
Marketers can be more transparent by: 
communicating clearly, accepting 
constructive criticism, explaining and 
acting on significant product or 
service risks, and disclosing pricing 
and terms. 
Transparency involves creating a 
spirit of openness. 
WOMMA (2010) 
 
Ethics guidelines 
Marketing Provides ethical 
guidelines to word of 
mouth marketers. 
WOM marketers can be more 
transparent by: saying on whose 
behalf you're speaking, saying what 
you truly believe, and saying who you 
are/never falsifying your identity. 
Transparency is related to honesty 
and forthrightness. 
(table 1 continued) 
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Author (Year) Study 
Type 
Context Objective Main Contribution Transparency Description 
CI (2006) 
 
Report 
Marketing Investigates the level of 
transparency in the 
pharmaceutical industry 
With regard to pharmaceutical 
companies being open about their 
marketing practices, CI notes that this 
industry lacks transparency. 
Transparency is related to 
forthrightness and openness. 
Accounting & Finance (Business Reporting) Academic Literature 
Nielsen (2004) 
 
Conceptual working 
paper 
Business 
reporting 
Compares types of 
information reported in 
9 different business 
reporting models 
Transparency is not only merely 
disclosing an infinite amount of 
information but also it must be  
relevant. Two categories of 
information represented in business 
reporting models: mandated (i.e. 
financial data) and voluntary (i.e. 
intellectual capital, sustainability). 
Transparency is an outcome of 
internal and external stakeholders' 
agreements on interpretations of the 
company. 
Nielsen (2005) 
 
Conceptual working 
paper 
Business 
reporting 
Develops the concept of 
voluntary disclosure and 
its relationship to 
transparency and user 
uncertainty. 
 Transparency may be reduced with 
voluntary disclosure; voluntary 
disclosure introduces uncertainties 
and lack of understanding because: 
lack of standardization, and thus 
comparability of information; lack of 
time to analyze the information; lack 
of frames from which to analyze the 
info; lack of interest in these types of 
information; and lack of correct form 
on which the information is conveyed.  
however, it's a paradox in that the 
capital market craves more 
information yet they seemingly don't 
know how to interpret it. 
Transparency is an outcome of 
internal and external stakeholders' 
agreements on interpretations of the 
company. 
(table 1 continued) 
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Author (Year) Study 
Type 
Context Objective Main Contribution Transparency Description 
Nielsen and Madsen 
(2009) 
 
Critical perspective 
Business 
reporting 
 Discusses transparency 
in terms of two prevalent 
information disclosure 
methods: disclose as 
much as possible versus 
disclose only the "right" 
information. 
 The author argues that reporting only 
the "right" information will lead to 
greater transparency because users' 
are constrained by bounded rationality 
and time and suggests the disclose-as- 
much-as-possible method hinders 
information processing.   
Transparency is a means of 
achieving mutual understanding.  
Transparency is an outcome of 
internal and external stakeholders' 
agreements on interpretations of the 
company. 
Accounting & Finance (Business Reporting) Practitioner Literature 
Bainbridge (2009) 
 
Practitioner literature 
Business 
reporting 
Reviews the GRI 
reporting framework as 
a means of achieving 
transparency in 
sustainability reporting. 
More complete reporting encourages 
positive sustainability effort behaviors 
from the firm and enables all 
stakeholders to make more informed 
choices. 
The goal of transparency should be 
to make costs, benefits, values, and 
risks as clear as possible. 
GRI (2009) 
 
Non-government 
organization reporting 
guidelines 
Business 
reporting 
 Provide a framework 
for companies outlining 
for what, how and when 
to disclose sustainability 
information. 
A report is high in transparency when 
it is complete, relevant, accurate, 
neutral, comparable, clear, timely, and 
formatted and in a language 
understandable to stakeholders. 
Transparency is “the complete 
disclosure of information on the 
topics and Indicators required to 
reflect impacts and enable 
stakeholders to make decisions, and 
the processes, procedures, and 
assumptions used to prepare those 
disclosures". 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(table 1 continued) 
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Author (Year) Study 
Type 
Context Objective Main Contribution Transparency Description 
Information Technology Academic Literature 
Santana and Wood 
(2009) 
 
Conceptual 
Information 
Technology 
Reviews transparency in 
the context of 
Wikipedia's writing and 
editing processes. 
Author relates transparency to 
capitalist economics which require 
marketplace actors have full and 
accurate information available from 
which to base their decisions; 
withholding information causes power 
asymmetry. 
Full transparency requires 
information providers are credible 
and legitimate, information itself is 
fairly represented and verifiable, 
and the information providers are 
held accountable for the 
information they distribute. 
Vaccaro (2006) 
 
Conceptual book 
chapter 
Information 
Technology 
Discusses three ethical 
perspectives (security, 
privacy, and 
transparency) that 
should be taken into 
consideration when 
adopting information 
technology platforms as 
communication methods 
with employees and 
customers. 
Adopting  and using information 
technology platforms as 
communication methods with 
employees and customers should take 
into consideration ethical perspectives 
including level of security of personal 
data required, level of privacy of the 
users required, and what and how 
much detailed information about 
internal activities should be made 
available on the system (transparency) 
without sacrificing the firm's market 
position.  
Transparency is the degree of 
completeness of information 
regarding a firm's own business 
activities provided to the market.  
Transparency is sharing every kind 
of information concerning its 
business activities requested by 
society; opaque (the opposite of 
transparent) firms do not disclose 
any kind of information other than 
that required by law. 
Vaccaro and Madsen 
(2009a) 
 
Conceptual/qualitative 
Information 
Technology 
Discusses the forces that 
affect a firm's 
information 
transparency. 
A firm's level of transparency depends 
on: 1) customer demand for 
transparency, 2) nature of 
competition, 3) pressure of investors 
for transparency, and 4) ethical 
pressures. 
See Vaccarro (2006) 
(table 1 continued) 
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Author (Year) Study 
Type 
Context Objective Main Contribution Transparency Description 
Vaccaro and Madsen 
(2009b) 
 
Conceptual 
Information 
Technology 
Discusses different types 
of transparency (static 
and dynamic) and argues 
that dynamic 
transparency is an 
ethical standard of 
which firms should 
strive. 
The conceptualization of transparency 
as unidirectional telling of 
standardized reporting information 
does not satisfy the ethical obligation 
of companies to share information that 
stakeholders need to assess if the 
product/service will have 
consequences on his/her life.  
Dynamic transparency leads to the 
receipt of more complete information 
by customers; however, firms can 
overload information causing "data 
asphyxia" rather than greater 
transparency; quality and relevance of 
data more important than quantity.  
Authors suggest transparency is the 
necessary ingredient for the 
development of trustworthy and 
accountable institutions.  Dynamic 
transparency is bilateral sharing of 
information contrasted with static 
transparency which is one-way 
telling of information. 
Political Science Academic Literature 
Florini (2007) 
 
Book chapter 
Politics Defines transparency 
and discusses the idea 
that publicly useful 
information is generally 
underprovided. 
The holders of information often have 
incentives to keep information secret; 
transparency contributes to 
overcoming the agency problem 
brought by information asymmetry; 
one reason to be secret is to guard 
against being accused of making a 
mistake. 
Transparency is the degree to 
which information is available to 
outsiders that enables them to have 
informed voice in decisions and/or 
to assess the decisions made by 
insiders. 
(table 1 continued) 
 21 
 
Author (Year) Study 
Type 
Context Objective Main Contribution Transparency Description 
Gupta (2008) 
 
Conceptual 
  Argues that stakeholders 
should not focus on 
transparency processes 
to assess transparency of 
a government/ 
organization but rather 
transparency outcomes. 
Author suggests using comparative 
analysis to scrutinize transparency 
efforts of an organization such as: 1) 
who discloses, 2) to whom is the info 
disclosed, 3) what is disclosed, 4) to 
meet what ends, 5) is it voluntary or 
mandatory, 6) is it standardized or 
non-standardized  
Transparency is seen as 
operationalized by information 
disclosure. 
Political Science Practitioner Literature 
Transparency 
International 
 
Reporting Guidelines 
Politics Transparency 
International is a 
nonprofit organization 
with the mission of 
reducing corruption in 
government. 
Developed a tool to measure 
transparency and improve 
accountability by governments and 
non-government organizations.  The 
measures are reflected in terms of 
properties of the information 
disclosed. 
Transparency is a principle that 
allows those affected by 
administrative decisions, business 
transactions or charitable work to 
know not only the basic facts and 
figures but also the mechanisms 
and processes. 
Management Academic Literature 
Hebb (2006) 
 
Case study 
Management Discusses the California 
Public Employees 
Retirement System's 
(CalPERS) efforts to 
make sure companies in 
the portfolio are 
transparent. 
Transparency is important for 
stakeholders to judge in whose best 
interest a firm is run; secrecy distorts 
the decision-making process; based on 
case study of CalPERS, negative 
capital market performance is more 
acceptable to stakeholders when 
accompanied by high transparency as 
compared to low. 
Transparency is about the 
availability of information to all the 
actors within the firm, principals, 
agents and stakeholders alike. 
(table 1 continued) 
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Author (Year) Study 
Type 
Context Objective Main Contribution Transparency Description 
Welch and Rotberg 
(2006) 
 
Conceptual 
Management Discusses negative 
consequences of 
transparency on 
management behaviors. 
Management may act to reduce risk if 
transparency is a policy so as not to be 
blamed for bad decisions, as such  
they could become more risk averse 
resulting in less innovativeness for the 
firm. 
Transparency described as “open 
and notorious” achieved by full 
disclosure. 
Pirson and Malhotra 
(2007, 2008) 
 
Empirical 
Management Investigates various 
firm-level behavioral 
factors as possible 
antecedents to 
stakeholder trust. 
Transparency is not an antecedent of 
trust for any stakeholder type 
including clients, suppliers, 
employees, and investors after 
controlling for other firm-level factors 
(integrity, benevolence, and 
competence).  Transparency may be 
important when assessments of 
integrity, benevolence and 
competence are unable to be made. 
 
 
Scale items used to measure 
transparency  imply transparency is 
perceived as high by stakeholders 
when a firm explains decisions, 
says if something goes wrong, and 
openly shares all relevant 
information. 
Management Practitioner Literature 
Higgins (2005) 
 
Industry magazine 
interview 
Management Herb Baum, president 
and CEO of Dial is 
interviewed in this 
article.   
Baum was able to turn around an 
underperforming company by 
managing the company with a 
leadership style he calls transparency. 
Transparency described as always 
telling the truth, being honest and 
open about how you run your life 
and business, and fessing up when 
you make mistakes. 
 
 
Bryant (2010) 
 
Popular press 
newspaper interview 
  
Management Vineet Nayar, CEO of 
HCL Technologies is 
interviewed in this 
article. 
Transparency in Nayar's organization 
has led to a culture of trust and 
honesty.  Nayar creates transparency 
by posting all employee performance 
reviews on the company’s internal 
website for all to see.  
Transparency is being completely 
open. 
(table 1 continued) 
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Author (Year) Study 
Type 
Context Objective Main Contribution Transparency Description 
Public Health Academic Literature 
O'Malley and 
Thompson (2009) 
 
Conceptual 
Public health Describes transparency 
and provides guidelines 
for determining whether 
or not certain 
information should be 
released by an 
organization. 
Information should be provided to 
stakeholders if: 1) the information is 
needed by stakeholders to avoid injury 
or risk,  2) the information is relevant 
to a decision-making process and 3)  
there no compelling reason to 
withhold or modify the information.   
An outcome of transparency is that 
people are informed in an accurate, 
accessible, and timely manner and 2) 
stakeholders are given timely access 
to the evidence and assumptions used 
to inform management planning, 
policy and control decisions, and info 
about decision-making processes and 
outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transparency is related to quality 
of information such that 
information needed should be 
factually accurate, easily 
understood by the intended 
audience and presented in a manner 
that promotes adoption of the 
desired behaviors.  Transparency is 
also related to the building of trust 
between the organization and 
consumers such that by being 
forthcoming and open on all 
aspects (of the emergency) trust 
should be facilitated. 
Communications Academic Literature 
(table 1 continued) 
(table 1 continued) 
 24 
 
Author (Year) Study 
Type 
Context Objective Main Contribution Transparency Description 
Plaisance (2007) 
 
Conceptual 
Mass Media 
Ethics 
Discusses transparency 
as the essence of ethical 
behavior. 
Transparency is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for trust.  One 
can increase transparency but still 
provide half-truths; all deceptions lack 
the element of transparency and lack 
of transparency is a prerequisite for all 
deceptive acts.   
Transparency is truthful 
forthrightness and proactive 
information disclosure. 
Baker (2008) 
 
Conceptual 
Public Relations Grounded in the context 
of ethics, public 
relations and advertising 
practitioners are 
discussed as being either 
Principled Advocates or 
Pathological Partisans. 
The Principled Advocate represents 
the advocacy virtues of humility, 
truth, transparency, respect, care, 
authenticity, equity, and social 
responsibility. The Pathological 
Partisan represents the opposing vices 
of arrogance, deceit, secrecy, 
manipulation, disregard, artifice, 
injustice, and raw self-interest. 
Secrecy is the opposite of 
transparency and it involves 
unjustified concealment, hiding, 
silence, suppression, furtiveness, and 
covertness. 
Transparency is openness which 
results in meeting others’ 
“reasonable requirements for 
information”.  The opposite of 
transparency is secrecy.  
Allen (2008) 
 
Conceptual 
Journalism Discusses why 
transparency as a goal 
for reporters is 
important. 
Transparency functions as a system of 
accountability and as a way of 
increasing legitimacy with citizens.   
Transparency is defined as making 
public the traditionally private 
factors that influence creation of 
the news. 
(table 1 continued) 
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Author (Year) Study 
Type 
Context Objective Main Contribution Transparency Description 
Rawlins (2008) 
 
Empirical 
Public Relations  Investigates the 
relationship between 
transparency efforts and 
trust in the context of 
employee-employer 
relationships. 
 Two dimensions of transparency 
efforts, providing substantial/quality 
information and holding itself 
accountable, explain .55 of the 
variance when regressed on trust.   
Transparency is the deliberate 
attempt to make available all 
legally releasable information - 
whether positive or negative in 
nature - in a manner that is 
accurate, timely, balanced, and 
unequivocal, for the purpose of 
enhancing the reasoning ability of 
publics and holding organizations 
accountable for their actions, 
policies, and practices. 
Rawlins (2009) 
 
Empirical 
Public Relations Develops two scales to 
measure stakeholder 
perceptions of 
organizational 
transparency. 
Transparency is measured based on 
firm traits such that stakeholders 
perceive a firm as highly transparent 
when the firm has a reputation for 
integrity, respect, and communication 
openness.  Transparency is also 
measured based on firm efforts such 
that stakeholders perceive a firm as 
highly transparent when the firm 
participates in two-way 
communication, provides 
substantial/quality information, holds 
itself accountable, and is not secretive 
with regard to the information it 
discloses. 
See Rawlins (2008) 
(table 1 continued) 
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Author (Year) Study 
Type 
Context Objective Main Contribution Transparency Description 
Christensen (2002) 
 
Conceptual 
Corporate 
communications 
Discusses transparency 
as a condition and a 
strategy for corporate 
communications. 
Transparency should be viewed as a 
condition of communicating with 
stakeholders in the current business 
environment because stakeholders 
expect unrestricted access to 
information and corporate 
accountability.  Transparency can also 
be a strategy in which firms 
strategically decide which information 
to provide in order to appeal to certain 
stakeholders.  The strategic approach 
is more logical given stakeholders are 
only looking for a minimum level of 
information to reduce uncertainty. 
Transparency is related to 
providing quality information (clear 
and insightful) rather than quantity.  
Transparency should be 
investigated from the stakeholder's 
perspective. 
van Woerkum and 
Aarts (2009) 
 
Conceptual 
Public Relations Discusses the need for 
organizations to provide 
visual transparency as a 
part of communicating 
with stakeholders. 
Visual transparency is especially 
important at early stages of orientation 
and when an abundance of 
information is available.  If the 
stakeholder's information requirement 
is ill-defined then visuals should be 
symbolic whereas when stakeholder's 
information requirement is well-
defined, then visuals should be iconic 
and resemble reality. 
Visual transparency is about 
organizations opening their doors 
to show how their goods are 
produced.  Transparency is about 
sharing what is not usually known. 
 
(table 1 continued) 
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Marketing Literature 
 
Few authors have investigated transparency in the B2C context in the marketing 
literature.  For both the B2C and B2B contexts, the major consensus of the authors with 
regard to transparency is that it is important to developing and maintaining relationships 
with stakeholders of the firm.   
B2C Context.  Murphy et al. (2007) conceptualize transparency as 
communication and action that is open and clear and as the overarching virtue, or good 
habit that is essential at all stages of relationship marketing.  The authors suggest that 
firms must make their ethical virtues explicit to stakeholders in order for stakeholders to 
trust them.  Further, transparency is the key ingredient of relationship marketing, 
meaning relationships will not flourish without transparency (Murphy, Laczniak, & 
Wood, 2007).   
Organizations such as the American Marketing Association (AMA), the Word of 
Mouth Marketing Association (WOMMA), and Consumers International (CI) view 
transparency as an ethical value that marketers should embrace with its stakeholders.  The 
AMA notes on its website that transparency involves creating a “spirit of openness” 
(AMA, 2010).  AMA offers guidelines for what marketers can do to become more 
transparent which include communicating clearly, accepting constructive criticism, 
explaining and acting on significant product or service risks, and disclosing pricing and 
terms.  The AMA’s guidelines for transparency could be interpreted to mean that 
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transparency is a firm being open with its stakeholders, but openness here seems to 
include “accepting customer feedback” according to the AMA.   
Like the AMA, the WOMMA also views transparency as a core ethical value 
along with honesty noting that transparency is the core foundation of its code of ethics: 
“ethical word of mouth marketers always strive for transparency and honesty in all 
communications with consumers, with advocates, and with those people who advocates 
speak to on behalf of a product” (WOMMA, 2010).  Specifically, and brought about by 
covert marketing activities such as 1) Sony Erickson’s fake tourists, and 2) bloggers 
covertly writing about products for compensation, the WOMMA urges marketers to be 
more transparent by saying on whose behalf one is speaking, saying what one truly 
believes, and saying who one is/never falsifying your identity (WOMMA, 2010).   
Finally, Consumers International (CI), a global organization with 220 member 
organizations in 115 countries, acts to protect consumer rights which among them 
includes the right “to be given facts needed to make an informed choice and to be 
protected against dishonest or misleading advertising and labeling” (CI, 2010).  CI notes 
that there is a “staggering lack of transparency” in the pharmaceutical industry because 
“only two (firms) reported code of conduct violations publicly” suggesting that this 
industry should be more open to sharing information with the public and “only one (firm) 
provides their marketing code of conduct directly to consumers” suggesting firms need to 
be more proactive with sharing information.  CI provides suggestions for what 
information should be provided to consumers including marketing policies, codes of 
conduct for gift giving, marketing codes of conduct, and allocation of marketing budget.   
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Transparency is also seen as an important building block to the co-creation of 
value in the firm-customer dyad (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004).  The authors note that 
it is difficult for dialogue to occur without access and transparency to information which 
suggests that transparency may be an antecedent of customer-firm dialogue.  Although 
the authors provide no formal definition of their conceptualization of transparency, they 
suggest that transparency is about providing access to as much information as the 
customer needs.   
Tom McManus, a leading authority on transparency in business, also notes that 
transparency is important to business relationships.  MacManus defines transparency in 
terms of openness, candor, free flow of information, and dialogue with stakeholders.  
“Openness” and “candor” seem to be fairly consistent with other interpretations of 
transparency.  “Dialogue with stakeholders” has been previously suggested by Prahalad 
and Ramaswamy (2004) as an outcome of a firm’s transparent behaviors such that when a 
firm engages in transparent behaviors, this results in an environment conducive for two-
way dialogue.  “Free flow of information” may be more appropriate as an antecedent of 
transparency such that perceptions of transparency should increase when stakeholders 
perceive that firms allow information to flow freely to them.  Finally, trustworthiness was 
suggested as a consequence of transparency (Lazarus & McManus, 2006). 
B2B context.  With regard to B2B relationships, most of the transparency 
literature is couched in the context of relationships within the supply chain.  For example, 
Eggert and Helm (2003; pg. 103) define transparency in terms of relevance of 
information exchanged in the context of buyer-supplier relationships: “an individual’s 
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subjective perception of being informed about the relevant actions and properties of the 
other party in the interaction” (Eggert & Helm, 2003).  The authors’ scale items refer to 
how often relevant information is exchanged with the supplier, and how aware the buyer 
is of the supplier’s economic situation, organizational structure, and technical abilities.  
Eggert and Helm (2003) found that vendor transparency significantly predicted perceived 
customer value. 
Hultman and Axelsson (2007) also discuss transparency in terms of buyer-
supplier relationships. The authors suggest there are four types of transparency in buyer-
supplier relationships.  However, upon close examination of the literature, the authors 
really mean that there are four types of information for which if disclosure is increased, 
transparency may also increase.  These information types include technological, 
organizational, supply, and cost/price.  Hultman and Axelsson (2007) define 
transparency, stating it is the ability to ‘see-through’ and to share information that is 
usually not shared between two business partners (Hultman & Axelsson, 2007).  The 
authors also note that sharing of information need not be reciprocal and that it can be 
unidirectional or bidirectional.   
Another example of transparency discussed in the supply chain context is that of 
Hofstede (2003; page 18).  He defines transparency as the “extent to which all the 
netchain’s stakeholders have a shared understanding of, and access to, the product-related 
information that they request, without loss, noise, delay and distortion” (Hofstede, 2003).  
From this it seems that transparency allows all parties to see the same relevant 
information and/or firm behaviors and thus facilitates shared understanding.   
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Finally, van Dijk et al. (2003; page 6) define transparency broadly as “the extent 
to which properties of a system are observable to the observer” in which a ‘system’ refers 
to either a netchain, relationship, or partner within a supply chain  (van Dijk, Duysters, & 
Beulens, 2003).    The authors state that an observer’s perceptions of transparency of a 
system can be influenced by the degree to which access to information and a learning 
opportunity is provided by the system to the observer.  This description seems fairly 
consistent with others that conceptualize transparency as making things observable which 
leads to a shared understanding of meaning.   
The popular press literature also provides insight into the concept of transparency 
and its importance to customer relationship management.  Lauren McKay in Customer 
Relationship Management magazine (2008; page 26) states that transparency is “the root 
of the customer experience” (McKay, 2008) suggesting that without it, relationships will 
not flourish.  McKay (2008) notes that transparency is about letting customers know what 
is happening by providing relevant information in a manner that is convenient to retrieve.    
Pete Blackshaw (2008; page 52) in Marketing Management magazine also notes 
the importance of transparency in relationship management stating that customers often 
want to know the “brand behind the brand” which occurs through transparency 
(Blackshaw, 2008).  A firm can do this by being open and visible, by providing relevant 
information to customers, enlarging fine print, and making information clear and easy to 
read.  He states, “a corporation or brand is transparent if much (or at least the most 
relevant) information and data are known about it” and further conceptualizes a 
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transparent firm as one that “lets the sun shine in”, is “easy to learn and discover”, and 
has “no secrets” (pg. 52).   
 
Accounting and Finance (Business Reporting) Literature 
In business reporting literature, more often than not, literature with the term 
“transparency” in its title refers to information disclosure and business reporting.  With 
regard to business reporting of firms, Nielsen and colleagues (2004, 2005, 2009) define 
transparency as an outcome of stakeholders’ agreements on interpretations of the 
company, it is a mutual understanding, and that transparency should “invoke” the ability 
for stakeholders to compare information disclosed across time and countries (Nielsen, 
2004, 2005; Nielsen & Madsen, 2009).  The authors also note that transparency is not 
only merely disclosing information but that the information disclosed must be relevant.  
This suggests that transparency enables stakeholders to see into the firm.   
Nielsen and Madsen (2009) propose that not all information leads to transparency.  
They note there are two prevalent business reporting strategies which most firms employ 
that include 1) disclosing as much information as possible and 2) disclosing only the 
“right” information.  The authors suggest that while firms that disclose as much 
information as possible view this strategy as a “good thing” toward creating transparency, 
it actually is not a good strategy at all.  The authors address what is “right” information 
from the perspective of the firm by labeling it as that which is “comparable” and “linked 
to strategic intent of the company” (pg. 852).  They propose this type of disclosure will 
lead to greater transparency, because users are better able to process limited quantities of 
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information given time constraints.  This view of what information is “right” is from the 
firm’s perspective in that firms decide which information is right.  To bring Nielsen’s and 
Madsen’s (2009) “right” information constraint into the perspective of stakeholders, one 
might evaluate “right” information as that which stakeholders perceive is relevant.   
Bainbridge (2009) suggests the goal of transparency should be to make costs, 
benefits, values, and risks as clear as possible and he supports the GRI reporting 
framework as one means of doing so.  The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), a nonprofit 
organization that helps firms become more transparent, especially with regard to 
economic, environmental, and social performance reporting, defines transparency as “the 
complete disclosure of information on the topics and indicators required to reflect 
impacts and enable stakeholders to make decisions, and the processes, procedures, and 
assumptions used to prepare those disclosures” (GRI, 2006; pg. 6).  It seems the GRI not 
only considers providing stakeholders with relevant and complete information as a part of 
transparency but it also considers providing stakeholders with an understanding of how 
the information was derived as a part of transparency.  Additionally, the GRI provides a 
reporting framework of guidelines for what, how, and when information should be 
reported by firms in order to be more transparent, in essence suggesting antecedents of 
transparency.  With regard to what is reported, the GRI suggests disclosing information 
that is relevant and complete; with regard to the quality/reliability of the information 
reported, the GRI suggests disclosing information that is accurate, neutral, and 
comparable; and with regard to how and when information is reported, the GRI suggests 
disclosing information that is clear, timely, and in a format and language appropriate to 
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the intended audience (Bainbridge, 2009; GRI, 2006).  The GRI’s definition and 
framework for transparency is consistent with other conceptualizations in that 
transparency is about sharing relevant and complete information.  A new element which 
the GRI brings into the transparency definition is that transparency should allow 
stakeholders to understand the processes used to derive reported information.  Therefore, 
it’s not only important to disclose relevant and complete information but that it’s also 
necessary to disclose how the information was derived.   
 
 
Information Technology Literature 
The information technology literature stream tends to conceptualize transparency 
in terms of information exchange, and particularly with regard to how much information 
is exchanged.  For example, in the context of information and communication 
technologies (ICT) for businesses, and in particular Internet-based communication tools, 
transparency is viewed as the degree of completeness of information provided by each 
company to the market in terms of business activities (Vaccaro, 2006; Vaccaro & 
Madsen, 2006, 2009b).  A transparent company is one that “shares every kind of 
information concerning its business activities requested by society” (Vaccaro, 2006; pg. 
146) contrasted with an opaque firm at the other end of the transparency continuum 
described as one that discloses only the information required by law. This 
conceptualization of transparency seems to be similar to other conceptualizations in 
which authors view transparency in terms of information exchanged or provided to the 
 35 
 
public, and in which characteristics of disclosure (such as what, how, and when 
information is disclosed) are seen as the same thing as transparency (Eggert & Helm, 
2003; GRI, 2006; Hofstede, 2003; Hultman & Axelsson, 2007).  However, disclosure is 
more like a proxy or “signal” for transparency (DeKinder & Kohli, 2008) and thus an 
antecedent, rather than a true measure of transparency.   
In a follow-up paper, the authors (Vaccaro & Madsen, 2009a) discuss different 
types of transparency and argue that dynamic transparency is an ethical standard of which 
firms should strive. Dynamic transparency is bilateral sharing of information contrasted 
with static transparency which is one-way telling of information.  The authors note that 
the typical conceptualization of transparency in existing literature to this point, as 
unidirectional telling of standardized reporting information, does not satisfy the ethical 
obligation of companies to share information that stakeholders need to assess if the 
product/service will have consequences on his/her life.  They also suggest that while 
dynamic transparency may lead to the receipt of more complete information by 
customers, it may also lead to information overload causing "data asphyxia"(Vaccaro & 
Madsen, 2009a; Vaccaro & Madsen, 2007; pg. 121) rather than greater transparency thus 
quality and relevance of data is more important than quantity (Vaccaro & Madsen, 
2009a) . Finally, these authors suggest transparency is necessary for the development of 
trustworthy and accountable institutions.   
From a business-to-consumer perspective, Santana and Wood (2009) discuss 
transparency in reference to the online website, Wikipedia.  The authors note that, on the 
one hand, this site’s process transparency is high because its policies and processes for 
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becoming a contributor are clear and easily accessible, but yet on the other hand this 
site’s identity transparency and information transparency are low because contributors 
may remain anonymous by providing fictitious names and the information may not be 
fairly represented and verifiable.  The authors note that marketplace actors should have 
“full and accurate information available on which to base their decisions” (Santana & 
Wood, 2009); pg. 135) which has been suggested in other literature as well. 
Political Science Literature 
In the political science literature transparency is referred to as “enabling citizens 
to gather information on the policies and behavior of their governments” (Florini, 2007; 
pg. 5), and is closely intertwined with concepts of accountability, inclusiveness, 
legitimacy, democracy (Gupta, 2008), and governance-by-disclosure (Gupta, 2008; 
Mason, 2008).  Florini defines transparency as “the degree to which information is 
available to outsiders that enables them to have informed voice in decisions and/or to 
assess the decisions made by insiders” (pg. 5).  Arguing that publicly useful information 
is generally underprovided, she notes that holders of information often have incentives to 
keep information secret, such as to guard against being accused of making a mistake.  
Transparency, on the other hand, contributes to overcoming the agency problem brought 
by information asymmetry (Florini, 2007).  
Gupta (2008) suggests using comparative analysis to scrutinize transparency 
efforts of an organization such as: 1) who discloses, 2) to whom is the info disclosed, 3) 
what is disclosed, 4) to meet what ends, 5) is it voluntary or mandatory, and 6) is it 
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standardized or non-standardized.  This seems to be another example of an author 
describing transparency in terms of information disclosure. 
Transparency International, a nonprofit organization with the mission of reducing 
corruption in government, defines transparency on its website as “a principle that allows 
those affected by administrative decisions, business transactions or charitable work to 
know not only the basic facts and figures but also the mechanisms and processes” and 
further states, “It is the duty of civil servants, managers and trustees to act visibly, 
predictably and understandably” (Transparency, 2010). Transparency International, in 
conjunction with The Carter Center (chartered by former president, Jimmy Carter), 
developed a tool to measure transparency in response to the idea that hiding information 
about donations to political parties breeds corruption.  The measurement tool, CRINIS, 
meaning ray of light in Latin, communicates to governments and their constituents what 
can be done to improve transparency and accountability in political finance.  CRINIS 
measures transparency based on: 1) who has access to the financial data ranging from 
internal network to organization party to the public, 2) quality characteristics of the data 
including comprehensiveness, depth, and reliability, and 3) oversight mechanisms 
ranging from internal-only to independent public auditors.  Here, the CRINIS tool 
provides firms with ways they can improve transparency based on what, when, and how 
information is disclosed.  There is also the notion that stakeholders must also be able to 
see the processes used to generate information in order for firms to be transparent, which 
has been suggested in other literature (GRI, 2006).   
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Management Literature 
 With few exceptions, management academics and practitioners conceptualize 
transparency in terms of information disclosure. 
According to Hebb (2006; page 386), transparency is “fundamentally about the 
availability of information to all the actors within the firm, principals, agents and 
stakeholders alike” (Hebb, 2006).  In her article, she discusses the California Public 
Employees Retirement System's (CalPERS) efforts to make sure companies in the 
portfolio are transparent.  Hebb notes that CalPERS, a major pension fund administrator 
and management watch dog for poorly performing companies within its portfolio, keeps 
an eye on a firm’s transparency and performance levels and, in some cases, calls for more 
transparency from firms within its portfolio.  Based on her case study of CalPERS and 
the performance of companies in its porfolio, Hebb (2006) indicates that negative capital 
market performance seems to be more acceptable to stakeholders when accompanied by 
high transparency as compared to low.   
 Finally, Pirson and Maholtra (2007, 2008) conceptualize transparency in terms of 
to what degree a firm explains its decisions to stakeholders, admits wrongdoings, and 
openly shares all relevant information (Pirson & Malhotra, 2007, 2008) which is similar 
to that of  Welch and Rotberg’s (2006; pg. 938) description of transparency as “open and 
notorious” achieved by full disclosure (Welch & Rotberg, 2006).   
 The popular press and industry publications in recent years have also been 
publishing articles related to transparency.  For example, in an interview for Marketing 
Management magazine, Herb Baum, former president and CEO of Dial, a $1.3 billion 
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consumer goods company, and author of The Transparent Leader: How to Build a Great 
company Through Straight Talk, Openness, and Accountability, discusses how he 
transformed the failing company through transparency.  He sites that his leadership style 
is “transparency” which he defines as “always telling the truth, being honest and open 
about how you run your life and business, and fessing up when you make mistakes” 
(Higgins, 2005); pg. 15).   
CEO of HCL Technologies, Vineet Nayar, in The New York Times also discusses 
his management style as creating an organization that is completely open, which he calls 
transparency.  Nayar creates transparency by posting all employee performance reviews 
on the company’s internal website for all to see.  He notes that this has led to a culture of 
trust and honesty (Bryant, 2010).  Interestingly, whereas the former CEO of Dial sees 
honesty as a part of transparency, the CEO of HCL Technologies sees honesty as a 
consequence of transparency.   
Public Health Literature 
 In the context of communicating public health emergency information to the 
public, about such topics as disease and virus outbreaks, O’Malley et al. (2009), describe 
transparency and provides guidelines for public health officials to determine how much 
transparency is needed and whether or not certain information should be released by an 
organization.  Although they do not formally define transparency, O’Malley et al. suggest 
transparency is when an organization is “forthcoming and open on all aspects (of an 
emergency; pg. 616) which results in increased public trust in the organization.  They 
also note that transparency is related to the quality and timing of information dispersed.  
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More specifically, transparency not only means that organizations distribute information 
that is factually accurate and easily understood by the intended audience, but also that 
organizations provide stakeholders with that information in a timely manner.  The authors 
suggest that while “transparency suggests that all relevant information ought to be 
communicated or made accessible, it has to be recognized there may be legitimate 
reasons for withholding certain information” (pg. 616). Information should be provided 
to stakeholders if: 1) the information is needed by stakeholders to avoid injury or risk, 2) 
the information is relevant to a decision-making process and 3)  there is no compelling 
reason to withhold or modify the information, such as compromising security or 
confidentiality (O'Malley, Rainford, & Thompson, 2009).    
Communications Literature 
 Ethics seems to be a major context in which transparency is couched in the 
communications literature.  Plaissance (2007) argues for transparency in media ethics, 
defining transparency in terms of both a behavior and an attitude.  Regarding transparent 
behavior, he states (pg. 118) it is “conduct that presumes openness in communication and 
serves a reasonable expectation of forthright exchange when parties have a legitimate 
stake in the possible outcomes or effects of the communicative act” (Plaisance, 2007); he 
also calls this behavior as being “aboveboard”.  Regarding transparent attitude, 
Plaissance suggests firms are transparent when they take the attitude of “proactive moral 
engagement” when deception or omission could lead to lack of due diligence on the part 
of the stakeholder; he also calls this a general “spirit of openness” (pg. 188).   
 41 
 
Grounded in the context of ethics, Baker (2008) discusses public relations and 
advertising practitioners as being either Principled Advocates or Pathological Partisans.  
She views transparency as an ethical virtue of the Principled Advocate, one that is 
morally driven, and conceptualizes it as openness which results in meeting others’ 
“reasonable requirements for information” (Baker, 2008).  She sites that an agent who is 
transparent “freely volunteers information that others have a legitimate need to know; 
and” in the context of mass media “who is candid and open about the sources of 
advocacy messages and the messages employed for persuasion (pg. 244).  Baker suggests 
that transparency and secrecy are at opposing ends of a continuum in which secrecy is a 
vice of the Pathological Partisan, one that abandons morals and virtues.  Further, she 
explains that secrecy is the opposite of transparency and it involves unjustified 
concealment, hiding, silence, suppression, furtiveness, and covertness.   
 In the context of journalist practices, Allen (2008) discusses why transparency as 
a goal for reporters is important.  He defines transparency as “making public the 
traditionally private factors that influence creation of the news” (pg. 323).  Allen suggests 
that transparency should be the goal for journalists and it is important to help ensure 
accountability of reporting and establish perceived legitimacy among citizens.  He states 
that transparency goes beyond disclosing details about a news story that might influence 
the creation of it but to also disclosing doubts the journalist may have as to the 
truthfulness of the information s/he reports (Allen, 2008). 
 In the context of corporate communications, Christensen (2002) discusses 
transparency as both a condition and a strategy.  Transparency should be viewed as a 
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condition for communicating with stakeholders in the current business environment 
because stakeholders expect unrestricted access to information.  On the other hand, 
transparency can also be a strategy for communicating with stakeholders in which firms 
strategically decide which information to provide in order to appeal to certain 
stakeholders (Christensen, 2002).  Although he provides no formal definition of 
transparency, Christensen offers some insight into this concept.  He comments that 
transparency is best conceptualized from the stakeholder’s perception and as providing 
quality information (clear and insightful) rather than quantity of information.  Because 
the majority of stakeholders neither care enough about the organization to learn all about 
it nor do they have the capacity for unlimited information processing the strategic 
approach to transparency seems best.   
 Whereas most authors discuss transparency as information disclosure without 
regard for specifying modes of disclosure (such as verbal, written, or visual), van 
Woerkum (2009) discusses it specifically in the context of visual information.  His 
central claim is that organizations need to provide visuals such as photos and videos as a 
part of communicating with stakeholders and this is especially important at early stages 
of orientation and when an abundance of information is available.  He seems to imply 
that information disclosed should be clear to the audience, which has been noted in other 
literature as well.  Van Woerkum also provides insight into what type of information 
should be visualized commenting that if the stakeholder's information requirement is ill-
defined then visuals should be symbolic whereas when stakeholder's information 
requirement is well-defined, then visuals should be specific and resemble reality of the 
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firm (van Woerkum & Aarts, 2009).  Implying firm openness, he notes that visual 
transparency is about sharing what is not usually known and it is about organizations 
opening their doors “to show how their goods are produced” (pg. 436) by providing 
visual material.  A Washington state newspaper, The Spokesman-Review, offers a good 
example of an organization implementing visual transparency efforts.  This newspaper 
posts webcasts on its website of behind-the-scenes editorial meetings as a part of its 
Transparent Newsroom Initiative (Fernando, 2007). 
Rawlins (2009) is perhaps the academic who provides the most important 
milestone in transparency research; he developed a scale to measure this concept, which 
is an essential starting point for better understanding transparency.  However, Rawlins 
falls short in rigorously defining and measuring transparency.  He defines transparency as  
“the deliberate attempt to make available all legally releasable 
information – whether positive or negative in nature – in a manner that is 
accurate, timely, balanced, and unequivocal, for the purpose of enhancing 
the reasoning ability of publics and holding organizations accountable for 
their actions, policies, and practices” (pg. 75).   
The problem with this definition is that by adding into it a description of how, when, and 
in what format information is provided, he has actually added a “disclosure” or 
“perception of disclosure” dimension which may be problematic since a review of the 
literature indicates disclosure may be an antecedent to perceived transparency.  
Interestingly, however, some of Rawlins’ scale items reflect themes consistent with other 
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literature including “open/closed”, “disclosing/concealing”, “guarded/candid”, and 
“makes it easy to find the information”.    
 
 
Transparency Themes Emerging from Literature: An Integrated View 
 
An objective of the literature review was to conceptualize transparency by 
defining it based on a critical review of the themes found during the literature review 
process.  An exhaustive review of the transparency literature across six different fields 
revealed that there were not only differences across fields in the way transparency was 
defined or conceptualized but also within specific fields.  For example, within the 
marketing literature, we see at least eight different definitional themes or elements 
identified as central to transparency by different authors: 
1. Open with stakeholders, including open to feedback  
2. Being upfront and candid 
3. Not hiding relevant information 
4. Being honest 
5.  Sharing relevant information with public 
6. Providing access to information 
7. Having a shared understanding 
8. Communicating clearly 
Clearly, some of these themes are referring to the same general idea, such as 
being upfront and candid and not hiding relevant information. We also notice that some 
other themes are either antecedents or consequences of other themes.  For example, 
providing access to information and communicating clearly can be seen as antecedents of 
being open with stakeholders and being upfront and candid while being honest and 
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having a shared understanding may be consequences of being open with stakeholders and 
being upfront and candid.  The eight themes identified in the existing marketing literature 
on transparency reveals themes located at different points in a cause and effect chain, 
thus emphasizing the need to develop a tight and precise definition of transparency.  
The differences across fields are also evident as we look at the themes emerging 
from the accounting literature and others.  Researchers in this area have identified mutual 
understanding, disclosure of comparable information, complete disclosure of relevant 
information, and communicating in a timely manner as important themes associated with 
transparency. It is easy to see that while some of these themes are in agreement with the 
themes identified in the marketing literature, the others seem to be quite unique to their 
field such as disclosure of comparable information in accounting literature, emphasis on 
quantity of information in the information technology literature, fessing up to mistakes in 
the management literature, and sharing information not usually shared in the 
communications literature.  In spite of the differences across and within fields about the 
core themes associated with the transparency construct, there were some core themes 
associated with transparency that appear to transcend the boundaries of different 
disciplines. In fact, these themes emerged in all the six literature streams that were 
reviewed in this dissertation. These were the themes of “being open” and “being 
forthright” with respect to issues that are “relevant” to stakeholders.  
Being open.  The first emerging theme from the literature review that comes up 
when transparency is discussed is that of “openness”.  While not all authors explicitly 
used the terms “open” or “openness” the meaning seemed to be the same.  Researchers 
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and non-government organizations (NGOs) conceptualize transparency of a firm as 
“being open” (Blackshaw, 2008; CI, 2010; Lazarus & McManus, 2006), allowing 
stakeholders to “see-through” it (Hultman & Axelsson, 2007), and openly sharing 
information (Hofstede, 2003; Pirson & Malhotra, 2007, 2008; Vaccaro, 2006; Vaccaro & 
Madsen, 2006, 2009a, b).  It seems a firm may be perceived as open if it affords 
stakeholders the opportunity to learn about it.  This might be envisioned by a glass 
building in which everything inside is visible.   
Being forthright.  The second emerging theme is that of “forthrightness”.  
Researchers and NGOs conceptualize transparency of a firm as “letting customers know 
what’s happening”  (McKay, 2008),  “explaining decisions and saying when something 
goes wrong” (Pirson & Malhotra, 2007, 2008), “fessing up” when a firm makes a mistake 
(Higgins, 2005),  “forthright exchange” (Plaisance, 2007), and “freely” volunteering 
information (Baker, 2008).  It seems a firm may be perceived as forthright when it gets 
straight to the point and proactively opens itself up to stakeholders without regard for 
consequences.  There is a difference between open and forthright.  For example, imagine 
you engage in an interaction with a salesperson in which you’re trying to learn more 
about a particular product.  The salesman answers all of your questions and thus you may 
perceive him as open.  Now imagine the salesperson knows there are questions you 
haven’t asked which have been important to others in the decision-making process.  The 
salesperson provides you with this information as well since you didn’t ask.  In this case, 
he proactively provided you with a learning opportunity, and hence you may perceive 
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him as forthright.  This scenario might especially apply for highly complex products or 
for novice users.   
Relevance.  The third emerging theme from the literature review is that of firm 
behavior relevance.  Specifically, in order for firms to act transparently, they should be 
open and forthright about that which is “useful” (Florini, 2007), and “relevant” 
(Blackshaw, 2008; Eggert & Helm, 2003; McKay, 2008; Nielsen, 2004, 2005; Nielsen & 
Madsen, 2009) to stakeholders.   
Three secondary themes also emerged.  These were later deemed inappropriate to 
include into the definition of transparency.  For example, “honesty” (Higgins, 2005; 
WOMMA, 2010) was an initial coded theme but it may be more appropriate if 
conceptualized as a consequence of transparency rather than a definitional element.  This 
is because honesty or perceptions of a firm being honest are a direct consequence of a 
firm being seen as open and forthright, which were two of the emerging themes.   
A second theme was “disclosure characteristics” such as disclosing clear 
information and disclosing information in a timely manner (Bainbridge, 2009; 
Christensen, 2002; GRI, 2006; O'Malley et al., 2009; Rawlins, 2009; van Woerkum & 
Aarts, 2009), but here characteristics related to what, how, or when information is 
disclosed is conceptualized as an antecedent of transparency rather than a definitional 
element.   
Finally, a third theme, “ethics/morality” emerged from the literature in which 
transparency is discussed as an ethical behavior (AMA, 2010; Baker, 2008; Murphy et 
al., 2007; Plaisance, 2007; WOMMA, 2010).  Ethics is perceived here as a consequence 
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of transparency.  More discussion on these three constructs will follow at the end of this 
chapter in the section that discusses constructs that are similar to transparency.  
Table 2 provides a summary of the major themes of the transparency construct 
used in various literature streams.   
Table 2: Themes Emerging from Literature 
Transparency is a Firm that is Open 
It is communication and action that is open and clear (Murphy et al. 2007) 
Related to availability of firm-specific information (Bushman et al. 2004) 
Sharing of every kind of information (Vacarro 2006; Vacarro and Madsen 2006, 2009b) 
Accessibility of information (Zhu 2002) 
Information is easily accessible (Santana and Wood 2009) 
Degree to which information is available (Florini 2007) 
Availability of information to all actors within the firm, principals, agents, and 
stakeholders (Hebb 2006) 
Open and notorious (Welch and Rotberg 2006) 
It is creating an organization that is completely open (Bryant 2010) 
Make public traditionally private factors that influence creation of news (Allen 2008) 
Unrestricted access to information; information is clear and insightful (Christensen 2002) 
Sharing what is not usually known and opening doors to show how goods are produced 
(van Woerkum and Aarts 2009) 
Involves creating a spirit of openness; Accept constructive criticism; explain and act on 
product/service risks; disclose pricing and terms (AMA 2010) 
Openness, candor, free flow of information, and dialogue with stakeholders (Lazarus and 
Mcmanus 2006) 
Conduct that presumes openness in communication (Plaisance 2007) 
Spirit of openness (Plaisance 2007) 
Candid and open (Baker 2008) 
Freely volunteers information (Baker 2008) 
Properties of a system are observable to the observer, access to information, affordance 
of a learning opportunity (vanDijk et al. 2003) 
(table 2 continued) 
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Let customers know the ‘brand behind the brand’ by being open and visible; described as 
“let the sun shine in”, “easy to learn and discover”, and has “no secrets” (Blackshaw 
2008) 
Should provide not only basic facts and figures about the company but also processes and 
mechanisms behind decisions (Transparency International 2010)  
Should report conduct violations publicly; provide marketing codes of conduct directly to 
consumers (Consumers International 2008) 
Being honest and open (Higgins 2005) 
Openly shares all relevant information (Pirson and Malhotra 2007, 2008) 
Ability to ‘see-through’ and to share information that is usually not shared between 
partners (Hultman and Axelsson 2007) 
 
Transparency is a Firm that is Forthright 
It’s about letting customers know what’s happening (McKay 2008) 
Say who you are, what you believe, don’t falsify identity (WOMMA 2010) 
Transparency is explaining decisions and saying when something goes wrong (Pirson and 
Malhotra 2007, 2008) 
Always telling the truth and fessing up when you make mistakes (Higgins 2005) 
Conduct that serves a reasonable expectation of forthright exchange when parties have a 
legitimate stake in the outcome of a communicative act (Plaisance 2007) 
Deliberate attempt to make available all legally releasable information whether positive 
or negative, in a manner that is accurate, timely, balanced, and unequivocal (Rawlins 
2009) 
Stakeholders have access to product-related information they request without loss, noise, 
delay, and distortion (Hofstede 2003) 
Firm Behaviors Should Be Relevant to the Consumer 
Transparency is not merely disclosing information but that the information disclosed 
must be relevant (Neilsen 2004, 2005; Nielsen and Madsen 2009) 
The information that is ‘right’ to disclose to consumers is that which is relevant to the 
consumer (Nielsen and Madsen 2009) 
Subjective perception of being informed about relevant actions of the other party (Eggert 
and Helm 2003) 
Relevant information should be made accessible (O’Malley et al. 2009) 
(table 2 continued) 
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Subjective perception of being informed about relevant actions of the other party (Eggert 
and Helm 2003)  
Provide relevant information (McKay 2008) 
A brand is transparent if much or at least the most relevant information and data are 
known about it (Blackshaw 2008) 
Involves being open and providing information  to consumers to make an informed 
choice (Consumers International 2008) 
Information should be publicly useful (Florini 2007) 
Shares relevant information (Pirson and Malhotra 2007, 2008) 
Information reported should be accurate, neutral, comparable, clear, timely, and in a 
format appropriate for the intended audience (Bainbridge 2009; GRI 2006) 
  
Transparency is being Honest 
It is being honest and always telling the truth (Higgins 2005) 
Don’t falsify identity (WOMMA 2010) 
 
Transparency Relates to What, How, and When Information is Disclosed 
Information is easily assessable (Santana and Wood 2009) 
Information is clear and insightful (Christensen 2002) 
Information shoud be accurate, neutral, comparable, clear, timely, and in a format 
appropriate for intended audience (Bainbridge 2009; GRI 2006) 
Disclose pricing terms (AMA 2010) 
 
Transparency is being Ethical/Moral 
A trait-based dimension of a firm that includes integrity, respect for stakeholders, and 
communication openness (Rawlins 2009) 
Proactive moral engagement (Plaissance 2007) 
 
Working Definition 
Based on the emerging themes from the literature review and following 
MacKenzie’s (2003) guidelines for excellent construct definition, the working definition 
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for transparency is: the extent to which a stakeholder perceives a firm’s conduct is 
forthright and open regarding matters relevant to the stakeholder.  This definition will be 
evaluated and revised if necessary in chapter 3 as qualitative research is conducted to 
validate the themes derived in this chapter. 
Constructs Related to Transparency 
This section is a review of constructs and concepts discussed in the literature that 
are similar to, yet distinct from, transparency.  Table 5 below summarizes the 
differentiation of transparency with disclosure, communication, ethics, trust, and honesty
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Table 3: Constructs Similar to Transparency 
 
Construct Citations Definition Differs from Transparency 
Disclosure, 
mandatory 
disclosure, voluntary 
disclosure, self-
disclosure 
Cozby 1973; Healy and Palepu 2001; 
Hofstede 2003; van Dijk et al. 2003; 
Nielsen 2004; Eccles and Mavrinac 1995; 
Nielsen 2005; Allen 2008; Dawkins and 
Fraas 2008; DeKinder and Kohli 2008; 
Williams 2008; AMA 2010; Chaudoir and 
Fisher 2010; WOMMA 2010 
Any purposeful public release of 
information - financial, social or 
environmental, required or voluntary, 
qualitative or quantitative, and 
provided either proactively or by 
requisition; sharing of personal 
information. 
Narrowly measures whether and what 
information is disclosed.  Transparency does 
not measure information.  Disclosure is 
probably one of the ways a firm can 
manipulate perceptions of transparency. 
Communication, 
communication 
openness, 
information 
communication 
Robertson and Gatignon 1986; Anderson 
and Weitz 1989; Anderson and Narus 
1990; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Smith and 
Barclay 1997; Ahearne, Jelinek, and Jones 
2007 
Formal and informal sharing of 
information; the essence of each get at 
perceptions of how well a firm 
communicates with its stakeholders. 
Perceptions of communication are formed 
narrowly based on assessments of the 
information provided.  Transparency does not 
measure assessments of information but 
rather perceptions of firm openness and 
forthrightness.  Communication is probably 
one of the ways a firm can impact 
perceptions of transparency. 
Ethics, ethical 
evaluations 
Sherwin 1983; Ferrell and Gresham 1985 Assessment of "just" or "right" 
standards of behavior between parties 
in a situation; evaluated based on 
what one believes is fair and 
culturally,  familially, and 
individually acceptable. 
Does not measure "forthrightness" or 
"openness"; transparency probably increases 
perceptions that a firm is ethical. 
Trust Anderson and Weitz 1989; Ganesan 1994; 
Morgan and Hunt 1994; Doney and 
Cannon 1997; Ahearne, Jelinek, and Jones 
2007; Eisingerich and Bell 2008; Yim et 
al. 2008 
Perceived credibility and benevolence 
(desiring to help others); willingness 
of stakeholder to rely on the target; 
confidence in an exchange partner's 
reliability and integrity. 
Trust does not measure "forthrightness" or 
"openness" but rather a willingness to rely on 
a firm; trust may be a consequence of 
transparency. 
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Construct Citations Definition Differs from Transparency 
Honesty Pechman 1992; Priester and Petty 1995 Perceived honesty of a source; what is 
said reflects the message sender’s true 
opinion. 
Does not measure the "open" or "forthright" 
dimension of transparency; honesty  may 
indirectly capture an assessment of perceived 
honesty thus honesty may be a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for transparency; 
honesty may also be a consequence of 
transparency in that transparency may lead a 
firm to being more honest and subsequently 
consumer perceptions of honesty should also 
increase. 
Transparency Dapko dissertation conceptualization Extent to which a stakeholder 
perceives a firm's conduct is 
forthright and open regarding matters 
relevant to the stakeholder. 
  
(table 3 continued) 
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Disclosure.  Conceptually, transparency and disclosure are distinct.  When a firm 
discloses about itself, the firm may then be seen as being open.  While the two may be 
seen as similar, there are key distinctions.  Some literature indicates disclosure may be a 
“signal” of transparency (DeKinder & Kohli, 2008; pg. 95), and thus is an antecedent of 
transparency.  Below is a review of what the construct of disclosure includes and then a 
discussion of how it differs from transparency. 
Disclosure refers to a firm providing information about itself (Chaudoir & Fisher, 
2010; Cozby, 1973; Dawkins & Fraas, 2008; Williams, 2008). It is a behavior of a firm in 
which information is shared about itself to stakeholders.  In journalism, disclosure refers 
to providing information about the interests of the writer which may bear on the subject 
being written about, for example, if the writer has worked with an interview subject in the 
past (Allen, 2008).  In psychology, disclosure or self-disclosure refers to sharing personal 
information such as one’s feelings with others (Chaudoir & Fisher, 2010; Cozby, 1973).  
In accounting and finance, disclosure refers to public companies sharing information 
about itself like past financial performance, future forecasts, and current operations, 
which might be kept secret if the company was a privately held company or a partnership 
(Nielsen, 2004, 2005).  In marketing, disclosure refers to providing product-related 
information, pricing, and terms to a stakeholder without loss, noise, delay, or distortion 
(AMA, 2010; Hofstede, 2003; van Dijk et al., 2003; WOMMA, 2010). 
Some disclosure literature delineates between mandatory disclosure and voluntary 
disclosure.  Mandatory disclosure is disclosure of information that is regulated by the 
government (Healy & Palepu, 2001) such as earnings reports in an accounting context, 
health side effects in pharmaceutical advertising, and contractual terms and agreements in 
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mobile phone plan advertising, to name a few.  Voluntary disclosure, on the other hand, 
is disclosure of information that is at the discretion of management (Healy & Palepu, 
2001) or a firm revealing information about itself that it is not required to by law to 
reveal (DeKinder & Kohli, 2008).  Voluntary disclosures may include information about 
the firm's costs, investments, likely earnings, new product developments, product 
launches, strategies, and personnel decisions in a business strategy context, (DeKinder & 
Kohli, 2008), providing competitive comparison pricing in a sales context, and two-sided 
messaging in an advertising context, to name a few.  A review of the disclosure literature 
across disciplines reveals a commonality in that disclosure is any purposeful public 
release of information by a firm to stakeholders.  
This dissertation conceptualizes disclosure, a firm behavior, as an antecedent of 
transparency, a stakeholder perception about a firm.  The firm discloses information and 
what follows is consumer evaluations of that disclosure and of the firm.  Disclosure is 
one potentially important behavior that a firm can control and manipulate to alter 
perceptions of transparency.  However, the academic and practitioner literature indicates 
that in most cases simply disclosing information is not enough to warrant perceptions of 
transparency.  For example, pharmaceutical companies are mandated to disclose in their 
advertisements certain information such as health risks.  Often the information is 
disclosed via “fine print” in which the font is much smaller than other information 
provided in the advertisement, or via voiceovers in which the communicator discloses 
information much faster than other information that is communicated in the 
advertisement.  The firm disclosed the required information yet consumers may not 
perceive this as being transparent.   
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It seems likely, then, that in order for disclosure to have positive effects on 
perceived firm transparency then disclosure must be seen as an internal, willful, voluntary 
act of the firm.  The perception, then, that the firm is voluntarily providing information 
seems to be a key antecedent to perceptions of transparency. 
Communication.  Several construct derivatives for ‘communication’ exist in the 
marketing literature including ‘communication’ of a channel partner (Anderson & Weitz, 
1989; Anderson & Narus, 1990) and supplier (Morgan & Hunt, 1994), ‘communication 
openness’ of an industry (Robertson & Gatignon, 1986) and selling partnership (Smith & 
Barclay, 1997a),  and ‘information communication’ of a salesperson (Ahearne, Jelinek, & 
Jones, 2007).  Unlike disclosure in which scale items typically reflect what information is 
disclosed, communication-related constructs are typically measured in terms of one party 
sharing or communicating information with another party (Ahearne et al., 2007; 
Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Anderson & Narus, 1990; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Robertson & 
Gatignon, 1986; Smith & Barclay, 1997b, a), frequency of communications (Palmatier, 
Dant, Grewal, & Evans, 2006; Smith & Barclay, 1997a) and/or by characteristics of 
information provided such as information timeliness (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Smith & 
Barclay, 1997a), information relevance/meaningfulness(Anderson & Narus, 1990),  and 
information objectivity/two-sidedness (Ahearne et al., 2007).  Upon a close review of the 
communication constructs, it seems that the essence of each get at perceptions of how 
well a firm communicates with its stakeholders.  For example, a seminal 
“communication” construct is that of Morgan and Hunt (1994), in which they use the 
scale items “In our relationship, my major supplier…” followed by “…keeps us informed 
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of new developments” and “…communicates well his expectations for our firm's 
performance”. 
Although communication is similar to transparency, they are not the same.  This 
dissertation conceptualizes communication as an antecedent of transparency.  
Communication refers to assessments of the quality of information provided or to 
assessments of how well a firm communicates with its stakeholders.  Therefore this 
dissertation sees a firm sharing information and communicating well as two of the ways 
that could lead a firm to be perceived as transparent. 
Ethical Evaluations.  The literature discusses ethical evaluations in terms of an 
assessment of “just” or “right” standards of behavior between parties in a situation 
(Ferrell & Gresham, 1985).  These ethical judgments are made based on what one 
believes is fair and acceptable in terms of cultural, familial, and individual standards  
(Reidenbach & Robin, 1990; Reidenbach, Robin, & Dawson, 1991), and may be person 
and context specific depending on one's cultural environment, professional environment, 
industry environment, organizational environment, and personal characteristics (Hunt & 
Vitell, 2006).   
According to Robin and Reidenbach (1987), the key to success of any corporate 
culture is the selection and implementation of core values.  When implemented and 
communicated to all parties, these values define the profile or face of the organization 
and become an integral part of the organizational mission.  A firm's profile is a projection 
to external publics with whom the organization interacts, identifying how the 
organization chooses to interact with those publics (Robin & Reidenbach, 1987).  
Transparency could be a core value that a company embeds into its culture (Baker, 2008; 
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Plaisance, 2007).  When these values are successfully implemented and communicated 
then it could give ethical direction to the marketing activities of the organization (AMA, 
2010; Robin & Reidenbach, 1987; WOMMA, 2010), and subsequently, consumers may 
perceive the firm to be more ethical as a result of firms engaging in transparency 
behaviors.  This dissertation conceptualizes transparency as most likely increasing 
perceptions that a firm is ethical. 
Trust.  The marketing literature generally conceptualizes trust in terms of 
perceived credibility and benevolence (desiring to help others) (Doney & Cannon, 1997), 
a  willingness of the stakeholder to be vulnerable in the presence of, or rely on, the target 
(Ahearne et al., 2007; Ganesan, 1994), and confidence in an exchange partner’s 
reliability, integrity, and competency (Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Bart, Shankar, Sultan, & 
Urban, 2005; Eisingerich & Bell, 2008; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Rawlins, 2008; Yim, Tse, 
& Chan, 2008).  Trust is a key mediating variable (KMV) between firm actions and 
stakeholder actions (Morgan & Hunt, 1994).   
Trust and transparency are conceptually distinct.  Trust does not measure 
‘openness’ or ‘forthrightness’ that is captured in the transparency construct. Conceptual, 
empirical and practitioner literature suggests that trust may be a consequence of 
transparency (Bryant, 2010; Lazarus & McManus, 2006; O'Malley et al., 2009; Rawlins, 
2008).  Transparency is said to be needed to create a sense of trustworthiness (Lazarus & 
McManus, 2006; O'Malley et al., 2009) and “transparency is the necessary ingredient for 
the development of trustworthy and accountable institutions” (Vaccaro & Madsen, 
2009b); pg. 223).  Practitioners also suggest that transparency is an antecedent of trust.  
Vineet Nayar, CEO of a large technology firm, HCL Technologies, states that 
 59 
 
transparency in his organization has “led to a culture of trust and honesty” (Bryant, 
2010).  On the other hand, there is some empirical evidence that transparency may only 
be an antecedent of trust when stakeholders are unable to make assessments of a firm’s 
integrity, benevolence, and competence (Pirson & Malhotra, 2007, 2008).   
Honesty.  Honesty is referred to as the degree to which what is said reflects the 
message sender’s true opinion (Pechmann, 1992) and may be assessments of truthfulness 
of an advertisement, person, or firm.  According to Plaissance (2007; pg. 203), “one can 
increase transparency but still provide half truths…all deception lacks the element of 
transparency and lack of transparency is a prerequisite for all deceptive acts” (Plaisance, 
2007).  Another way of looking at this relationship is from the ethical perspective that 
when a firm employs transparency as an ethical corporate value then firm behavior 
should naturally lead to increased honesty.  As such, honesty may be a consequence of 
transparency in that transparency may lead a firm to being more honest and subsequently 
consumer perceptions of honesty should also increase.    Along these lines, transparent 
firms “are correctly seen as honest when telling the truth but give themselves away when 
they lie” (Levine, Shaw, & Shulman, 2010); pg. 217). 
Chapter Summary 
While the term “transparency” is used in the trade press (Blackshaw, 2008; 
Bryant, 2010; CI, 2006; GRI, 2006; Higgins, 2005; McKay, 2008; Transparency, 2010)  
and academic literature (Eggert & Helm, 2003; Hofstede, 2003; Hultman & Axelsson, 
2007; Lazarus & McManus, 2006; Murphy et al., 2007; Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004; 
van Dijk et al., 2003), there is a lot of ambiguity in terms of what practitioners and 
academics mean by the term.  The term transparency is used a lot in the business press 
today particularly in the context of financial and economic crises all over the world.  As a 
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result, the word “transparency” is often used to connote different things by different 
people.  For example, when a prominent hedge fund manager is caught engaging in 
dishonest practices, there is a call for transparency by several industry experts and 
academics.  However, some of these experts are calling for greater honesty among 
managers in this industry so that the public’s trust can be regained; others are calling for 
greater disclosure of relevant information by firms and managers, while yet others have 
called for managers to be more open and upfront with the public about information that 
may be seen as relevant to an investor in an investment decision.  The ultimate goal of all 
these experts may be the same; i.e. to suggest ways to restore the public’s trust in the 
industry.  Here, the term transparency is used as an umbrella term to refer to stakeholder 
perceptions that a firm’s conduct is forthright and open regarding matters relevant to the 
stakeholder.  
 There are several constructs similar to transparency, such as disclosure, 
communication, ethics, trust, and honesty, but all do not capture the essence of 
‘forthrightness’ and ‘openness’ of transparency as conceptualized in this dissertation.  A 
review of these constructs indicates that these may either be antecedents or consequences 
of transparency rather than conceptually the same as transparency.  Two important 
antecedents of transparency may be disclosure and communication.  Three important 
outcomes of transparency may perceived ethicality, trust, and perceived honesty which 
may be attributed to the boundary spanner, the firm, or both when stakeholders perceive 
transparency. 
 The next chapter will discuss the procedure used to validate the themes and will 
provide a final definition of transparency based on this work. 
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CHAPTER 3:  THEME VALIDATION AND FINAL TRANSPARENCY 
DEFINITION 
 
This section reviews the qualitative research that was conducted in order to 
validate the themes derived from the literature review.  First this involved a coding task 
with expert judges who coded transparency definitions using predetermined themes that 
emerged from the literature review.  Second, interviews, focus groups, and open-ended 
surveys were conducted to further validate the themes and to ensure “everyday” 
consumers think about transparency in the same way as practitioners and academics.   
Theme Coding 
Procedure.  Judges (marketing Ph.D. students) participated in a qualitative sorting 
procedure to substantiate the major themes found by the author.  The sorting procedure 
included providing each judge independently with a set of index cards with each card 
including a definition or description of transparency found in the literature.  The judges 
were told “what is on the cards is a description or definition of transparency from the 
literature” and they were instructed to “sort these cards into piles that represent similar 
concepts or ideas”.  Because the sorting procedure was used to validate previous theme 
coding, judges were given predefined categories and were told to put each card into a 
category that best represents what is on the card.  The categories included those that were 
identified by the author (i.e. open, forthright, relevance) as well as an “other” category.  
The judges were also asked to “further refine the ‘other’ group into subcategories and to 
label each subcategory”. The same forty-eight descriptions previously used to identify 
emerging themes (see Table 2) were then used as the qualitative data for theme validation 
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by judges, marketing Ph.D. students, along with the three previously identified themes 
(open/openness, forthright/forthrightness, and sharing relevant information) and one 
additional theme (other) for the sorting procedure.   
Theme inter-rater reliability.  The PRL reliability measure (Rust & Cooil, 1994) 
was calculated to assess the inter-rater reliability of the qualitative judgments.  The PRL 
reliability measure was calculated by dividing the total number of agreements between 
each pair of judges by the total number of potential agreements.  In this case, there were 
four judges resulting in a total of 6 potential pair-wise agreements per item.  Each judge 
evaluated 48 items for a total of 288 potential agreements.  There were a total of 168 
agreement pairs resulting in .58 proportion of inter-judge agreement.  This corresponds to 
a PRL reliability of .89 which indicates the inter-rater reliability is adequate because the 
PRL reliability is a “direct extension and generalization of Cronbach’s alpha to the 
qualitative case” (Rust & Cooil, 1994).  Table 2 shows the 48 transparency definitions 
and descriptions from existing literature that were used to identify initial themes and used 
in the inter-rater coding procedure.  The theme consensus for each item was consistent 
with the researchers’ conceptualization of the forthright, open, and relevant dimensions 
of the transparency construct. 
Interviews, Focus Groups, and Surveys 
Next, interviews, focus groups, and open-ended surveys were conducted to further 
validate the themes. 
Procedure.  Interviews and focus groups were semi-structured and discovery-
oriented in nature.  In particular this means that, while the researcher had certain 
objectives with pre-formulated relevant questions for the interviews and focus groups, 
she also allowed for the participants to speak freely on the topic.  The researcher 
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conducted the interviews and focus groups both on and offline.  Regarding the online 
method, the researcher used Eluminate! software which allowed her to utilize an online 
version of a “whiteboard” and text chatting for discussions with participants.  The 
researcher did not utilize the voice or video capabilities of this software.  Regarding the 
offline method, the researcher arranged for interviews and focus groups in a safe 
environment. 
Participant recruitment.  Participant recruitment commenced with an email 
invitation to friends and family of the researcher to include the nature of the study and 
potential harms.  Upon participant confirmation that s/he would participate, for both the 
online and offline research, the researcher emailed the participant with a link to an online 
survey that included  the IRB consent form with the following statement: “Please click on 
the ‘I have reviewed the IRB consent form and would like to participate in this research’ 
button below”.  The survey also included a few demographic questions such as age, 
gender, nationality, and occupation.   
The researcher recruited participants that were at least 18 years of age with no 
other restrictions as to psychographic or demographic qualifiers.  Recruitment included 
soliciting friends, family, and personal business contacts of the primary researcher, as 
well as reaching out to local organizations such as the Young Entrepreneurs Society and 
local Home Owners Associations by contacting the director/manager of these 
organizations.  The researcher also employed the snowball technique upon completing 
the interviews and focus groups with friends, family, and personal business contacts.   
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The online method resulted in data transcripts and the offline method resulted in 
voice transcripts that the researcher transcribed into text files.  All of the electronic files 
were named according to the date of the interview/focus group and password protected. 
Qualitative research included one in-person focus group with four participants, 
one online focus group with three participants, two online interviews, and one open-
ended survey with 46 student respondents.   
Lines of questioning.  The specific questions for the focus groups and in-depth 
interviews included: 1) what does the term, transparency, mean to you? 2) When is 
transparency important? 3) and What does it mean for a company to be transparent?   
The open-ended surveys included a scenario followed by two open-ended 
questions in which respondents were asked to “Imagine you just heard the below 
statement made by a CEO of a particular company.  Please read the CEO’s statement then 
answer the questions that follow”.  The statement was: “The goal of this company is to be 
transparent with our customers”.  This scenario was based on recent comments made by 
U.S. President, Barack Obama in which he communicated “transparency” as his goal for 
government reform (Obama, 2010).  The two questions included: 1) what do you think it 
means for a company to be transparent with its customers? And 2) what specific things 
could a company do to show its customers that it is transparent?   
Sample.  The sample for all qualitative research collectively was about 50% male 
and ranged in age from 22 to 73 with a mean age of about 24 years old (excluding 
outliers from the mean calculation).  
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Theme inter-rater reliability.  Theme identification and protocol coding was 
employed for the qualitative quotes from the interviews, focus groups, and open-ended 
surveys.  First the researcher examined the transcripts identifying respondent quotes that 
matched the emerging themes from the literature review (open/openness, 
forthright/forthrightness, and sharing relevant information).  A second pass through the 
data was then conducted to identify any other common themes, of which there was one.  
A fourth theme, “honest/honesty” seemed to appear in the data, and thus it was added to 
the theme validation procedure.  Finally, a fifth, “other” theme was added to the coding 
procedure which allowed the independent judges to account for data that did not seem to 
fit into the other themes.  The quotes were then presented to independent judges for 
theme validation.  The judges were told to select only one theme for each quote.   
The PRL reliability measure (Rust & Cooil, 1994) was calculated to assess the 
inter-rater reliability of the qualitative judgments.  The PRL reliability measure was 
calculated by dividing the total number of agreements between each pair of judges by the 
total number of potential agreements.  In this case, there were three judges resulting in a 
total of 3 potential agreements per item.  Each judge evaluated 24 items for a total of 72 
potential agreements.  There were a total of 29 agreement pairs resulting in .40 proportion 
of inter-judge agreement, which is low.  For three judges and five categories, this 
corresponds to a PRL reliability of .65 which indicates the inter-rater reliability is 
approaching the minimal acceptability of .70 indicated as a “rule of thumb” for 
exploratory work (Rust & Cooil, 1994).  Disagreements were then resolved through 
discussion.  There were seven data strings for which the judges did not come to a 
consensus.  Agreement was reached through discussion for these items.  The discussion 
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revealed that there was confusion among the judges with regard to which theme several 
of the quotes belonged.  Recall that the experts were told to assign only one theme per 
quote.  Several of the quotes clearly belonged to at least two different themes.  As an 
example, this quote highlights both the “open” and the “forthright” themes: 
 “Transparency is being upfront and not feeling like you’re getting cheated, or 
like a bait and switch; the product you’re buying is what you’re buying and price 
isn’t going to go up.  I would think it’s everything out on the table.  Just open.” 
(Female, 33 years old). 
 
 
Findings from Qualitative Data 
The following section presents the quotes that were coded and validated by 
independent judges. 
Focus groups and in-depth interviews.  Specific questions for the focus groups and in-
depth interviews included: 1) what does the term, transparency, mean to you? 2) When is 
transparency important? 3) and What does it mean for a company to be transparent? 
Examples of responses coded as ‘openness’ include:  
“Transparency is being upfront and not feeling like you’re getting 
cheated, or like a bait and switch; the product you’re buying is 
what you’re buying and price isn’t going to go up.  I would think 
it’s everything out on the table.  Just open.” (Female, 33 years old). 
 
“The word by itself is ‘see-through’…it’s like a glass building 
where everything is see-through…” (Male, 44 years old). 
 
“A company has nothing to hide…it’s the consumer’s ability to 
know what they can expect from a company …” (Female, 50-59 
years old). 
 
“…shares of itself, open and forward thinking with its sharing of 
its culture and how people work and who their employees are, 
what they can offer better than someone else…” (Female, 60+ 
years old). 
 
Examples of responses coded as ‘forthrightness’ include: 
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“Transparency is upfront, state it” (Male, 38 years old). 
 
“Straightforward about business and relationships between 
customer and buyer” (Female, 30-39 years old). 
 
“Transparency is the company takes it upon themselves to reveal 
it” (Female, 33 years old). 
 
Examples of responses coded as referring to sharing relevant information:  
 
“…that’s a good point [that transparency is individual]…in what 
area do we want to know more about, what’s sensitive to all of us?  
There are buzz words for all of us where we want to know more in 
terms of transparency…” (Male, 44 years old). 
 
“It is important for companies to make relevant information 
available” (Female, 30-39 years old). 
 
There were three strings of data for which the judges agreed belonged in the “other” 
category, which seems to be consistent with the current conceptualization of 
transparency.  They are: 
“It’s taking responsibility for successes and failures” (Male, 40-49 
years old). 
 
“Transparency is individual… it comes down to each individual’s 
view of the product and what they want” (Male, 38 years old). 
 
“Transparency is knowledge-driven based on the individual and 
how it affects them in their day-to-day lives” (Male, 38 years old). 
 
The first item seems to be outside the scope of what the literature and other qualitative 
research participants view as transparency.  To some degree this response is related to 
being forthright if “taking responsibility for successes and failures” is a proactive event.  
It could also be related to the open dimension of transparency if one places emphasis on 
taking responsibility for “failures”.  Alternately, it’s possible that when a stakeholder 
perceives a firm is taking responsibility for both successes and failures then this will 
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result in increased perceptions of transparency.  Finally, the last two statements are 
probably most aligned with the “sharing relevant information” theme in that both 
statements refer to transparency as a perception of individuals with regard to what is 
relevant to them. 
Open-ended surveys.  The open-ended surveys included a scenario followed by 
two open-ended questions in which respondents were asked to “Imagine you just heard 
the below statement made by a CEO of a particular company.  Please read the CEO’s 
statement then answer the questions that follow”.  The statement was: “The goal of this 
company is to be transparent with our customers”.  This scenario was based on recent 
comments made by U.S. President, Barack Obama in which he communicated 
“transparency” as his goal for government reform (Obama, 2010).  The two questions 
included: 1) what do you think it means for a company to be transparent with its 
customers? And 2) what specific things could a company do to show its customers that it 
is transparent?   
Examples of responses coded as ‘openness’ include: 
“For a company to be transparent it must be honest, open, and 
ethical.  The company must be willing to share all decision 
information” (Male, 23 years old). 
 
“To be transparent, it almost sounds as though they want to be seen 
through.  Therefore they want all of the different aspects in the 
company to be seen by its customers…makes them seem to be 
more open to outside view with nothing to hide” (Male, 21 years 
old). 
 
“To be transparent with one’s customers to me means to be as open 
as possible” (Male, 24 years old). 
 
"Be completely honest, no secrets from the consumers" (Female, 
20) . 
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Examples of responses coded as ‘forthrightness’ include: 
“They were straight forward and truthful about the good and the 
bad about the product purchased.  There were no hidden tricks or 
fine print” (Male, 22 years old). 
 
“Honest and forthright” (Female, 24 years old). 
 
“It means to be true to the customer and upfront” (Male, 22 years 
old).  
 
“The company was upfront and honest about their product or 
service and what the customer expected the product would 
perform, it did” (Male, 23 years old).  
 
“If the company makes a decision then the customers know about 
it” (Male, 22 years old).  
 
"They did not give any false expectations.  Gave them honest facts 
about the product, possibly even subjective point of view.  Didn't 
hold back any vital information" (Male 22). 
 
Another theme that emerged from the open-ended studies was that participants 
seemed to include ‘honesty’ into perceptions of transparency.  This is not surprising 
based on the literature review that revealed honesty as a potential construct closely 
related to transparency.  An important note is that the judges were instructed to list only 
one theme per data string.  Perhaps more of the data would have been coded as “honesty” 
if the judges were able to code data as belonging to more than one theme because some 
responses fit a combination of categories including ‘open’ and ‘honesty’ and ‘forthright’ 
and honesty’.  An example of data coded as “honesty” includes:   
 
"He thinks the company was honest and open about their product.  He 
doesn't think they are trying to 'put one over on him' or sell him something 
that was falsely represented" (Female 29). 
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This theme of honesty also came up in the focus groups and interviews as well: 
 
"It's being open and honest; open in that you know what kind of service 
you're going to receive; and far as I'm aware, nobody really likes to call 
India and get the runaround, "excuse me, what did you say?  can you 
repeat that again?  No this is what I'm trying to say." (Male, 38 years old) 
 
"Meaning straight forward and honest about business and relationships 
between customer and buyer" (Female, 30-39 years old) 
 
"Be completely honest, no secrets from the consumers" (Female, 20) 
 
"They did not give any false expectations.  Gave them honest facts about 
the product, possibly even subjective point of view.  Didn't hold back any 
vital information" (Male 22) 
 
"He thinks the company was honest and open about their product.  He 
doesn't think they are trying to 'put one over on him' or sell him something 
that was falsely represented" (Female 29) 
 
"They were straight forward and truthful about the good and the bad about 
the product purchased.  There were no hidden tricks or fine print" (Male, 
22) 
 
Even though many subjects viewed transparency and honesty as being closely related, 
many of these same subjects seemed unsure whether the two were one and the same.  For 
example:  
“Does transparency equal truth?  I don't know and that's a very good 
question.  I would like it to, but I don't know if it does.  I would hope it 
would.  What is that line from the movie, Something's Gotta Give where 
Jack Nicholson says, ‘I told you some version of the truth’...I don't know 
if that's acceptable or not for transparency.” (Female, 60+ years old) 
 
We conceptualize transparency and honesty as two distinct constructs.  
Transparency allows one to see things clearly and it encourages "honest behaviors". 
However, this does not mean the two constructs are one and the same. As it facilitates 
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honest behaviors, it is easy to see why many respondents talked about the two constructs 
in the same breath and yet felt unsure if the two were the same.  Honesty is referred to as 
the degree to which what is said reflects the message sender’s true opinion (Pechmann, 
1992) and may be assessments of truthfulness of an advertisement, person, or firm.  
According to Plaissance (2007), “one can increase transparency but still provide half 
truths…all deception lacks the element of transparency and lack of transparency is a 
prerequisite for all deceptive acts” (Plaisance, 2007).  When a firm is transparent then 
firm behavior should naturally lead to increased honesty.   
Summary of Qualitative Research 
Conceptualization of the transparency construct was derived based on a review of 
the literature, focus groups, interviews, and surveys.  To our knowledge, this is the first 
attempt to conceptualize transparency utilizing existing literature as a foundation with 
qualitative research as a triangulation method for ecological validity. 
Final Definition 
Based on the emerging themes from the literature review, validation from the 
qualitative theme validation, and following MacKenzie’s (2003) guidelines for excellent 
construct definition, it seems the initial definition is still relevant.  Transparency is 
defined as: the extent to which a stakeholder perceives a firm’s conduct is forthright and 
open regarding matters relevant to the stakeholder.   
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CHAPTER 4: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF TRANSPARENCY 
This chapter will address the following three questions: 1) when are perceptions 
of transparency formed in the minds of consumers? 2) What triggers the salience of 
transparency perceptions? And 3) what happens when transparency perceptions are 
formed? These questions are important to address because they provide a contextual 
understanding of when transparency may be especially salient to consumers and hence 
relevant to firms.  Grounded in Attribution (Weiner, 1986) and Systematic-Heuristic 
Processing (Chen & Chaiken, 1999) Theories, this chapter will also discuss how 
transparency may operate to impact important consequences such as reducing consumer 
skepticism, and ultimately increasing positive attitudes toward the firm and purchase 
intentions.  The discussion in this chapter will generally follow Figure 1 in addressing the 
above questions.  Finally, this chapter will propose a theoretical model of antecedents and 
consequences of transparency.   
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Figure 1: Overview of the Processing Mechanisms Impacting Perceptions of Transparency 
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When are perceptions of transparency formed in the minds of consumers? 
 As Figure 1 indicates, consumers most likely form perceptions of transparency 
during some communication interaction with a firm.  A communication interaction is 
defined here as a communication event in which information is shared between a firm 
and a consumer.  The interaction can be between a consumer and any of a firm’s 
boundary spanning employees or boundary spanning systems.  Boundary spanning 
employees include salespeople, customer service representatives, and human resources 
personnel.  Boundary spanning systems include a firm’s website, automated phone 
messages, and email marketing messages.   
We can find numerous examples of consumer-to-firm and firm-to-consumer 
interactions.  With regard to a consumer-firm interaction, a consumer may seek or request 
information from a firm’s boundary spanner or system.  For example, a consumer may 
seek or request information from a salesperson while shopping in a store, from a 
customer service representative over the phone, or by surfing the firm’s website.  
Information sought might relate to the firm’s products or to the firm’s legal, ethical, and 
operating practices.  With regard to the firm’s products, a consumer might want to know 
specific features, advantages, or benefits of a particular product.  With regard to the 
firm’s legal, ethical, and operating practices, a consumer may want to know from which 
country materials are sourced for a particular product, the manufacturing processes of and 
human labor conditions for the product, or to understand the business wealth and health 
of a firm.  With regard to a firm-consumer communication interaction, a firm may contact 
a consumer with product updates, special promotions, and corporate happenings and may 
do so by various means such as email, phone, text messaging, and mail.  Providing 
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information opportunities for the consumer such as maintaining a corporate website, 
distributing news releases, or hosting product information seminars or manufacturing 
plant tours, are also examples of a firm initiating communication interactions.   
The next section discusses objectives for consumer-firm interactions and how the 
way in which firms respond to meeting consumer-firm interaction objectives may impact 
perceptions of transparency. 
Communication interaction objectives.  A consumer may initiate an interaction 
with a firm to reduce ambiguity and uncertainty about a firm or its products.  This is in 
line with prior research indicating that uncertainty and ambiguity reduction are two 
objectives for communication events (Daft and Lengel 1986).  Uncertainty is the absence 
of information whereas ambiguity is the absence of knowing what information is 
important to the decision making process (Daft & Lengel, 1986).  A consumer may seek 
to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity by perusing a firm’s website or directly 
communicating with the firm through email, instant chat, in person, or by phone and may 
seek information about not only favorable aspects of the product or firm, but also 
negative aspects of the product or firm.  A consumer may want to know the weaknesses 
of a product, better understand how a product works or how it’s made, or the reasons 
behind a firm’s profit or loss prior to buying the firm’s product or stock.   
A consumer who lacks certainty but has no ambiguity knows what information is 
important in order to make an informed decision but currently doesn’t possess that 
information (Daft & Lengel, 1986).  For example, pertaining to company’s product 
offerings, s/he may be uncertain about the benefits of a certain product, additional 
surcharges, quality levels, and/or guarantees and assurances.  Pertaining to the company 
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itself, s/he may be uncertain about the company’s reputation, all the different ways the 
company is bringing in revenue, the expertise of its staff, and/or which companies are 
considered partnering companies, which are customers, and which are competitors.  
According to Uncertainty Reduction Theory (Berger and Calabrese 1975), individuals 
will increase information seeking behaviors as uncertainty increases.   It is proposed that 
one way transparency will become salient is when a firm helps or hinders a consumer’s 
goal to reduce uncertainty through the firm’s willingness to provide relevant information 
to consumers and by sufficiently answering consumers’ questions posed directly to them.   
A consumer in an ambiguous communication event may have multiple 
interpretations for the information or may lack interpretations altogether.  In this 
situation, a consumer doesn’t know what questions to ask because s/he is highly confused 
and lacks understanding of the information provided (Daft & Lengel, 1986).  Unlike 
uncertainty reduction behaviors such as asking questions, the consumer must rely on the 
firm to help him/her figure out what’s important to the decision making process since the 
consumer doesn’t know what questions to ask.  Thus it is up to the firm to proactively 
provide relevant information to the consumer.  It is proposed that transparency will 
become salient when the information provided (or not provided) in an open and forthright 
manner by a firm helps (or hinders) a consumer’s goal to reduce ambiguity and 
uncertainty.  Transparency implies the firm will be willing to go beyond simply 
responding to questions asked by consumers to proactively providing information, 
especially when the consumer lacks sufficient knowledge of the product or firm.  
Ambiguity and uncertainty reduction were discussed as two primary objectives 
for a consumer when interacting with a firm.   However, the firm may have divergent 
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goals for a communication interaction.  The objective for the firm may be to increase 
favorable attitudes toward the firm and ultimately increase sales, hence, rarely will a firm 
want to help to reduce consumer ambiguity and/or uncertainty when it means it must go 
out of its way or change its processes to do so, and probably especially when it has 
negative implications for the firm.  Therefore, there exists a gap in communication 
objectives.  The consumer wants to reduce ambiguity and uncertainty, and the firm wants 
to help reduce consumer ambiguity and uncertainty but only when it is favorable to the 
firm to do so.  This gap between what consumers want to know and what firms want to 
tell (and how they tell it) is probably where perceptions of transparency become 
activated.   
The next section discusses the specific processing mechanism that elicits salience 
of and impacts perceptions of transparency in a communication interaction. 
Disconfirmation of Expectations and Transparency Salience 
It is proposed that transparency perceptions become salient when expectations for 
a communication interaction have been disconfirmed.  Following is a discussion of the 
conditions under which prior research suggests expectations are typically disconfirmed, 
when transparency may become salient, and the process that makes this happen.  The 
discussions will follow Figure 1. 
Disconfirmation of Expectations.  As Figure 1 indicates, it’s likely that 
consumers have certain latent expectations toward communicators regarding how they 
will behave in a communication interaction, such as how transparent the firm is expected 
to be.  This is labeled “Latent Expectations for the Communication Outcome”.  These 
latent expectations can be both related and unrelated to transparency.  Expectations refer 
to anticipated behavior and are drawn from societal norms, industry norms, and an 
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individual’s prior experiences (Burgoon, 1993).  For example, a consumer may expect a 
car salesman to lack transparency based on prior experience with car salesmen or based 
on a perceived industry norm or heuristic that “car salesmen can’t be trusted”.  These 
expectations are called “latent” because the consumer is not yet cognitively evaluating 
the communicator based on these expectations.   
Communications literature suggests that latent expectations become salient when 
expectations for a communication interaction are “sufficiently discrepant” so as to 
reallocate attention from the topic at hand to characteristics of the communicator 
(Burgoon, 1993).  A communication outcome that is unexpected, negative, or thwarts the 
consumer from attaining a desired goal may cause a disconfirmation of expectations 
(Fein, 1996; Hastie, 1984; Weiner, 1985, 1986).  Therefore latent transparency 
expectations may become salient when 1) the communication interaction is sufficiently 
discrepant from what the consumer expects or 2) when the transparent behavior is 
unexpected, negative, or hinders the consumer from attaining a desired goal related to the 
firm or its products.  However, simply disconfirming expectations may not be enough to 
make transparency salient.  Based on prior research on expectations (Burgoon, 1993; 
Oliver & Winer, 1987), a communication outcome must disconfirm expectations beyond 
a certain threshold for transparency expectations to become salient.  Sufficiently 
discrepant (Burgoon, 1993) implies that for the transparency discrepancy to become 
salient the discrepancy must be outside of some tolerable boundary, or outside the 
consumer’s zone of tolerance or threshold for transparency.  This is reflected via the 
“Compare with thresholds” box in Figure 1.  The consumer expectations literature 
seconds these ideas that 1) expectations do not become salient and processed until 
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disconfirmed and 2) there exists a “tolerable range” from which, outside this range, 
causes ‘surprise’, orientation toward, and elaboration upon the discrepancy (Oliver & 
Winer, 1987).   
Figure 1 shows that latent expectations for a communication outcome and 
perceptions of the communication outcome are used as inputs in determining an 
expectation disconfirmation for the interaction.  As Figure 1 indicates, expectations may 
or may not be disconfirmed.  If expectations have not been disconfirmed, then a 
consumer may still form judgments and evaluations (i.e. consumer skepticism, trust, 
attitudes, and purchase intention) toward the firm.  However, they will be based on 
previously formed perceptions of transparency, rather than on transparency perceptions 
formed directly from the communication interaction; and this will occur via spontaneous 
processing.  Spontaneous processing is an automatic activation of attitudes from memory 
without conscious effort (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986).  In other words, 
whatever attitudes the consumer held prior to the interaction about the firm, its products, 
and/or toward advertisers in general, it will be those same attitudes that will be used in 
impacting consumer skepticism, attitudes toward the firm, and ultimately whether or not 
the consumer intends to purchase from the firm.  According to dual processing theories, 
spontaneous processing is expected to occur when intention to form an impression is 
absent for a particular event (Uleman, 1999; Uleman, Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008), such 
is the case when no expectations have been disconfirmed.  When spontaneous processing 
is at work, attitudes toward a target in a given situation are formed based more on 
existing attitudes and less on situational information.  This is indicated in Figure 1 by the 
box labeled “Stored Attitudes Remain Unchanged to Impact Consequences”.  In sum, 
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spontaneous processing will occur when expectations have not been disconfirmed 
resulting in stored attitudes impacting judgments. 
When expectations have been disconfirmed the next process involves determining 
what exactly about the interaction has disconfirmed expectations.  This is represented 
with the “Transparency expectation disconfirmation?” process diamond in Figure 1.  
When expectation disconfirmations are unrelated to transparency then attitudes toward 
whatever cue has disconfirmed the expectation will be used to impact consequences 
toward the firm.  This is represented via the “Non-Transparency Related Expectation 
Disconfirmations Impact Consequences” box in Figure 1.  Note that these two cases in 
which either 1) expectations have not been disconfirmed, or 2) expectations have been 
disconfirmed but the disconfirmation is unrelated to transparency, are outside of the 
scope of this dissertation because the focal judgment is unrelated to transparency.  Thus 
further discussion of these process mechanisms will not be reviewed in further detail. 
For those disconfirmations in which transparency is the cause of the 
disconfirmation, the next process step is a comparison of the level of transparency 
disconfirmation to some tolerable transparency threshold within the consumer.  This is 
represented by the “Compare with thresholds” process diamond in Figure 1.  Inasmuch as 
the transparency discrepancy falls outside of some acceptable threshold, the transparency 
discrepancy should become salient and this is shown in Figure 1 via the “Active/salient 
expectations related to transparency” box.  This is consistent with literature that states 
disconfirmations will become salient above a certain threshold or zone of tolerance 
(Burgoon, 1993; Oliver & Winer, 1987).  Inasmuch as transparency disconfirmations fall 
within some acceptable threshold then the transparency disconfirmation will remain 
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latent, and this is shown via the “Transparency cue unconsciously impacts consequences” 
box in Figure 1. 
Three types of information processing may operate to impact perceptions of firm 
transparency and other distal consequences.  The three types are nonconscious heuristic 
route processing, conscious heuristic route processing, and conscious systematic route 
processing.  Following is a discussion of each and their impact on how perceptions are 
processed to form perceptions of firm transparency. 
Systematic-Heuristic Processing 
Overview.  The Systematic-Heuristic processing model (Chen & Chaiken, 1999), 
a dual route processing theory, is one theory that can help explain how transparency 
operates to impact and change consumer attitudes and behavioral responses. This theory 
suggests that transparency may affect the amount and direction of attitude change in three 
ways.  First, transparency may have effects through systematic route processing in which 
a consumer engages in effortful focusing and elaboration on transparency of the firm to 
form attitudes.  Second, transparency may have effects through heuristic route processing 
in which a consumer uses contextual cues or heuristics related to transparency to form 
attitudes, rather than engaging in an effortful elaboration of the message as in systematic 
route processing.  Third, the route that is the least commonly talked about is 
nonconscious processing of heuristic cues which are used nonconsciously to form 
attitudes.  Each processing route can impact attitudes, however, attitudes formed based on 
systematic route processing tend to be more enduring and stable as compared to those 
formed based on heuristic route processing.  Two major tenets of the Systematic-
Heuristic theory is that 1) consumers want to hold correct attitudes, however, 2) the 
extent to which they are willing and able to engage in effortful elaboration depends on 
 82 
 
motivation and ability in a given context (Chen & Chaiken, 1999).  Systematic route 
processing is said to occur when motivation and ability are high, whereas heuristic route 
processing is said to occur when motivation and/or ability are low.  Although both 
heuristic and systematic processing may be used in conjunction to form attitudes, the 
likelihood that heuristic route processing will occur is greater as motivation and ability 
decrease in a given situation; and likewise, the likelihood that systematic route processing 
will occur is greater as motivation and ability increase in a given situation.  Thus, 
motivation and ability are key determinants in predicting which processing route will be 
used in a given situation.  Figure 1 illustrates this point.  The “Motivation &/or ability to 
resolve discrepancy?” diamond indicates that one must be sufficiently motivated and/or 
able to resolve the transparency disconfirmation.   
Communication outcomes may be either congruent or incongruent for consumers 
who come into the communication interaction with either positive or negative attitudes 
toward the firm.  Congruent outcomes include when 1) a disliked firm negatively 
disconfirms expectations by being less transparent than expected or 2) a liked firm 
positively disconfirms expectations by being more transparent than expected.  
Incongruent outcomes include when 1) a disliked firm positively disconfirms 
expectations by being more transparent than expected or 2) a liked firm negatively 
disconfirms expectations by being less transparent than expected.  In these four cases, 
motivation to resolve transparency discrepancies may be impacted.  Motivation to resolve 
the discrepancy will be less with congruent outcomes compared to incongruent ones.  
When incongruent outcomes occur, defense motivation (Chen & Chaiken, 1999) may 
‘kick in’ whereby existing attitudes are defended by either extending or shortening the 
 83 
 
information processing route.  For example, if a liked firm negatively disconfirms 
expectations or a disliked firm positively disconfirms expectations, a consumer may 
attempt to keep his/her existing attitude by engaging in systematic processing hoping to 
find evidence that is in sync with prior attitudes. On the other hand, for congruent 
outcomes such as when a liked firm positively disconfirms expectations or a disliked firm 
negatively disconfirms expectations, the firm’s behavior will reflect existing consumer 
attitudes and so consumers may attempt to defend these existing attitudes by using less 
information in the evaluation process, thus resulting in a shorter, heuristic, information 
processing route.  This is consistent with the Heuristic-Systematic Model which predicts 
“defense-motivated individuals will process information selectively, in a way that best 
satisfies defense concerns” (Chen & Chaiken, 1999).  This explanation may help to 
address why consumers respond to congruent outcomes by saying “that figures”, “I’m not 
surprised”, or “that makes sense” without questioning the situational factors that may 
have led to the outcome.   
Conscious heuristic route processing.  Without motivation and/or ability, the 
consumer is likely to engage in a less effortful process in evaluating a firm’s 
transparency, which may occur through conscious heuristic route processing. 
“Conscious” implies that transparency expectations are active and salient at this 
processing stage inasmuch as the expectation disconfirmation was outside of the zone of 
tolerance.  Both congruent and incongruent outcomes must be outside of the zone of 
tolerance for transparency expectations to become active and salient.  The impact of 
conscious heuristic route processing on perceived transparency of the firm is indicated by 
the “Transparency Cue Consciously Impacts Perceptions” box in Figure 1.  A consumer 
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may rely on previously formed attitudes that are used as cognitive elaboration short-cuts 
to attitude formation.  For example, one might apply the heuristic, “if the firm is making 
me put in a lot of effort to get answers I need then it must not want to be transparent with 
me” or “if the firm is providing me with information that could negatively impact its 
sales then it really must want to be transparent”.   Here the transparency cue is used in 
conscious heuristic processing as the person is not asking why the firm provided them 
with a lot of information or why the firm did not provide them with a lot of information.  
The processing of attributions (the ‘why’ questions) is a key distinction between 
conscious heuristic route processing and systematic processing (systematic processing is 
discussed on page 83 and represented in Figure 1). Without effortful elaboration (of the 
attributions), the valence of disconfirmation will also likely have a direct impact on 
perceptions of firm transparency (without considering moderation of perceived motives 
for firm transparency).  For example, negative disconfirmations in which the firm is less 
transparent than expected will likely result in negative transparency perceptions of the 
firm.  Likewise, positive disconfirmations in which the firm is more transparent than 
expected will likely result in positive transparency perceptions of the firm.  
Nonconscious heuristic processing.  Unlike with conscious heuristic processing, 
with nonconscious processing, transparency cues impact consequences (i.e. consumer 
skepticism, trust, attitudes toward the firm, and purchase intention) directly without the 
consumer being aware it was transparency that was the influencing factor (Chen & 
Chaiken, 1999).  Figure 1 indicates that when a transparency discrepancy is within a 
certain threshold then the transparency cue (which caused the expectation 
disconfirmation) will nonconsciously impact consequences.  Here, it is posited that 
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because transparency perceptions are still outside of awareness and have not been 
activated, then nonconscious processing will impact consumer skepticism etc. directly 
bypassing altogether the conscious process of making transparency evaluations.  It is 
suggested that the transparency cue will act as a prime residing below the surface of 
consumer awareness to influence attitudes and behaviors (Bargh, 2002).  Therefore there 
are two major differences between conscious and nonconscious heuristic route 
processing.  First, consumers will be aware of the transparency cue’s effects with 
conscious processing and unaware of transparency cue’s effects with nonconscious 
processing.  Second, the transparency cue will impact consequences mediated by 
perceptions of firm transparency when processed consciously, whereas the transparency 
cue will impact consequences directly when processed nonconsciously.  This is 
represented in Figure 1. 
 Systematic route processing.  Systematic processing is a conscious process 
inasmuch as extensive cognitive processing occurs (Chen & Chaiken, 1999). As 
previously noted, when motivation and/or ability is sufficiently high, systematic 
processing will be used to engage in a more effortful evaluation of the firm’s 
transparency, which one type of effortful evaluation is making attributions about a firm’s 
transparency and the motives for its behaviors.  When expectations have been sufficiently 
disconfirmed, then deliberative processing is activated and attitudes toward a target in a 
given situation are formed based on a more deliberate evaluation of situational 
information and less on chronic constructs.   In other words, consumers engaged in 
systematic route processing are more likely to scrutinize the situation and context in 
which the firm has disconfirmed expectations.  Prior research has found that consumers 
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engaged in systematic route processing may engage in a causal search to understand why 
expectations have not been met (Wong & Weiner, 1981) and/or to understand what the 
motives are of the firm for acting a certain way (Friestad & Wright, 1994).  A causal 
search includes questioning what about the interaction is unexpected, negative, or 
hindered goal achievement, as well as assessing who is responsible for the outcome, 
what, if anything, could have been done differently, and the frequency with which the 
outcome is expected to reoccur in the future (Weiner, 1985).  This process is called 
causal reasoning in which the consumer attempts to attribute the firm’s behavior to a 
specific cause (Weiner, 1985). The attribution process helps consumers to form accurate 
judgments and to assess appropriate avoidance or approach behaviors toward the firm in 
the future (Weiner, 1986).  Figure 1 illustrates the process of conscious systematic 
processing which begins with the consumer having sufficient motivation and/or ability to 
resolve the transparency discrepancy.  The proposition that consumers will attempt to 
resolve the transparency discrepancy via causal reasoning is indicated with the box 
labeled “Attributions”.  The proposition that consumers use attributions to form 
perceptions of transparency is indicated by an arrow from “Attributions” to “Perceived 
transparency of firm” in Figure 1. 
The Systematic-Heuristic model was used to suggest three types of processing 
which may impact perceptions of transparency and other consequences such as consumer 
skepticism, attitude toward the firm, and purchase intention.  It was also argued that 
consumers will engage in causal reasoning via attributions to make sense of, and resolve, 
the expectation disconfirmation.  Next is a more detailed review of Attribution Theory 
and its implications on perceived firm transparency. 
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Figure 1 shows how systematic processing by way of attributions will operate for 
both positive and negative disconfirmations.   
Attribution Theory, Persuasion Knowledge Model, and Motives 
Attribution Theory (Kelley & Michela, 1980) and the Persuasion Knowledge 
Model (Friestad & Wright, 1994) help to explain consumer reactions to marketer 
behaviors, and in particular, moderating effects of transparency on consumer attitudes 
and intentions. Attribution Theory presumes that consumers often seek to explain others' 
behaviors by attributing the behavior to certain causes (Friestad & Wright, 1994; Kelley 
& Michela, 1980; Weiner, 1985, 1986).  Attribution Theory is the guiding theory for the 
Persuasion Knowledge model which suggests that for a persuasion episode consumers 
use what they know about the topic, persuasive tactics, and the actor to cope with and 
react to persuasive attempts.  Both Attribution Theory and the Persuasion Knowledge 
Model suggest that people use what they know to make causal attributions about firm 
behaviors.  Additionally, both propose that causal attributions impact consumer attitudes, 
intentions, and behaviors.  One type of attribution that is investigated in the Persuasion 
Knowledge Model literature is motives.  For example, some researchers have found that 
consumers tend to react more positively toward the firm when the firm’s behaviors are 
attributed to other-serving motives rather than self-serving motives (Forehand & Grier, 
2003). This suggests that consumers must perceive a firm’s transparency to be motivated 
by other-serving motives such as helping customers, rather than self-serving motives such 
as increasing sales for transparency, to have a maximum impact on reducing skepticism, 
and increasing trust, attitude toward the firm, and purchase intention. 
The next section presents the hypothetical model of antecedents and consequences 
of firm transparency.   
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Proposed Theoretical Model 
Ultimately it is proposed that transparency will impact attitudes toward the firm 
and purchase intention.  Also proposed are a few intermediary constructs by which 
transparency influences attitudes toward the firm and purchase behavior, of which there 
are two: consumer skepticism and trust.  Figure 2 illustrates the proposed model.
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Figure 2: Proposed Theoretical Model 
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Antecedents of Transparency 
Consumer effort.  Consumer effort is conceptualized as the amount of effort a 
consumer perceives s/he has to exert in order to find and understand relevant information 
that the firm shares with consumers.  Findings from the literature review conducted in 
this dissertation suggest that simply disclosing information is not enough to warrant 
perceptions of transparency; rather it must be disclosed in a way that makes it easy for 
consumers to find and learn.  Firms must make it easy to learn about the company.  For 
example, authors note that information provided to stakeholders should be clear and easy 
to understand (Blackshaw, 2008), comparable (Nielsen & Madsen, 2009), provided 
without delay (Hofstede, 2003), and convenient and easy to retrieve (McKay, 2008).    
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) publishes a reporting framework that helps 
firms become more transparent. This framework provides guidelines for disclosing 
information so as to be transparent.  The GRI suggests reporting information that is 
relevant, complete, accurate, neutral, comparable, clear, timely, and in a format and 
language appropriate for the audience (Bainbridge, 2009; GRI, 2006).   The qualitative 
research from Chapter 3 included the following question “what stood out to you about 
this website?”.  Subjects made a few similar comments related to what and how 
information was provided. Out of 59 respondents, more than half (32) mentioned at least 
one of the information-related characteristics suggested by the GRI to impact 
transparency.  Specifically: 
 Seven respondents mentioned that information should be easy to find. 
 Eleven respondents mentioned that the information should be complete. 
 Nine respondents mentioned that the information shared should be clear, 
concise, and/or with no “fine print”. 
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 Six respondents mentioned the information should be immediate/timely 
and/or relevant. 
Upon a close review of these characteristics, one commonality seems to exist.  
Each may impact perceptions of transparency by way of reducing consumer effort.  For 
example, the more a firm discloses information that is ‘clear’, the less effort the consumer 
will have to expend to understand it; and inasmuch as ‘clear’ information reduces 
consumer ambiguity and uncertainty about the firm (or its products) then the more the 
consumer should perceive the firm as transparent.  The same logic can apply for the rest 
of the disclosure characteristics as well and therefore the consumer effort construct 
relates to consumer effort toward finding relevant information (is the information easily 
accessible and complete?) and understanding the information provided (is it in a language 
and format that is easily understood?).  It is proposed that consumer effort negatively 
impacts perceptions of transparency, such that as consumer effort goes up, perceptions of 
firm transparency will go down.  
 
H1: Consumer perceived effort toward learning about a firm has a negative effect 
on perceptions of transparency. 
 
 
Reciprocity.  Reciprocity is the extent to which a communication episode is 
perceived to be reciprocal or allow for mutual conversation or mutual action (Johnson, 
Bruner II, & Kumar, 2006).   Many modes of communication (websites, toll free 
numbers, instant chatting, etc.) enable reciprocal communication.  Other features which 
may elicit perceptions of reciprocity include contact information such as phone numbers, 
email addresses, and mailing addresses, and feedback mechanisms such as virtual 
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suggestion boxes, blogs, content search functionality, and frequently asked questions 
(FAQs).   Perceived reciprocity is proposed as an antecedent of transparency.  Consider a 
website that allows for no opportunity to communicate with the firm – no contact phone 
numbers, email addresses, mailing addresses, chatting systems, or feedback mechanisms 
are provided on the website.  Now contrast this website with one that allows for multiple 
opportunities to communicate with a firm.  Should these two websites elicit different 
transparency perceptions?   Several transparency researchers (Hultman & Axelsson, 
2007; Lazarus & McManus, 2006) have correlated reciprocity with transparency stating 
that transparency is "about" two-way communication.  For example, the AMA (2010) 
cites that one way marketers can be more transparent with consumers is by being willing 
to accept customer feedback.   And yet other researchers state that transparency is about 
having "dialogue" with stakeholders (Lazarus and McManus 2006), and "sharing 
information" between partners (Hultman and Axelsson 2007) which suggests openness.  
Accepting feedback, having dialogue, and sharing information requires that marketers 
provide consumers with channels to communicate with them, which is reciprocity.  
Therefore, reciprocity facilitates transparency and it is suggested that reciprocity 
positively impacts perceptions of transparency.  This may be especially true when 
consumers do not have much prior experience related to the firm’s transparency. 
 
H2: Perceived firm reciprocity has a positive effect on perceptions of 
transparency. 
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Information perceived as firm-damaging.  Information perceived as firm-
damaging is conceptualized here as the extent to which a consumer perceives that a firm 
is willingly providing negative information about itself or about its products.  It is 
proposed that information provided by a firm that is considered by a consumer to be 
potentially damaging to the firm will increase perceptions that the firm is transparent 
(assuming that information reduces ambiguity and/or uncertainty and the firm is not 
perceived as having any ulterior motives in providing the information).  Consumers 
probably expect firms to communicate favorable messages about its products or about it, 
spin responses to consumer requests so as to create the most favorable impression 
possible, and to communicate favorable messages and omit unfavorable ones. Therefore, 
what happens when a firm communicates messages perceived as unfavorable to the firm?  
Two-sided messages, in which both favorable and unfavorable aspects of a product are 
communicated in advertising, are reported to increase source credibility, attitude toward 
the brand, attitude toward the ad, and purchase intention (Eisend, 2006), and the effects 
of source credibility are amplified when the negative information in the ad is perceived as 
being shared voluntarily (Eisend, 2006).  Two-sided ads generally are contrived to 
persuade consumers to buy a firm’s products and thus are not really providing potentially 
damaging information about a firm or a product, but research in this area may still lend 
some support for the positive effects of communicating potentially damaging information 
on transparency perceptions. 
Suppose a consumer searching for store cleanliness on a fast food restaurant’s 
corporate website finds that the restaurant has provided this information and it is quite 
negative (i.e. 40% of the restaurants were given a rating of C or worse by the Health 
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Department).  Inasmuch as the unfavorable information is perceived as potentially 
damaging to the firm (i.e. customers may not eat there anymore or may engage in 
negative word of mouth to friends and family), consumers may perceive the firm to be 
more transparent when providing unfavorable information as compared to favorable 
information.  This may be so because providing information that may have negative 
consequences to the firm should be perceived as the firm being especially willing to be 
open and forthright (transparent) with customers.   
 
H3: Information provided by a firm that is perceived as firm-damaging has a 
positive effect on perceptions of transparency. 
 
Consequences of Transparency 
Consumer skepticism.    Skepticism refers to both a disposition (Campbell & 
Kirmani, 2008) and an enduring and stable trait (Obermiller & Spangenberg, 1998) that 
reflects a consumer’s disbelief of marketer actions (Forehand & Grier, 2003).  This 
dissertation focuses on skepticism in terms of a trait which references a generalized and 
stable level of doubt and uncertainty that exists within consumers.  This presence of 
doubt and uncertainty has been shown to exist even when consumers know that firms are 
being honest (Darke & Ritchie, 2007).  Thus skepticism levels are generally stable across 
firms and across marketing messages.  When skepticism is present, consumers are on 
guard against firms’ persuasion attempts (Darke & Ritchie, 2007).  Skeptical consumers 
may be prone to disproving marketing messages by counter-arguing the favorable merits 
of a marketing message with unfavorable ones.  They may also be especially prone to 
requiring evidence that a marketer’s claim is true.   
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Consumers are generally skeptical of firms, business practices, and advertisers in 
general (Darke & Ritchie, 2007) and they hold consistent, trait-like, internal active 
attitude scripts such as: “I don’t trust marketers”, “I don’t believe what companies tell 
me”, and “companies lie” to name a few, and these negative attitudes apply not only 
toward the offending firm but also generalizes toward other firms.  By being transparent, 
firms may be able to reduce consumer skepticism by disconfirming “schemer schemas” 
(Friestad & Wright, 1994) that consumers hold about marketers.  To consumers 
transparency suggests that a firm has nothing to hide.  Similar to a glass building in 
which everything inside of it is visible, a transparent firm openly shares information 
about itself, whether good or bad, acting as an “advocate” (Urban, 2003) for its 
customers.  As a result, transparency should reduce disbelief and doubt.  Transparency is 
hypothesized to reduce consumer skepticism.   
 
H4: Perceived transparency has a negative effect on consumer skepticism.   
 
Trust.  Trust is defined here as confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability and 
integrity (Ahearne et al., 2007; Eisingerich & Bell, 2008; Yim et al., 2008).  Trust is a 
key mediating variable (KMV) between firm actions and stakeholder actions (Morgan & 
Hunt, 1994).   Trust implies that one is willing to assume the risk that goes along with 
taking action based on the reliance of another (Stanley, Meyer, & Topolnytsky, 2005).  
Therefore a consumer that is trusting of a firm will be more likely to assume the risk 
inherent in relying on a firm’s marketing messages as input in the purchase decision-
making process.  As previously noted, skeptical consumers are more likely to have a 
generalized disbelief of marketer actions, and thus are less likely to trust firms’ marketing 
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messages. Therefore, when skepticism is present, consumers increase the vigilance with 
which consumers protect themselves from blindly trusting firms.  When skepticism is 
absent, consumers may decrease their protection mechanisms (such as counter-arguing 
claims), and allow themselves to more ‘blindly’ trust a firm’s marketing messages. 
Conceptual, empirical and practitioner literature suggests that trust may be a 
consequence of transparency (Bryant, 2010; Lazarus & McManus, 2006; O'Malley et al., 
2009; Rawlins, 2008).  For example, Urban (2009) suggests that transparency impacts 
trust, it’s important to building trust, and a “lack of transparency can be a ‘trust buster’”.  
Others note that transparency is needed to create a sense of trustworthiness (Lazarus & 
McManus, 2006; O'Malley et al., 2009) and “transparency is the necessary ingredient for 
the development of trustworthy and accountable institutions” (Vaccaro & Madsen, 
2009b). 
Transparency may engender trust especially when it is seen to weaken a firm’s 
persuasion abilities.  According to the Persuasion Knowledge Model (Friestad & Wright, 
1994), both consumers and firms use their knowledge of each other, the situation, and 
persuasion tactics to cope with and react to each other’s persuasive attempts.  This is 
much like what happens in a negotiation setting in which both negotiators use all the 
information available to them about the other negotiator, his/her situation, and the 
persuasion tactics being used to attain his/her goal.    Thus negotiation literature may 
provide some insight into the relationship between transparency and trust.  One study 
shows in a negotiation context that being transparent (by disclosing potentially damaging 
information to one’s negotiation power)  impacts liking and trust for the negotiator 
(Paese, Schreiber, & Taylor, 2003).  The authors of this study note that the discloser 
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“may have appeared to weaken his/her bargaining position for the sake of being honest” 
(Paese et al., 2003).   
Finally, in a study investigating consumer acceptance of start-up firms, DeKinder 
and Kohli (2008) infer that consumers may interpret transparency as an indication of a 
firm’s trustworthiness, especially in the absence of other referential information such as 
prior experiences with the firm (DeKinder & Kohli, 2008). Formally: 
 
H5: Perceived transparency has a positive effect on trust. 
 
It is proposed that transparency will also have direct effects on attitudes toward 
the firm and purchase intentions.  This may be the case especially when transparency is 
used to infer product quality. There will always be some level of uncertainty regarding 
product quality until one actually tries the product and verifies the product quality for 
him/herself (Dawar & Parker, 1994).  Therefore transparency may be one signal used by 
consumers to infer product quality.  Other signals of unobservable product quality 
include brand name, low short term introductory prices, high long term prices, warranties, 
money back guarantees (Kirmani & Rao, 2000), firm reputation (Dawar & Parker, 1994), 
and brand advertising (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986). 
Researchers propose that product quality signaling refers to a “rational consumer 
who expects a firm to honor the implicit commitment conveyed through a signal because 
not honoring the commitment is economically unwise” (Kirmani & Rao, 2000).  
Transparency as a signal suggests that a firm is open and forthright with regard to both 
positive and negative information about itself and about its products.  When firms adopt 
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transparency into their culture it may force a higher standard of product quality because 
the firm knows it will be required to communicate the quality level of its products if 
prompted to do so; and communicating that the product is of poor quality risks a loss in 
sales.  With this in mind, consumers may infer that transparent firms hold themselves to a 
higher standard of product quality and may base attitudes toward the firm and purchase 
intention on transparency as a product quality signal.  Following is a more detailed 
discussion of the relationship between attitude toward the firm, purchase intention, and 
transparency. 
Attitude toward the firm.  Attitude toward the firm is defined as a consumer’s 
“overall global expression of favorable or unfavorable feelings” toward the firm and is 
generally expressed in terms of liking/disliking and good/bad (Hair, Bush, & Ortinau, 
2009).   
  The interaction between a firm and consumers can be characterized as one where 
one side may attempt to persuade the other to achieve their goals while the other side uses 
their knowledge of such tactics to accept or reject such attempts in an effort to get the 
best possible outcome for themselves (Campbell & Kirmani, 2008).  This is very similar 
to what happens in negotiations between two parties therefore negotiation literature may 
aid in understanding the relationship between transparency and attitudes toward the firm.  
Negotiation literature shows that negotiators who have “inside” information feel more 
successful in negotiations compared to negotiators who do not have inside information 
(Brodt, 1994).  This is relevant because transparency ensures “inside” information is 
made known for the consumer to see.  Interestingly, this study also shows that the success 
metric used by negotiators differs depending on whether the negotiator has the inside 
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information or not.  In particular, negotiators who do not have the inside information base 
their success evaluation more on price (indicated by a significant negative correlation 
between price and success evaluation, p<.01).  On the other hand, negotiators who have 
the inside information base their success evaluation more on some interpersonal standard 
of fairness (indicated by a non-significant correlation between price and success 
evaluation, p<.42) (Brodt, 1994).  Transparent firms are those that share information that 
ordinarily may not be shared.  Firms that are transparent will allow consumers to see 
processes behind the firm’s decisions.  To some degree this indicates that firms may 
benefit from being transparent via customers basing their attitudes on fairness standards 
rather than on price alone which is important in creating value.  Finally, this study also 
shows that when buyers have inside information, both buyers and sellers shared feelings 
of success (Brodt, 1994) making it a “win-win” for both parties.  Paralleling the 
negotiation literature findings, transparent firms are those that allow consumers to feel 
successful in their interactions with firms by being open and forthright, and this may lead 
to positive attitudes toward the firm.  
Thus it is proposed (and illustrated in H6) that transparency has a direct effect on 
attitudes toward the firm.  
 
H6: Perceived transparency has a positive effect on attitudes toward the firm. 
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Purchase Intention.  According to Ajzen (1991), “intentions are assumed to 
capture the motivational factors that influence a behavior; they are indications of how 
hard people are willing to try, of how much of an effort they are planning to exert, in 
order to perform the behavior.  Literature has shown that consumers’ behavioral 
intentions are influenced by the evaluations that consumers make about firms (Fernandes 
& Proenca, 2008; Gremler & Gwinner, 2000; Holzwarth, Janiszewski, & Neumann, 
2006).  Generally, positive evaluations should increase such behaviors, and likewise, 
negative evaluations should decrease such behaviors (Ajzen, 1991).   
Transparency implies that firms will go the “extra mile” to ensure consumers are 
well-informed.  Researchers have found that consumers reward firms for extra effort and 
extra effort is a significant predictor of likelihood of patronage, attitude toward 
salespersons, increased willingness to pay, and more positive overall ratings (Morales, 
2005).  Transparency is a positive evaluation of a firm which is hypothesized to increase 
purchase intention.  Thus it is proposed (and illustrated in H7) that transparency has a 
direct effect on purchase intention over and above the mediating effects.   
 
H7: Perceived transparency has a positive effect on purchase intention. 
 
Mediators.  It is proposed that consumer skepticism and trust mediate the 
relationships of transparency and consumer’s attitude toward the firm and transparency 
and purchase intention.  This mediating relationship is in addition to the direct effects of 
transparency on attitude and purchase intention. If a marketer can positively influence 
consumer skepticism and trust, then this should have a positive effect on the perception 
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of the company and its products.  It has been widely shown that attitudes toward 
attributes of an object impact overall attitudes toward that object and subsequent 
behavioral intentions toward the object (Ajzen, 1991).  Generally, less skeptical 
consumers should hold more favorable attitudes toward the firm and should be more 
likely to want to purchase from it (Darke & Ritchie, 2007; DeCarlo, 2005; Friestad & 
Wright, 1994; Kirmani & Zhu, 2007; Obermiller & Spangenberg, 1998) .  In an 
environment where skepticism of marketing actions is prevalent, it is reasonable to 
assume that consumers are more likely to want to buy from firms perceived to be 
transparent and less likely to want to buy from firms lacking transparency, assuming 
same situation and constraints on both firms.  Transparency should instill confidence in 
one’s decisions and thus enable him/her to make a purchase (Urban, Amyx, & Lorenzon, 
2009).  Likewise, consumers who perceive firms to be more trustworthy should hold 
more favorable attitudes toward it and should be more likely to purchase from it.   
 
H8: The impact of transparency on attitude toward the firm is partially mediated 
by (a) consumer skepticism and (b) trust. 
 
H9: The impact of transparency on purchase intention is partially mediated by (a) 
consumer skepticism and (b) trust. 
 
Finally, attitude toward the firm should have positive impact on purchase 
intention.  This relationship of attitudes impacting intentions are well established (Ajzen, 
1991; Holzwarth et al., 2006). 
 
H10: The impact of attitude toward the firm should positively impact purchase 
intention. 
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Moderating role of perceived motives.  Finally, it is proposed that perceived 
motives will moderate the relationships of transparency and skepticism and transparency 
and trust.  This dissertation proposes that transparency should have a fairly strong impact 
in reducing consumer skepticism and increasing trust without considering the impact of 
perceived firm motives.  Taking into account perceived motives, the strength of the 
relationships will be less when the firm’s motives for being transparent are perceived as 
firm-serving compared to when these motives are perceived as other-serving.  These 
effects are shown in Figures 3 and 4.  For example, Figure 3 shows skepticism as a 
function of transparency and the two lines sloping down and to the right have different 
slopes under conditions of high perceived firm transparency.  Conversely, Figure 4 shows 
trust as a function of transparency and the two lines sloping up and to the right have 
different slopes under conditions of high perceived firm transparency. 
According to the literature stream grounded in the Persuasion Knowledge Model 
(Friestad & Wright, 1994) when motives of a firm are salient to the consumer, the 
consumer reacts with resistance, or coping behaviors, to what might be perceived as 
persuasion attempts.  Generally, the types of motives can be categorized as either firm-
serving or other-serving (Forehand & Grier, 2003).  Firm-serving motives are those in 
which a firm’s behaviors are perceived to benefit the firm.  Other-serving motives are 
those in which a firm’s behaviors are perceived to benefit others.  Perceptions of firm-
serving motives have been found to decrease: perceptions of salesperson sincerity 
(Campbell & Kirmani, 2000), attitude toward a firm’s corporate social responsibility 
efforts (Menon & Varadarajan, 1992), attitude toward the brand, firm, and communicator 
(Wei et al., 2008), and purchase intention (Ashley & Leonard, 2009).  
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Formally: 
H11: The influence of transparency on (a) consumer skepticism and (b) and trust is 
moderated by perceived motives. 
 
Specifically, it is proposed that the impact of transparency on skepticism will be greater 
with perceptions of other-serving motive attributions than with perceptions of firm-
serving motive attributions. Likewise, the impact of transparency on trust will be greater 
with perceptions of other-serving motive attributions than with perceptions of firm-
serving motive attributions.  Figures 3 and 4 illustrate this interaction. 
 
 
Figure 3: Interaction of Transparency and Motives on Consumer Skepticism 
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Figure 4: Interaction of Transparency and Motives on Trust 
 
Table 4 summarizes the hypotheses proposed in this chapter. 
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Table 4: List of Hypotheses 
H1: Consumer perceived effort toward learning about a firm has a negative effect on perceptions of 
transparency. 
H2: Perceived firm reciprocity has a positive effect on perceptions of transparency. 
H3: Information provided by a firm that is perceived as firm-damaging has a positive effect on 
perceptions of transparency. 
H4: Perceived firm transparency has a negative effect on consumer skepticism. 
H5: Perceived firm transparency has a positive effect on trust. 
H6: Perceived firm transparency has a positive effect on attitudes toward the firm. 
H7: Perceived firm transparency has a positive effect on purchase intention. 
H8: The impact of transparency on attitude toward the firm is partially mediated by (a) consumer 
skepticism and (b) trust. 
H9: The impact of transparency on purchase intention is partially mediated by (a) consumer skepticism 
and (b) trust. 
H10: Attitude toward the firm has a positive effect on purchase intention. 
H11: The influence of transparency on (a) consumer skepticism and (b) and trust is moderated by 
perceived firm motives.  Specifically, when the firm’s motives for being transparent are perceived to be 
firm-serving, the effect of transparency on skepticism will be less than when the motives are perceived 
as other-serving.  When the firm’s motives for being transparent are perceived to be firm-serving, the 
effect of transparency on trust will be less than when the motives are perceived as other-serving. 
 
Chapter Summary 
Following the flow of Figures of 1 and 2, this chapter addressed three questions.  
First, when are perceptions of transparency formed in the minds of consumers?  It was 
proposed that perceptions of transparency are formed during a communication interaction 
with firms in which a consumer has the goal to reduce ambiguity and uncertainty toward 
the firm or its products.  Several transparency cues were proposed as antecedents to 
perceptions of transparency including consumer effort, reciprocity, and firm 
communication of information perceived as firm-damaging. 
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Second, what triggers perceptions of transparency to become salient?  It was 
proposed that expectation disconfirmations above a certain threshold activate 
transparency perceptions.  Below the threshold, transparency cues were proposed to 
affect attitudes toward the firm and purchase intention by way of nonconscious heuristic 
processing.  Above the threshold, transparency cues were proposed to affect perceived 
transparency of the firm in one of two possible ways.  The first is by conscious heuristic 
processing which was proposed to occur given no motivation or ability to resolve the 
expectation disconfirmation.  The second is by systematic processing which was 
proposed to occur by way of attribution causal reasoning, given sufficient motivation or 
ability to resolve the expectation disconfirmation.   
The final question this chapter addressed was what are some consequences of 
transparency?  Several consequences of transparency were proposed.  Transparency was 
proposed to reduce consumer skepticism, and increase perceptions of trust, attitude 
toward the firm, and purchase intention.  Also introduced were motive attributions as a 
moderator influencing the impact of transparency perceptions on consumer skepticism 
and trust.  
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CHAPTER 5: SCALE DEVELOPMENT 
 
The purpose of Chapter 5 is to develop the transparency scale.  There are two 
main studies in this chapter with a few phases within each study.  Study 1 consists of 
three phases: 1) scale item generation and testing the face validity of those scale items to 
be applied in the subsequent phase, 2) exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to determine the 
underlying dimensions of transparency and to reduce the number of indicators, and 3) 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to validate the psychometric properties of the scale 
developed through the EFA and to test its predictive and nomological validities. Study 2 
is dedicated to further validating the transparency scale and testing its psychometric 
properties and validity.   
The procedure for developing the transparency scale follows accepted scale 
development procedures found in marketing and psychology literatures (Churchill, 1979; 
Gerbing & Anderson, 1988; Spector, 1992; Voss, Spangenberg, & Grohmann, 2003; 
Walsh & Beatty, 2007).  Subjects for all of the studies are undergraduate business 
students.  Subjects were not permitted to participate in more than one data collection 
therefore all of the subjects were unique across each data collection, and this includes the 
data collections for the pretests. 
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Study 1 
Phase 1 
Phase 1 included scale item generation and initial purification of scale items. 
 Procedure.  First a pool of scale items were drawn from the literature review, 
focus groups, interviews, and open-ended surveys.  The literature and transcripts from the 
qualitative research were coded into themes.  The theme coding procedure and associated 
theme validation procedure is discussed in detail in chapter 3.  The preliminary pool of 
items included 34 statements intended to reflect the transparency definition.   
This initial set of items was reviewed for readability and clarity by four 
independent judges (Marketing Ph.D. students).  Each judge was provided with the 
definition of transparency and was asked to rate each scale item as either “clearly 
representative”, “somewhat representative”, or “not representative” of the transparency 
definition provided.  This process is consistent with other scale development research 
(Bruner & Kumar, 2007; Walsh & Beatty, 2007).   
A scale item was either deleted or modified based on feedback if it was not 
consistently rated “clearly representative”. There were several cases in which a scale item 
was rated by half of the judges as “clearly representative” and by the other half of the 
judges as “somewhat representative”.  In total there were six scale items that were either 
deleted or modified based on these criteria.  The scale item, “This company explains its 
decisions to me” is one example in which the judges were split between “somewhat 
representative” and “clearly representative”.  One judge commented:  
 
“A company may be transparent but not have the resources to explain 
its decisions to customers”.   
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The item was modified to explicitly reflect a willingness to explain decisions: “This 
company is willing to explain its decisions to me”.  The scale item, “I know what to 
expect when I deal with this company” is an example of one that was deleted from the 
set.  One judge commented: 
“The company could be transparent and it would not guarantee that 
you would know what to expect during your interactions, 
transparency would help though.” 
The judges had two additional tasks.  Judges were also asked to identify items 
which were unclear or ambiguous and to provide suggestions for improving the scale 
item’s clarity.  The judges provided a few suggestions.  For example, two judges 
commented regarding the scale item, “When the company makes a decision, I know 
about it”:  
“Could ‘I know about it’ be understood as it's the stakeholder's 
responsibility to go find the info?”  
 
“The information may be out there for major decisions but it is 
unrealistic to think that consumers can or should know all of the 
decisions that are made.” 
 
The scale item was modified to: “When the company makes decisions, it affords me the 
opportunity to know about it”.  There was also a scale item that asked subjects to respond 
to a company’s “behavior” (“This company tries to hide its bad behavior”).  Given 
concern that this term would cause confusion with subjects, “behavior” was changed to 
“the things that it does” (“This company tries to hide the bad things that it does”). 
 Finally, judges were asked to provide additional scale items that they believed 
would represent the transparency definition if they thought of any while participating in 
the content validitation of the pool of scale items.  Items were suggested to measure the 
“relevant” aspect of transparency behaviors: “The company shares information about 
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itself that is important to me, rather than just any random information” and “I feel that the 
information the company shares with me is useless to me” (reverse code).  Both items 
were added to the pool. 
 Results.  Although most scale development studies have a much larger pool of 
items, a pool of 20-30 items is appropriate when the construct is narrowly defined and the 
final scale is expected to have no more than 10 scale items (Netemeyer, Bearden, & 
Sharma, 2003).  Table 5 provides the final set of 31 transparency scale items which 
reflect a reflective construct in relation to its indicators (scale items).  Conceptualization 
of the construct in relation to its indicators is that of a reflective model in which the 
direction of causality is from the construct to the item (Jarvis, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 
2003; MacKenzie, 2003).  A construct is reflective when “indicators are manifestations of 
the construct” (Jarvis et al., 2003) such as personality and attitude constructs 
(Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001) and formative when indicators “are observed 
variables that are assumed to cause the latent variable (Bollen & Lennox, 1991; 
Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001) such as the index of sustainable economic welfare 
and the quality-of-life index (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001).  Other indications 
that a construct should be reflective include: “indicators should be interchangeable and 
have similar content (share a common theme), “dropping an indicator should not alter the 
conceptual domain of the construct”, and indicators are expected to covary” (Jarvis et al., 
2003).  Formative constructs are described as having the opposite defining characteristics 
to those described above for reflective constructs.   
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Table 5: Study 1, Scale Items Subjected to EFA 
Name Scale Item 
TRANSP1 This company is candid.   
TRANSP2 This company is straightforward in telling me what I want to know.   
TRANSP3 This company tries to hide the bad things it does.  (R) 
TRANSP4 This company tries to hide the good things that it does.  (R) 
TRANSP5 Generally, this company tries to hide the things that it does.  (R) 
TRANSP6 This company gives me false expectations. (R) 
TRANSP7 This company is clear with me.  
TRANSP8 This company readily admits failures. 
TRANSP9 This company is willing to share its failures with me.  
TRANSP10 
This company is willing to share information with me even when it may make 
the company look bad.  
TRANSP11 This company is genuine with me.  
TRANSP12  This company exposes itself to criticism.  
TRANPS13 This company beats around the bush when communicating with me. (R) 
TRANSP14 This company faces problems without hesitation. 
TRANSP15 This company puts everything "out on the table" for all to see.  
TRANPS16 This company provides me with a learning opportunity about itself.  
TRANSP17 
I envision this company as a glass building in which everything inside is visible 
for all to see.  
TRANSP18 This company enables me to know what it's doing.  
TRANSP19 This company allows its customers to see how it's doing.  
TRANSP20 When the company makes decisions, it gives me the ability to know about it.  
TRANSP21 This company helps me understand why it behaves the way it does. 
TRANSP22 This company is willing to explain its decisions to me. 
TRANSP23 This company is willing to tell me how it really feels about the products it sells.  
TRANSP24 This company is willing to share bad things about itself or about its products.  
TRANSP25 This company is willing to share just about any information I request from it.  
TRANSP26 
I feel as if this company doesn't mind me seeing what's going on behind its 
closed doors. 
TRANSP27 This company wants me to understand what it is doing.  
TRANSP28 
This company shares information about itself that is important to me, rather than 
just any random information. 
TRANSP29 I feel that the information this company shares with me is useless to me. (R) 
TRANSMNP_OPN This company is open with me. 
TRANSMNP_FRT This company is forthright with me. 
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Phase 2 
Phase 2 served to reduce the number of items, provide an initial structure to the 
scale, and assess internal consistency through EFA.  Generally, factor analysis requires a 
minimum of 5-10 observations per variable (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 
2006a) but this varies depending on degrees of freedom and desired power and 
significance levels (MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996).   
 Method.  The data collection lasted five days.  Students of a large Basic 
Marketing course were recruited to participate in the study via an email distributed by the 
teacher’s assistant.  There were 263 completed surveys.  Students received extra credit 
for participating in the study. 
Procedure.  Participants in the study were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions, high or low transparency.  They responded to an online survey in which they 
were asked to think about a company they are familiar with or have interacted with in the 
past and, in particular, focus on a company that they thought was open and forthright (not 
open and not forthright) with them during some interaction with the company.  
Definitions for ‘open’ and ‘forthright’ were provided to ensure respondents understood 
the task.  Subjects in the ‘open and forthright’ condition were told: 
 “Open is defined as: 1.Not closed. 2. Accessible or available. 3. Exposed 
to general view. 4. Uncovered. 5. Open to or in full view of all. 6. 
Relatively free of obstructions to sight.   
 
Forthright is defined as: 1. Going straight to the point; 2. Direct. 3. Being a 
straight shooter. 4. To face a problem squarely and directly. 5. Directly 
and frankly. 6. Without hesitation.” 
 
Subjects in the ‘not open and not forthright’ condition were told: 
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“NOT Open is defined as: 1.Closed. 2. Unaccessible or unavailable. 3. Not 
exposed to general view. 4. Covered. 5. Not open to or in full view of all. 
6. Not free of obstructions to sight. 
   
Not Forthright is defined as: 1. Not going straight to the point; 2. Indirect, 
roundabout. 3. Not being a straight shooter. 4. To not face a problem 
squarely and directly. 5. Indirectly and not frankly. 6. With hesitation.” 
Subjects were required to provide the name of the company, a description of its 
products/services, and a detailed example or reason as to why this company fits the 
criteria.  Respondents were then exposed to the 31 transparency scale items.  The 31 scale 
items were presented in blocks of 5-7 scale items to break up the long list of items.  The 
blocks were randomized and the scale items within each block were randomized.  
The EFA was conducted with the SAS program, version 9.2, utilizing the PROC 
FACTOR syntax.  This study utilized common factor analysis which derives underlying 
latent constructs from only shared variance.  Common factor analysis is also more 
appropriate when variable reduction is a goal.   Iterated Principal Axis factor analysis was 
utilized to reduce the number of scale items and assess the underlying structure of the 
variables.  The prior communality estimates (h
2
) were estimated from the squared 
multiple correlations (R
2
) between each variable and all other variables by including the 
PRIORS = SMC syntax.  With this procedure 1s on the diagonal of the correlation matrix 
are replaced with the communality estimates.  The unrotated solution was used.  All 
variables loaded significantly onto just one factor (see Table 5).   
Results.  The variables that were subjected to EFA correspond to those in Table 5.  
The mean and standard deviations for those variables are also listed in Table 6.  The 
variables denoted with an “R” (i.e. TRANSP3R) are reverse-items therefore the scores 
for these items have been adjusted.  
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Table 6: Study 1, Variable Item Means and Standard Deviations 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
TRANSP1           4.28 1.64 
TRANSP2           4.54 2.07 
TRANSP3R          4.14 1.82 
TRANSP4R          5.62 1.38 
TRANSP5R          4.75 1.74 
TRANSP6R          4.43 2.14 
TRANSP7           4.48 2.10 
TRANSP8           3.70 1.74 
TRANSP9           3.70 1.75 
TRANSP10          3.72 1.78 
TRANSP11          4.43 2.07 
TRANSP12          4.21 1.60 
TRANSP13R         4.35 2.12 
TRANSP14          4.37 1.83 
TRANSP15          4.13 2.10 
TRANPS16          4.58 1.90 
TRANSP17          3.78 2.01 
TRANSP18          4.45 1.93 
TRANSP19          4.66 1.87 
TRANSP20          4.20 1.78 
TRANSP21          4.25 1.96 
TRANSP22          4.25 1.96 
TRANSP23          4.79 1.95 
TRANSP24          3.69 1.76 
TRANSP25          4.19 1.88 
TRANSP26          4.10 2.02 
TRANSP27          4.54 2.01 
TRANSP28          4.50 1.91 
TRANSP29R         4.81 1.75 
TRANSMNP_OPN      4.39 2.18 
TRANSMNP_FRT      4.45 2.16 
 
The first step was to ensure the appropriateness of the data for EFA.  Three 
assessments were completed which included 1) reviewing the correlation matrix for 
multicollinearity among variables, 2) checking the Measure of sampling adequacy for the 
entire correlation matrix as well as for individual variables, and 3) assessing normality 
through kurtosis and skewness.   
Regarding multicollinearity, although some degree of correlation is ideal for 
factor analysis, overly high correlations may indicate redundancy in variables making it 
difficult to assess the unique contribution of a single variable (Hair et al., 2006a).  One 
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such pair of variables that was highly correlated was TRANS_OPN (“This company is 
open with me”) and TRANS_FRT (“This company is forthright with me”) (r = .93, p< 
.0001).  The decision was made to leave both variables in the data analysis at this stage 
because these variables have extremely high content validity. 
The Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) tests the appropriateness of factor 
analysis by assessing the degree of inter-correlations among variables (Hair et al., 2006a).  
The rule of thumb for this measure is .50 or greater for the overall MSA value as well as 
for each variable and the MSA values are described as follows: 0 - .50 = unacceptable, 
.51 – 60 = miserable, .61 - .70 = mediocre, .71 - .80 = middling, and .81 – 1 = meritorious 
(Kaiser, 1970).  The overall MSA value for this data was .97 indicating the data is 
“meritoriously” appropriate for factor analysis.  Each individual variable’s MSA value 
was also assessed.  The “mediocre” threshold of .70 was applied in assessing variables 
for possible deletion.  For individual MSA values, the variable with the lowest MSA 
should be deleted first and the factor analysis rerun until all variables meet the pre-
specified threshold (Hair et al., 2006a).  There was one variable that did not meet the 
threshold TRANSP4R (“Company tries to hide the good things it does”) (MSA = .56).  
This variable was deleted and the analysis was rerun.  After rerunning the EFA without 
TRANSP4R, the overall MSA was .97 and all other variables had meritorious MSA 
values of at least .93 indicating it was appropriate to move to the next step in the factor 
analysis process. 
Finally, normality was assessed by evaluating the kurtosis and skewness of each 
variable.  Generally, variables with kurtosis > 2 and skewness >1 are considered to be 
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non-normally distributed.  All variables in this data set fell within the acceptable range 
for kurtosis and skewness indicating normal distribution. 
The second step was to examine the factor loadings.  Based on a power level of 
80%, n = 250, and significance level of .05, factor loadings +/- .35 are considered 
significant (Hair et al., 2006a), however a more stringent criteria of .70 was applied as the 
cut-off for retaining variables to meet practical significance.  Loadings of +/- .70 indicate 
a “well-defined structure” and are “the goal of any factor analysis” (Hair et al. page 128).  
Four variables (TRANSP1 = .53, TRANSP12 = .42, TRANSP14 = .64, and TRANSP29R 
= .61) did not meet the .70 pre-specified cut-off and were deleted.  Two variables 
(TRANSP8 = .69 and TRANSP10 = .69) were close enough to the cut-off and were 
retained for further analysis. Finally, there were no significant cross-loadings indicating a 
rotated solution was not required. 
The third step included an assessment of the communalities. The communality 
estimate is the amount of variance explained for each variable in the factor solution.  A 
rule of thumb is to delete those variables in which the factor structure explains less than 
50% (Hair et al., 2006a), but for more practical significance, a more stringent threshold of 
.60 was applied.  Four variables (TRANSP1 = .32, TRANSP12 = .42, TRANSP14 = .52, 
and TRANSP29R = .49) did not meet the threshold of at least .60.  Note that these same 
variables also did not meet the .70 factor loading threshold of .70.  They were deleted 
from further analysis.  One variable (TRANSP8 = .59) was close enough to the cut-off 
that it was retained for further analysis.  Note that this variable was also close to the .70 
factor loading cut-off. 
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The fourth step was to derive an appropriate number of factors.  This step was 
conducted after deleting the variables that did not meet the criteria outlined in steps 1, 2, 
and 3 and after the EFA re-run. Eigenvalues and scree plots were assessed.  A priori it 
was thought that either one factor or two factors representing “open” and “forthright” 
may emerge, however the interpretation of the data was not guided by this notion. Table 
7 provides the factor pattern loadings. 
All variables loaded significantly onto one factor.  However, the eigenvalues 
indicated the data may represent two factors based on the eigenvalue greater than 1 
criterion.  The eigenvalues were 17.01 and 1.01 with these factors explaining 88.32% and 
5.24% of the total retained variance respectively.  The third factor had an eigenvalue of 
.55 and explained 2.85% of the retained variance.  According to Hair et al. (2006; page 
120), there is no threshold for the total amount of variance extracted by all factors.  The 
number of factors extracted in the natural sciences should often explain at least 95% of 
the retained variance and stop with those factors explaining 5% or less of the retained 
variance. However it is common for the total retained variance extracted by all factors to 
be closer to 60% in the social sciences and still be considered satisfactory.   
The scree plot indicates potential cut-offs at one, two, or six factors.  There is a 
significant drop from factor one to factor two as the eigenvalues would indicate and there 
is a smaller drop after factors two and six, at which the scree plot plateaus.   
Based on the eigenvalue greater than 1 rule of thumb, a two factor solution is 
appropriate.  However, because all variables loaded significantly onto one, it would be 
difficult and arbitrary to determine the appropriate variables to assign to each of the two 
factors.  Therefore the decision was made to move forward with a one factor solution, 
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rather than a multi-factor solution, for two main reasons.  First, all variables loaded 
significantly onto one factor with no significant cross-loadings, indicating a one factor 
solution is ideal.  Second, one eigenvalue contributed to a significant portion of the 
variance and the second factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1 barely reaches this 
threshold (factor 2 = 1.01).  The scree plot shows a significant drop from factor 1 to 
factor two. 
Table 7: Study 1, EFA Factor Pattern Loadings  
Factor Pattern Loadings 
 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
TRANSP2 0.88 -0.07 -0.04 0.01 -0.09 
TRANSP3R 0.72 -0.24 0.22 0.16 0.04 
TRANSP5R 0.72 -0.51 0.10 0.28 0.20 
TRANSP6R 0.81 -0.32 0.07 0.01 -0.08 
TRANSP7 0.90 -0.10 -0.02 -0.10 -0.13 
TRANSP8 0.68 0.23 0.21 0.05 0.08 
TRANSP9 0.74 0.27 0.28 -0.01 0.10 
TRANSP10 0.68 0.34 0.27 -0.03 0.05 
TRANSP11 0.89 -0.07 0.04 -0.08 -0.11 
TRANSP13R 0.73 -0.29 0.04 -0.03 0.01 
TRANSP15 0.85 0.14 -0.16 0.28 -0.17 
TRANPS16 0.80 0.03 -0.16 -0.12 0.12 
TRANSP17 0.82 0.22 -0.13 0.27 -0.18 
TRANSP18 0.86 0.09 -0.17 0.03 0.06 
TRANSP19 0.79 0.03 -0.13 0.06 0.11 
TRANSP20 0.81 0.04 -0.26 -0.01 0.16 
TRANSP21 0.85 -0.01 -0.13 -0.03 0.03 
TRANSP22 0.86 0.10 -0.13 -0.08 0.07 
TRANSP23 0.76 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 0.03 
TRANSP24 0.75 0.27 0.19 0.07 0.00 
TRANSP25 0.79 0.16 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 
TRANSP26 0.81 0.11 -0.01 0.07 -0.02 
TRANSP27 0.86 -0.03 -0.06 -0.17 0.06 
TRANSP28 0.82 -0.02 0.01 -0.10 0.08 
TRANSPOPN 0.90 -0.14 0.09 -0.18 -0.15 
TRANSPFRT 0.90 -0.16 0.13 -0.14 -0.15 
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The fifth and final step was to assess the convergent validity of the one factor 
model by assessing its factor loadings, variance extracted, and reliability.  Convergent 
validity is the extent of shared variance among a construct’s set of indicators and thus 
convergent validity exists when the indicators are highly correlated (Netemeyer et al., 
2003) Evidence of convergent validity exists when: 1) ideally all variables have factor 
loadings greater than .7, 2) average variance extracted exceeds .5, and 3) reliability 
exceeds .7 (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006c).  First, as Table 7 indicates, 
the factor loadings ranged from .68 to .90 with all but two meeting the ideal threshold of 
.7.  Second, average variance extracted (AVE) was .65.  AVE is the average of the sum of 
the squared factor loadings and is an indication of the amount of shared variance between 
the measures compared to the error (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Hair et al., 2006c; 
Netemeyer et al., 2003).  The AVE of .65 suggests there is more shared variance than 
error for the variables which is above the reasonable threshold of .50 for newly developed 
scales (Netemeyer et al., 2003).  Finally, two internal reliability measures are commonly 
used to assess convergent validity, Cronbach’s coefficient alpha which assesses the 
degree of inter-item correlations, and composite reliability which assesses the variance 
extracted compared to the error in the model.  The generally agreed upon lower limit for 
Cronbach’s alpha is .70 and the rule of thumb for inter-item correlations is that they 
should exceed .30 (Hair et al., 2006a).  Coefficient alpha for this scale is .98 with item-
total correlations ranging from .67 to .89.  The composite reliability measure is computed 
from the squared sum of factor loadings and the sum of the error variance.  Like 
Cronbach’s alpha, the ideal estimate value is .7 or greater to provide sufficient evidence 
of convergent validity.  The composite reliability estimate is .97 for these scale items. 
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The data analysis proceeded to phase 3, confirmatory factor analysis, since the 
construct reliability exceeded minimum thresholds and provided evidence for convergent 
validity of the scale items derived from EFA. 
Phase 3 
The purpose of phase 3 was to confirm the model derived through EFA and to test 
its validity.  A second sample of student subjects was utilized.   
Method.  The data collection lasted five days.  Students of a large, online Basic 
Marketing course were recruited to participate in the study via an email distributed by the 
teacher’s assistant.  There were 316 completed surveys.  Students received extra credit 
for participating in the study. 
Procedure.  The study’s design was identical to that of phase 2.  Participants in 
the study were randomly assigned to either the high transparency or low transparency 
condition.  Data for all variables from phase 2 were again collected in phase 3.  
Additional constructs were also included in the survey to test for convergent, 
discriminant, and nomological validity.  These constructs included communication 
openness to test for discriminant validity with a known and similar construct in the 
marketing literature, and skepticism, trust, attitude toward the firm, and purchase 
intention to test for both discriminant and nomological validities with the dependent 
variable constructs within the proposed theoretical model (Figure 2).   
The 26-variable transparency model that emerged through EFA was assessed for 
fit through CFA using the PROC CALIS procedure in SAS.  The chi-square was 1263.30 
(p<.0001) on 299 degrees of freedom (df).  Significant chi-square values indicate the 
model does not perfectly fit the data based on comparing the actual and estimated 
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covariance matrices.  However, significant chi-squares are typically expected, especially 
for N>250 and m (number of variables in the model) > 12 (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, 
& Tatham, 2006b).  Additional fit indices were inspected.  Based on the rules of thumb 
for a sample of this size (N>250) and m between 12 and 30, the model fit indices 
generally indicated a very poor fit to the data based on absolute (e.g. SRMSR = .05, GFI 
= .73), parsimony (e.g. RMSEA = .10), and incremental indices (e.g. CFI = .88, and NFI 
= .85).  Although the SRMSR, which assesses the degree of residuals between the actual 
and reproduced covariance matrix, fits within the recommended threshold, all other 
indices do not. Ideally for this sample size and number of variables, SRMR should be 
below .08 (Hu & Bentler, 1998), RMSEA should be below .07, and incremental indices 
such as CFI and NFI should be above .92 (Hair et al., 2006b).  To diagnose the problem 
of poor fit, path estimates, residuals for variable pairs, and Lagrange Multiplier 
modification indices were assessed.  
First path estimates were assessed.  A few path estimates (TRANSP3R = .64, 
TRANSP5R = .64, TRANSP8 = .60, and TRANSP13R = .68) fell below the ideal 
threshold of .70. These four items were deleted and the analysis was rerun.  All path 
estimates were above the .70 threshold. 
Next, standardized residuals were assessed.  Residuals measure the difference 
between the observed covariance terms and the expected covariance terms (Hair et al., 
2006c).  The standardized residual output in SAS provides pairs of variables that have the 
highest residuals.  Variable pairs with standardized residuals between |2.5| and |4.0| 
should be investigated as potential candidates for deletion from the model (Hair et al., 
2006c).  Additionally, an “ideal” fitting model will have few residuals above |2.58| 
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(Hatcher, 1996).  There were 10 variable pairs well above the |4.0| threshold.  Table 8 
provides the rank order of the 10 largest standardized residual pairs. 
Table 8: Study 1, Rank Order of the 10 Largest Standardized Residuals 
Rank Order of the 10 Largest Asymptotically 
Standardized Residuals 
Var1 Var2 Residual 
TRANSPFRT TRANSPOPN 11.02 
TRANSP24 TRANSP9 8.51 
TRANSP10 TRANSP9 8.34 
TRANSP17 TRANSP15 7.68 
TRANSP6R TRANSP3R 7.41 
TRANSP5R TRANSP3R 7.05 
TRANSP7 TRANSP2 6.95 
TRANSP13R TRANSP6R 6.46 
TRANSP6R TRANSP5R 6.25 
TRANSP20 TRANSP19 5.77 
 
Variables were dropped one at a time and the model was re-specified after each variable 
dropped.  A total of 15 variables were dropped.  The model fit on the remaining seven 
variables will be discussed in the Results section. 
 Results.  Following is a discussion of the fit for the seven variable transparency 
model.  The chi-square was 12.90 (p=.53) on 14 degrees of freedom (df). Other fit indices 
were also inspected.  Given the sample size (N = 316) and the number of observed 
variables (m = 7), the model fit indices generally indicated a very good fit to the data 
based on absolute (e.g. SRMSR = .01, GFI = .99), parsimony (e.g. RMSEA = .00
1
, 
probability of close fit = .95), and incremental indices (e.g. CFI = 1, and NFI = .99).   
                                                             
 
1
 Note the RMSEA 90% lower confidence limit is .00 and the RMSEA 90% upper 
confidence limit is .05. 
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Table 9 provides the factor loadings, t-values, reliability, and fit statistics for the 
seven variable transparency scale that emerged through CFA testing. 
Table 9: Study 1, Factor Loadings for Seven Item Transparency Scale 
  Alpha = .93, CR = .94, AVE = .65 
Factor 
Loading 
t value 
(Std. error) 
TRANSP10 
This company is willing to share information 
with me even when it may make the company 
look bad.  
0.77 31.33 (.02) 
TRANPS16 
This company provides me with a learning 
opportunity about itself.  0.71 24 (.03) 
TRANSP18 
This company enables me to know what it's 
doing.  0.84 43.55 (.02) 
TRANSP22 
This company is willing to explain its 
decisions to me. 0.84 43.74 (.02) 
TRANSP25 
This company is willing to share just about 
any information I request from it.  0.77 30.43 (.02) 
TRANSP27 
This company wants me to understand what it 
is doing.  0.81 36.71 (.02) 
TRANSP_OPN This company is open with me. 0.9 63.69 (.01) 
Chi-Square (14, n = 316) = 12.90 (p=.53), SRMSR = .01, GFI = .99, RMSEA = .00,  
CFI = 1, NFI = .99 
 
Tests of validity.  The seven item scale that emerged through CFA was then tested 
for convergent, discriminant, and nomological validities.   
The transparency scale was tested for convergent validity by assessing factor 
loadings, variance extracted, and reliability. The factor loadings ranged from .71 to .90 
and AVE, the average of the sum of the squared factor loadings, was .65 which is well 
above the .50 recommended threshold.  Finally, Cronbach’s coefficient alpha and 
composite reliability (CR) were both assessed as Cronbach’s alpha may understate 
reliability (Hair et al., 2006c).  Coefficient alpha for this scale is .93 with item-total 
correlations ranging from .69 to .85.  The formula for calculating composite reliability is: 
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The composite reliability estimate is .94 for these scale items. 
Discriminant validity was assessed at two levels, first between transparency and 
communication openness, and second, between transparency and the other constructs in 
the proposed model that are dependent on transparency.  First, because perceived 
transparency is a new construct being proposed, discriminant validity was assessed 
between transparency and communication openness (COMOP).  Communication 
openness was discussed in Chapter 2 as a similar, yet distinct construct, and CFA will 
help clarify this notion.  Second, discriminant validity was assessed between constructs in 
the theoretical model.  These constructs include transparency, skepticism (SKEP), 
attitude toward the firm (ATT), purchase intention (PI), and trust (TRST).   
Prior to testing for discriminant validity, all scale items for the constructs were 
first subjected to individual EFA and internal reliability analyses even though these scales 
have been widely used in prior literature.    This is to ensure each of the scales exhibit 
good psychometric properties, and this includes convergent validity, uni-dimensionality, 
and internal consistency.  One scale in particular, communication openness, was 
especially important to assess for reliability because it was originally developed by its 
authors to measure two-way mutual communication between buyer and supplier in a 
business-to-business context (Smith & Barclay, 1997a).  Thus this measure was revised 
and adapted to fit the context of the current study. The skepticism scale used in this 
research was adapted from the skepticism toward television advertising scale (Boush, 
Friestad, & Rose, 1994).  Items were modified to reflect state-based skepticism toward a 
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particular firm, rather than a generalized predisposition of skepticism toward television 
advertising.  The trust scale was adapted from literature that conceptualizes this construct 
as confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability and integrity (Ahearne et al., 2007; 
Eisingerich & Bell, 2008; Yim et al., 2008).  The attitude toward the firm scale was 
adapted from literature that investigates favorable/unfavorable attitudes toward brands 
(Batra & Ray, 1986; Thomson, MacInnis, & Park, 2005).  Finally, purchase intention was 
adopted from literature which conceptualized this construct as a willingness to buy from 
a particular company (Holzwarth et al., 2006).  Appendix A provides the scale items used 
to measure each construct. 
For the EFA, those variables meeting a factor loading threshold of at least .40 
were retained which exceeds the minimum loading for significance (p<.05) for this 
sample size and a power level of 80%.  For internal reliability analyses, Cronbach’s 
coefficient alpha and the item-to-total correlations were assessed.  Those variables 
meeting at least .50 for item-to-total correlations and at least .30 for inter-item 
correlations were retained.  All variables were measured with 7-point Likert-type scales 
with the exception of those for attitude toward the firm which were measured with 7-
point bipolar scales.  Three of the five items were retained for the communication 
openness scale.  All three items were retained for the skepticism scale.  Four of the five 
items were retained for the trust scale.  All six items were retained for the attitude toward 
the firm scale.  All three items were retained for the purchase intention scale. 
Three steps were taken to test for discriminant validity between transparency and 
communication openness.  First, AVE for the transparency scale was compared to the 
square of the correlation estimate for the two constructs.  The AVE is the average squared 
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factor loading for the construct.  AVE for the two constructs should be greater than the 
square of correlations between those two constructs as an indication of discriminant 
validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).  The square of the correlation (R
2
 =.55) was less than 
the average variance extracted estimate for the two constructs (transparency = .65 and 
communication openness = .56).  
Second, a two-factor model was compared to a one-factor model with 
transparency and communication openness scale items constrained to one factor 
(Anderson and Gerbing 1988).  The overall model fit assessed by chi-square should be 
better with the two-factor model as an indication of discriminant validity.  The chi-square 
for the one-factor model was 136.14 (p<.001) and was 93.23 (p<.001) for the two-factor 
model, indicating a significant improvement in fit when separating the two constructs. 
The chi-square difference test with one degree of freedom was significant at p<.0005.  
Other fit indices such as the standardized RMSR (.03 vs. .05), RMSEA (.07 vs. .09), and 
CFI (.97 vs. .92) also showed improvement with the two constructs separated rather than 
in unity.   
Finally, the confidence interval for the correlation between the two constructs was 
evaluated.  If the confidence interval does not include one then this is an indication of 
discriminant validity (Anderson and Gerbing 1988).  The 95% confidence interval around 
the correlation between the two factors (r = .74) did not include 1.0 (lower bound = .68 
and upper bound = .78).  In sum, there is sufficient evidence for discriminant validity 
between transparency and communication openness taking into account AVE, chi-square 
tests for one and two factor models, and the confidence interval around the correlation. 
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Next, AVE, chi-square tests, and confidence intervals around correlations were 
assessed to investigate discriminant validity between transparency and: skepticism 
(SKEP), attitude toward the firm (ATT), purchase intention (PI), and trust (TRST).  The 
AVE for the four constructs were .56 (COMOP), .92 (TRST), .82 (SKEP), .89 (ATT), 
and .92 (PI).  As previously mentioned, the AVE for TRANSP was .65.  Transparency 
does not show good discriminant validity from two constructs, trust and attitude toward 
the firm, based on comparing AVE with the squared correlations for these variable pairs.  
The squared correlation was .74 for transparency and trust and .67 for transparency and 
attitude toward the firm, both of which are greater than .65 which is the AVE for 
transparency.  This will be discussed further at the end of this section.  Table 10 provides 
the Pearson’s correlations, squared correlations, and AVE for each construct.   
As a second test of discriminant validity between transparency and the other 
constructs, two-factor models were compared to one-factor models for transparency and 
each of the other constructs. The chi-square tests were performed on one pair of factors at 
a time (Anderson and Gerbing 1988) resulting in five separate constrained model versus 
unconstrained model chi-square tests (TRANSP-SKEP, TRANSP-TRST, TRANSP-ATT, 
and TRANSP-PI).  Each of the five comparison tests showed improved chi-squares with 
the two-factor models.  All chi-square differences had one degree of freedom and the 
difference was significant at p<.0001.  For example, the chi-square for the one-factor 
model for transparency and trust was 309.43 (p<.001) compared to 93.48 (p<.001) for the 
two-factor model. The one-factor model for transparency and attitude toward the firm 
was 530.50 (p<.0001) compared to 167.84 (p<.0001) for the two-factor model.  The fit 
indices also showed improvement with the two-factor models.  For example, standardized 
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RMSR, RMSEA, and CFI for transparency and trust for the one-factor model were .05, 
.14, and .93 respectively compared to .02, .06, and .99 for the two-factor model.  The 
standardized RMSR, RMSEA, and CFI fit indices for the one-factor model for 
transparency and attitude toward the firm were .07, .15, and .91 respectively compared to 
.02, .07, and .98 for the two-factor model.  Table 11 provides the chi-square and fit 
indices for the one and two-factor models for transparency and each of the constructs in 
the model.  
Finally, the confidence intervals were assessed. None of the confidence intervals 
around the correlation estimates between the pairs of two factors included 1.0.    
 
Table 10: Study 1, Psychometric Properties of Constructs Used in Validity Testing 
Pearson’s Correlations, AVE, and Squared Multiple Correlations 
  
TRANSP COMOP TRST SKEP ATT PI 
TRANSP 0.65 0.74 0.86 -0.68 0.82 0.74 
COMOP 0.55 0.56 0.71 -0.55 0.71 0.63 
TRST 0.74 0.50 0.92 -0.73 0.91 0.87 
SKEP 0.46 0.30 0.53 0.82 -0.73 -0.65 
ATT 0.67 0.50 0.83 0.53 0.89 0.88 
PI 0.55 0.40 0.76 0.42 0.77 0.92 
Correlations above the diagonal; square of correlations below the diagonal; AVE on diagonal. 
Correlations significant at p<.01. 
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Table 11: Study 1, One-Factor vs. Two-Factor Discriminant Validity Tests 
 
TWO FACTOR MODEL
a
 ONE FACTOR MODEL 
TRANSP-COMOP 
  Chi Square 93.23 (p<.001) 136.14  (p<.001) 
Standardized RMSR 0.03 0.05 
RMSEA 0.07 0.09 
CFI 0.97 0.92 
TRANSP-SKEP 
  Chi Square 67.78  (p<.0005) 499.12  (p<.001) 
Standardized RMSR 0.03 0.07 
RMSEA 0.06 0.2 
CFI 0.99 0.82 
TRANSP-TRST 
  Chi Square 93.48 (p<.001) 309.43 (p<.001) 
Standardized RMSR 0.02 0.05 
RMSEA 0.06 0.14 
CFI 0.99 0.93 
TRANSP-ATT 
  Chi Square 167.84 (p<.0001) 530.50 (p<.0001) 
Standardized RMSR 0.02 0.07 
RMSEA 0.07 0.15 
CFI 0.98 0.91 
TRANSP-PI 
  Chi Square 75.77 (p<.001) 636.92 (p<.001) 
Standardized RMSR 0.03 0.11 
RMSEA 0.06 0.23 
CFI 0.99 0.81 
a All Chi-Square differences have 1 d.f. and p<.0001. 
To summarize the findings of the discriminant validity tests for transparency and 
the other constructs, TRANSP-TRST and TRANSP-ATT variable pairs did not pass the 
AVE discriminant validity test.  However, other tests such as the chi-square test and the 
confidence interval test for correlations illustrated sufficient discriminant validity.  While 
all three tests of discriminant validity are recommended, researchers must also consider 
which type of latent constructs are being tested: exogenous, endogenous, or a mix of both 
(Shiu, Pervan, Bove, & Beatty, 2010).  Shiu et al. (2010) suggest that AVE is more 
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important than confidence intervals and chi-square tests when testing exogenous 
constructs and especially as a part of testing multi-dimension scales.  On the other hand, 
confidence intervals and chi-square tests are more important when testing a combination 
of exogenous and endogenous constructs in SEM causal modeling.  The authors argue 
that discriminant validity testing using confidence intervals and chi-square differences is 
necessary in SEM causal modeling to ensure multicollinearity of constructs will not cause 
erroneous regression coefficient estimates and standard error estimates.  They state “the 
information of whether a pair of constructs has (or has not) failed the F&L [Fornell and 
Larker; AVE] test does not alter the probability of rejecting the null hypotheses regarding 
the (lack of) significance of specific regression paths associated with the constructs” 
(Shiu et al. page 498).  This suggests that, while AVE is an important determination of 
discriminant validity between transparency and communication openness (two exogenous 
constructs), on the other hand, confidence intervals and chi-square tests are better 
diagnostics for discriminant validity between transparency (an exogenous construct in the 
model) and skepticism, trust, attitude toward the firm, and purchase intention 
(endogenous constructs in the model).  Since confidence interval and chi-square testing 
indicated that the constructs in the model were sufficiently different from each other to be 
distinct, the decision was made to proceed with testing the nomological validity of the 
transparency scale. 
Nomological validity is the extent to which a construct fits into a theoretical 
network (Hair et al., 2006c).  The network of interest is depicted in Figure 5.  Confidence 
in the transparency scale should increase if the correlations between the measure and 
other related constructs in the network behave as expected.  As a stronger test of 
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nomological validity, relationships between variables can be evaluated via path estimates 
in a structural equation model rather than evaluating relationships between variables via a 
correlation matrix.  The transparency scale was tested with three proposed outcomes, 
including skepticism, trust, and attitude toward the firm, in a structural equation model so 
that the size and magnitude of the path estimates could be investigated.  This dissertation 
suggested in chapter three that transparency will decrease skepticism and increase trust 
and attitude toward the firm.  The standardized direct effects of transparency with all of 
the dependent variables was significant and in the predicted direction (SKEP = -.54, 
p<.0001; TRST = .85, p<.0001; ATT = .89, p<.0001).  The direction of the relationships 
between the exogenous construct (TRANSP) and the endogenous constructs (SKEP, 
TRST, ATT) was as predicted indicating sufficient nomological validity.  The scale 
items, factor loadings, and t values are presented in Table 12 and a structural view is 
presented in Figure 5. 
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Table 12: Study 1, Nomological Validity Testing 
Variable Name Description 
Factor 
Loadings 
t values 
(Std. error) 
Transparency  
  
TRANSP10 
This company is willing to share information with me 
even when it may make the company look bad. 
0.73 27.04 (.03) 
TRANPS16 
This company provides me with a learning opportunity 
about itself. 0.68 21.61 (.03) 
TRANSP18 This company enables me to know what it's doing. 
0.81 40.03 (.02) 
TRANSP22 This company is willing to explain its decisions to me. 
0.79 35.15 (.02) 
TRANSP25 
This company is willing to share just about any 
information I request from it. 0.74 27.96 (.03) 
TRANSP27 This company wants me to understand what it is doing. 
0.79 36.58 (.02) 
TRANSP_OPN This company is open with me. 0.92 94.54(.01) 
Skepticism 
   SKEP1 
This company cares more about getting me to buy its 
product/service than it does about what's good for me.  
0.81 39.09 (.02) 
SKEP2 This company tries to trick customers into buying 
something.  0.95 100.3 (.01) 
SKEP3 This company tries to manipulate customers.  0.95 101.3 (.01) 
Trust in firm       
TRST1 This company can be trusted. 0.97 217.4 (.004) 
TRST3 This company is truthful.  0.97 264.3 (.003) 
TRST4 
This company can be counted on to do what’s right.  
0.96 173.3 (.005) 
TRST5 
I have confidence in this company as an organization.   
0.95 148.1 (.01) 
Attitude toward 
the firm       
ATT1 Bad: Good 0.96 198.2 (.004) 
ATT2 Unfavorable: Favorable 0.96 202.5 (.004) 
ATT3 Disagreeable: Agreeable 0.93 121.9 (.01) 
ATT4 Unpleasant: Pleasant 0.93 114.9 (.01) 
ATT5 Negative: Positive 0.92 96.23 (.01) 
ATT6 Dislike this company: Like this company 0.95 157.9 (.01) 
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Figure 5: Study 1, Phase 3 Nomological Model Tested 
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To summarize Study 1, scale item generation and initial purification was 
conducted in phase 1.  This included generating 34 items from the literature review 
(Chapter 2) and through qualitative research (Chapter 3).  Independent judges 
participated in a judgment task to assess face and construct validity of the items.  The 
judges also assisted with enhancing clarity and readability of the items.  Phase 1 resulted 
in 31 items being retained for phase 2.  
EFA was conducted in phase 2 with the purpose of variable reduction and 
identification of the underlying latent factors.  Variables were deleted if they did not meet 
predetermined thresholds for MSA, factor loadings, and communalities.  The 26 variable, 
one factor solution was then tested for convergent validity by way of AVE, Cronbach’s 
coefficient alpha, construct reliability, item-to-total correlations, and intra-correlations.  
Phase 2 resulted in 26 items being retained for phase 3. 
CFA was conducted in phase 3 with the purpose of additional scale refinement 
and assessment of its validity.  The 26-variable model was a very poor fit to the data.  
Path estimates, residuals, and modification indices were assessed to determine which 
variables could be deleted from the model.  In all, 19 items were deleted through 15 
iterations of deleting one variable at a time and re-specifying the model.  A seven-
variable model resulted and it was a good fit to the data.  The seven-variable model was 
then evaluated for convergent, discriminant, and nomological validities.  Overall, the 
model exhibited these validities.  Next is a discussion of Study 2. 
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Study 2 
The purpose of Study 2 is to confirm the factor structure of Study 1, and further 
assess reliability and validity of the scale.  Furthermore, by using scenarios which 
specifically manipulate levels of transparency, Study 2 should provide stronger evidence 
of nomological validity such that a change in the dependent variables (SKEP, TRST, 
ATT, and PI) is more likely to be a result of changing levels of transparency rather than 
some other underlying construct not being measured. 
Method.  Undergraduate business students were recruited to participate in the 
study via an email distributed by the instructors.  There were 299 completed surveys.  
Students received extra credit for participating in the study. 
 Procedure.  As in Study 1, data was collected via online questionnaires.  
However, the stimulus was different from that in Study 1.  In Study 1, subjects were 
asked to recall a firm that they thought was open and forthright (or not open and not 
forthright depending on the condition for which they were assigned).  Subjects then 
answered the survey questions based on the firm that they recalled.  In Study 2, rather 
than a recall task, subjects were assigned randomly to one of two transparency 
conditions. 
  Specifically, subjects were first presented with a welcome page thanking them 
for participating and communicating what they will do during this experiment.  This was 
followed by the IRB Informed Consent waiver.  Subjects were then presented with the 
following directions: “You will now be presented with a scenario in which you are to 
imagine you will soon fly to visit a friend. Please read the scenario carefully.  Proceed to 
the scenario when you're ready”.  Subjects were then presented with the high or low 
transparency manipulation: 
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Set up for both manipulations: 
You are planning to fly out of town to visit your friend sometime in 
the near future.  Your friend mentioned that ABC Airlines is one of the 
airlines that flies direct from your hometown airport to the airport that 
is nearest him/her.  You hadn’t flown this airline before.   
 
You were curious to find out how the seats are assigned and who is 
given priority for this particular airline.  You went to ABC’s website 
to see if you could learn more about the seat assignment process and 
whatever else you thought might be important to know before flying 
on this airline.   
 
High transparency 
ABC airlines provided whatever information you wanted to know on 
the website.  The company also provided a way to reach the company 
in case you needed additional information on this subject.  
 
Low Transparency 
ABC airlines did not provide any information you wanted to know on 
the website.  The company also did not provide a way to reach the 
company in case you needed additional information on this subject.  
 
 After the scenario subjects were exposed to the survey which consisted of a series 
of scale items to measure communication openness, transparency, skepticism, trust, 
attitude toward the firm, and purchase intention.  Table 12 provides the scale items for 
each construct.  Qualitative data was also collected.  Subjects were asked to list what 
specific information they would want to know if they were actually learning about an 
airline.  This qualitative data was collected to better understand appropriate 
manipulations of variables in subsequent studies.  The findings from this qualitative data 
are reviewed as a part of the Study 3, Phase 1 discussion. 
 The transparency scenarios were first pretested with a separate sample of 
undergraduate marketing students (n=41).  Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the 
two conditions.  The same scenarios described above were used in the pretests and 
transparency was measured using the seven item scale that resulted from Study 1.  The 
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manipulation of high and low transparency levels had a strong effect and they worked as 
intended.  The effectiveness of the manipulations was tested with an independent samples 
t test.  On average, subjects exposed to the high transparency manipulation (n = 24) 
experienced significantly higher perceived firm transparency (M = 4.98, SE = .18) than 
the subjects (n = 17) exposed to the low transparency manipulation (M = 1.58, SE = .17), 
t (39) = -13.37, p<.0001). 
Results.    The seven item transparency scale was subjected to a CFA.  The chi-
square was 53.50 (p<.0001) with 14 degrees of freedom.  Given the sample size (N = 
299) and the number of observed variables (m = 7), the model fit indices generally 
indicated an excellent fit to the data based on absolute (e.g. SRMSR = .01, GFI = .95) 
and incremental indices (e.g. CFI = .98, and NFI = .98).  However, the model fit indices 
indicated a “questionable” fit (MacCallum et al., 1996) to the data based on parsimony fit 
indices (e.g. RMSEA = .10, probability of close fit = .003). In particular, MacCallum et 
al. (1996) suggest models are questionable with RMSEA values greater than .10.  With 
regard to appropriate RMSEA values, researchers suggest that RMSEA values less than 
.08 are reasonable (Hair et al., 2006b; Hu & Bentler, 1998; MacCallum et al., 1996).  The 
standardized residuals indicated that some improvement in the model could be made.  
There were several pairs of variables for which residuals were between |2.50| and |4.0|, 
indicating the model fit could improve by deleting at least one item.  In all, upon close 
examination, three items (TRANSP10, TRANSP22, AND TRANSP25) were deleted 
from the model based on residuals and lower factor loadings compared to the others.  
Additionally, these three items are related to the firm sharing information, which, based 
on the conceptual definition of transparency, is an antecedent of transparency.  The 
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model fit improved significantly.  The chi-square was 1.84 (p = .17) with 1 degree of 
freedom.  Given the sample size (N = 299) and the number of observed variables (m = 4), 
the model fit indices indicated an excellent fit to the data based on absolute (e.g. SRMSR 
= .003, GFI = .99), incremental indices (e.g. CFI = .99, and NFI = .99), and parsimony fit 
indices (e.g. RMSEA = .05, probability of close fit = .32).  Finally, the four item model 
had no residuals approaching |2.50| (range = .52 to -1.33).  Table 13 provides the factor 
loadings, t-values, reliability, and fit indices for the four item transparency scale. 
Table 13: Study 2, Factor Loadings for Transparency Scale 
  Alpha = .97, CR = .97, AVE = .82 
Factor 
Loading 
t value 
(Std. error) 
TRANPS16 
This company provides me with a learning 
opportunity about itself.  
0.91 87.17 (.01) 
TRANSP18 
This company enables me to know what it's 
doing.  
0.96 158.7 (.006) 
TRANSP27 
This company wants me to understand what 
it is doing.  
0.95 136.8 (.007) 
TRANSP_OPN This company is open with me. 0.94 120.0 (.008) 
Chi-Square (1, n = 299) = 1.84 (p=.17), SRMSR = .003, GFI = .99, RMSEA = .05,  
CFI = .99, NFI = .99 
 
Tests of validity.  The four item scale that emerged through CFA was then tested 
for convergent, discriminant, and nomological validities.   
The transparency scale was tested for convergent validity by assessing factor 
loadings, variance extracted, and reliability. The factor loadings ranged from .91 to .96 
which is higher compared to the range of factor loadings from Study 1 (.71 to .90). 
Average variance extracted was .89, also well above the scale’s AVE from Study 1 (AVE 
= .65).  Finally, Cronbach’s coefficient alpha was .97 and composite reliability (CR) was 
.99, again above the alpha (.93) and CR (.94) from Study 1.   
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Following the same process outlined in Study 1, discriminant validity was 
assessed at two levels, first between transparency and communication openness, and 
second, between transparency and the other constructs in the proposed model that are 
dependent on transparency.  Additionally, like Study 1, prior to testing for discriminant 
validity, all scale items for the constructs were first subjected to individual EFA and 
internal reliability analyses to ensure each of the scales exhibit good psychometric 
properties, and this includes convergent validity, uni-dimensionality, and internal 
consistency.  The same scale items were used from Study 1.  All scales exhibited 
excellent internal reliability, convergent validity, uni-dimensionality, and internal 
consistency (see Tables 14 and 15).  
Table 14: Study 2, EFA Factor Loadings for Constructs Used in Validity Testing 
Variable  Description Factor Loadings 
Communication Openness (Cronbach's Alpha = .85) 
COMOP2 This company and I talk candidly with each other. 0.81 
COMOP3 This company and I provide each other with timely information. 0.94 
COMOP5 This company is responsive to my needs for information. 0.88 
Skepticism  (Cronbach's Alpha = .87) 
SKEP1 This company cares more about getting me to buy its 
product/service than it does about what's good for me.  
0.81 
SKEP2 This company tries to trick customers into buying something.  0.94 
SKEP3 This company tries to manipulate customers.  0.93 
Trust in firm(Cronbach's Alpha = .95) 
TRST1 This company can be trusted. 0.93 
TRST3 This company is truthful.  0.94 
TRST4 This company can be counted on to do what’s right.  0.93 
TRST5 I have confidence in this company as an organization.   0.94 
Attitude toward the firm (Cronbach's Alpha = .98) 
ATT1 Bad: Good 0.95 
ATT2 Unfavorable: Favorable 0.95 
ATT3 Disagreeable: Agreeable 0.94 
ATT4 Unpleasant: Pleasant 0.94 
ATT5 Negative: Positive 0.96 
ATT6 Dislike this company: Like this company 0.95 
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Three steps were performed to test for discriminant validity between transparency 
and communication openness.  First, confirmatory models for transparency and 
communication openness scales were performed to get the average variance extracted for 
the two constructs in order to compare the AVE for the transparency scale to the square 
of the correlation estimate for the two constructs.  The AVE for the two constructs should 
be greater than the square of correlations between those two constructs as an indication of 
discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).  The square of the correlation (R
2
 =.67) 
was less than the average variance extracted for transparency (AVE = .89) but not for 
communication openness (AVE = .67).  
Second, a two-factor model was compared to a one-factor model with 
transparency and communication openness scale items constrained to one factor 
(Anderson and Gerbing 1988).  The chi-square for the one-factor model was 134.04 
(p<.001) and was 62.86 (p<.0001) for the two-factor model, indicating a significant 
improvement in fit when separating the two constructs. The chi-square difference test 
with one degree of freedom was significant at p<.0001.  Other fit indices such as the 
standardized RMSR (.03 vs. .05), RMSEA (.12 vs. .18), and CFI (.98 vs. .95) also 
showed improvement with the two constructs separated rather than in unity.   
Finally, the confidence interval for the correlation between the two constructs was 
evaluated.  If the confidence interval does not include one then this is an indication of 
discriminant validity (Anderson and Gerbing 1988).  The 95% confidence interval around 
the correlation between the two factors (r = .82) did not include 1.0 (lower bound = .78 
and upper bound = .86).  In sum, based on the findings from both Study 1 and Study 2, 
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there is sufficient evidence to confirm discriminant validity between transparency and 
communication openness taking into account AVE, chi-square tests for one and two 
factor models, and the confidence interval around the correlation. 
Next, AVE, chi-square tests, and confidence intervals around correlations were 
assessed to investigate discriminant validity between transparency and: skepticism 
(SKEP), attitude toward the firm (ATT), purchase intention (PI), and trust (TRST).  The 
AVE for the four constructs were .67 (COMOP), .83 (TRST), .73 (SKEP), .88 (ATT), 
and .92 (PI).  As previously mentioned, the AVE for TRANSP was .89.  Transparency 
shows good discriminant validity between it and the other variables, based on comparing 
AVE with the squared correlations for these variable pairs.  This is an improvement in 
discriminant validity compared to Study 1 (recall transparency did not exhibit 
discriminant validity with trust and attitude toward the firm through the AVE method). 
Table 15 provides the Pearson’s correlations, squared correlations, and AVE for each 
construct.   
Similar to Study 1, as a second test of discriminant validity between transparency 
and the other constructs, two-factor models were compared to one-factor models for 
transparency and each of the other constructs. The chi-square tests were performed on 
one pair of factors at a time (Anderson and Gerbing 1988) resulting in five separate 
constrained model versus unconstrained model chi-square tests (TRANSP-SKEP, 
TRANSP-TRST, TRANSP-ATT, and TRANSP-PI).  Each of the five comparison tests 
showed improved chi-squares with the two-factor models (Table 16).  All chi-square 
differences had one degree of freedom and the difference was significant at p<.0001.  For 
example, the chi-square for the one-factor model for transparency and trust was 393.13 
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(p<.0001) compared to 69.60 (p<.0001) for the two-factor model. The one-factor model 
for transparency and attitude toward the firm was 590.87 (p<.0001) compared to 99.54 
(p<.0001) for the two-factor model.  Consistent with Study 1, the fit indices showed 
improvement with the two-factor models.  For example, standardized RMSR, RMSEA, 
and CFI for transparency and trust for the one-factor model were .08, .26, and .88 
respectively compared to .02, .09, and .98 for the two-factor model.  The standardized 
RMSR, RMSEA, and CFI fit indices for the one-factor model for transparency and 
attitude toward the firm were .05, .20, and .86 respectively compared to .01, .08, and .99 
for the two-factor model.  Table 16 provides the chi-square and fit indices for the one and 
two-factor models for transparency and each of the constructs in the model.  
Finally, the confidence intervals were assessed. As with Study 1, none of the 
confidence intervals around the correlation estimates between the pairs of two factors 
included 1.0.    
Table 15: Study 2, Psychometric Properties of Constructs Used in Validity Testing 
Pearson’s Correlations, AVE, and Squared Multiple Correlations 
  TRANSP COMOP TRST SKEP ATT PI 
TRANSP 0.82 0.83 0.79 -0.49 0.86 0.79 
COMOP 0.69 0.64 0.76 -0.44 0.81 0.73 
TRST 0.62 0.58 0.82 -0.55 0.86 0.82 
SKEP 0.24 0.19 0.30 0.7 -0.58 -0.53 
ATT 0.74 0.66 0.74 0.34 0.88 0.85 
PI 0.62 0.53 0.67 0.28 0.72 0.90 
Correlations above the diagonal; square of correlations below the diagonal; AVE on 
diagonal. 
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Table 16: Study 2, One-Factor vs. Two-Factor Discriminant Validity Tests 
 
TWO FACTOR MODEL 
a
 ONE FACTOR MODEL 
TRANSP-COMOP 
  Chi Square 62.86 (p<.0001) 134.04  (p<.0001) 
Standardized RMSR 0.03 0.05 
RMSEA 0.12 0.18 
CFI 0.98 0.95 
TRANSP-SKEP 
  Chi Square 28.18  (p<.01) 490.66  (p<.0001) 
Standardized RMSR 0.02 0.16 
RMSEA 0.06 0.34 
CFI 0.99 0.79 
TRANSP-TRST 
  Chi Square 69.60 (p<.0001) 393.13 (p<.0001) 
Standardized RMSR 0.02 0.08 
RMSEA 0.09 0.26 
CFI 0.98 0.88 
TRANSP-ATT 
  Chi Square 99.54 (p<.0001) 590.87 (p<.0001) 
Standardized RMSR 0.01 0.05 
RMSEA 0.08 0.23 
CFI 0.99 0.88 
TRANSP-PI 
  Chi Square 28.12 (p<.0001) 584.42 (p<.0001) 
Standardized RMSR 0.01 0.07 
RMSEA 0.06 0.37 
CFI 0.99 0.81 
 
To summarize the findings of the discriminant validity tests for transparency and 
the other constructs, Study 2 provided even stronger evidence of discriminant validity 
compared to Study 1.  Whereas in Study 1 TRANSP-TRST and TRANSP-ATT variable 
pairs did not pass the AVE discriminant validity test, in Study 2 this test was passed.   
Like the process in Study 1, to investigate nomological validity, the transparency 
scale was tested with three proposed outcomes, including skepticism, trust, and attitude 
toward the firm, in a structural equation model so that the size and magnitude of the 
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direct causal relationships could be investigated.  Study 1 showed that transparency had a 
significant direct effect on all of the dependent variables (SKEP = -.54, p<.0001; TRST = 
.85, p<.0001; ATT = .89, p<.0001).  Study 2 confirmed these findings (SKEP = -.55, 
p<.01; TRST = .85, p<.01; ATT = .90, p<.01).  The SEM model testing the nomological 
validity for Study 2 is presented in Figure 6 and the scale items, factor loadings, and t 
values are presented in Table 17. 
 
Table 17: Study 2, Nomological Validity Testing 
Variable Name Description 
Factor 
Loadings*  
t values 
(Std. error) 
Transparency  
  
TRANPS16 
This company provides me with a learning opportunity 
about itself. 0.91 86.15 (.01) 
TRANSP18 This company enables me to know what it's doing. 
0.95 153.17 (.01) 
TRANSP27 This company wants me to understand what it is doing. 
0.95 134.23 (.01) 
TRANSP_OPN This company is open with me. 0.94 124.34 (.01) 
Skepticism 
   SKEP1 
This company cares more about getting me to buy its 
product/service than it does about what's good for me.  
0.65 18.55 (.03) 
SKEP2 This company tries to trick customers into buying 
something.  0.94 65.04 (.01) 
SKEP3 This company tries to manipulate customers.  0.94 65.10 (.01) 
Trust in firm       
TRST1 This company can be trusted. 0.92 88.33 (.01) 
TRST3 This company is truthful.  0.92 84.37 (.01) 
TRST4 
This company can be counted on to do what’s right.  
0.88 61.41 (.01) 
TRST5 
I have confidence in this company as an organization.   
0.92 88.33 (.01) 
Attitude toward 
the firm       
ATT1 Bad: Good 0.94 127.08 (.01) 
ATT2 Unfavorable: Favorable 0.95 137.55 (.01) 
ATT3 Disagreeable: Agreeable 0.93 103.29 (.01) 
ATT4 Unpleasant: Pleasant 0.93 103.59 (.01) 
ATT5 Negative: Positive 0.94 133.08 (.01) 
ATT6 Dislike this company: Like this company 0.95 153.77 (.01) 
*All factor loadings are significant at p<.0001.
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Figure 6: Study 2, Nomological Validity Testing 
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To summarize Study 2, the purpose of Study 2 was to confirm the factor structure 
of Study 1, and further assess reliability and validity of the scale.  Study 2 provided 
stronger evidence of nomological validity by using scenarios manipulating levels of 
transparency rather than allowing subjects to think about a firm they’ve interacted with in 
the past.  Generally, the findings of Study 2 mirror those of Study 1 and since the 
transparency manipulation was better controlled for confounding constructs compared to 
Study 1, the findings are more likely to be a result of changing levels of transparency 
rather than some other underlying construct not being measured.   
Chapter Summary 
Two studies were conducted to develop the transparency scale.  Study 1 was 
dedicated to scale development and validation for the transparency construct.  The scale 
development procedure followed the guidelines as set forth by Churchill (1979) and 
Gerbing and Anderson (1988).  Study 1 consisted of three phases: 1) scale item 
generation and testing the face validity of those scale items to be applied in the 
subsequent phase, 2) exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to determine the underlying 
dimensions of transparency and to reduce the number of indicators, and 3) confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) to validate the psychometric properties of the scale developed 
through the EFA and to test its predictive and nomological validities. Study 1 resulted in 
a seven-item, one factor psychometrically sound transparency scale.  Study 2 was 
dedicated to further validating the transparency scale and testing its psychometric 
properties and validity.  The findings from Study 2 further validated the transparency 
scale from Study 1 and provided further evidence of its psychometric and validity 
properties. 
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CHAPTER 6: HYPOTHESIS TESTING:  METHODOLOGY, DATA ANALYSIS 
& RESULTS 
 
This chapter focuses on testing the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4 and 
illustrated in Figure 2 via two data collections.  The first data collection (Study 3; study 
numbers continue from the previous chapter) serves to test the complete proposed model 
in Chapter 4 using scenarios as the stimuli.  The second data collection (Study 4) tests the 
model using scenarios with a slightly more ecologically valid manipulation of the 
constructs.  It tests the full model across two different stimuli which combine two often-
used corporate marketing communications methods, email and a website. 
Study 3 
 The purpose of Study 3 is to test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4 using 
scenarios. The complete proposed model was tested with a 2 (consumer effort: low, high) 
x 2 (perceived firm reciprocity: low, high) x 2 (damaging information: low, high) 
between subjects design using pretested scenarios as the stimuli. The airline context for 
the scenarios remained the same as in previous studies.   
Pretest of Scenarios.  The scenarios manipulating each of the three antecedents 
were first pretested with separate samples of undergraduate marketing students in a 
between-subjects design.  Table 18 provides the manipulations for the high and low 
conditions for the three antecedents.  Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the 
conditions (high/low) for either consumer effort, perceived firm reciprocity, or perceived 
firm-damaging information.   
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Prior to testing the effectiveness of the manipulations, scale items for the three 
constructs were first subjected to individual EFA and internal reliability analyses to 
ensure the measures were one-dimensional and internally consistent.  Although the 
sample sizes were extremely small for factor analysis (consumer effort: n = 14; firm 
reciprocity: n = 16; negative information: n = 20), research indicates that “if components 
possess four or more variables with loadings above .60, the pattern may be interpreted 
whatever the sample size used” (Guadagnoli & Velicer, 1988). 
For perceived consumer effort, all four factor loadings ranged from .71 - .97.  All 
variables loaded onto one factor which explained 89% of the retained variance.  
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha for this scale was .91 and item-to-total correlations ranged 
from .70 - .93.  Thus the perceived consumer effort scale shows adequate one-
dimensionality and internal consistency. 
For perceived firm reciprocity, all four factor loadings ranged from .71 – 1.0.  All 
variables loaded onto one factor which explained 100% of the retained variance.  
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha for this scale was .95 and item-to-total correlations ranged 
from .71 - .96.  Thus the perceived reciprocity scale shows adequate one-dimensionality 
and internal consistency. 
For perceived firm-damaging information, a two-factor solution resulted from 
EFA.  Upon close examination of the two factors, only one factor represented the 
conceptualization of the construct.  The definition provided in Chapter 4 was “the extent 
to which a consumer perceives that a firm is willingly providing negative information 
about itself or about its products that could be harmful to its sales or reputation”. Upon 
close examination, the first factor (“This company shares unbiased information about 
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itself or its products”, “This company provides information that could be harmful to its 
reputation”, and “This company provides information that could be harmful to its sales”) 
closely represented the conceptualization of the construct and were kept.  Both of the 
reverse coded items, which loaded onto the second factor (“This company provides only 
favorable information about itself or its products” and “This company seems willing to 
share only the good things about itself or its products”) were removed due to low factor 
loadings and because they did not best represent the conceptual definition compared to 
the first factor.  The two reverse coded items loading onto one factor (and with low factor 
loadings) is not surprising as reverse coded items can be problematic in factor analysis 
(Herche & Engelland, 1996).  The remaining variables loaded onto one factor, with factor 
loadings of .88 for both items.  This factor explained 100% of the retained variance.  
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha for this scale was .87 and item-to-total correlations was .78.   
 Next, the scenarios were checked to ensure subjects perceived the scenarios as 
intended.  All three manipulation checks worked as intended.  The effectiveness of the 
manipulations was tested with an independent samples T test.  Levene’s test was non-
significant for each manipulation check indicating the variances between the two groups 
for each manipulation check were roughly equal.  On average, subjects exposed to the 
high perceived consumer effort manipulation (n = 8) experienced higher perceived 
consumer effort (M = 5.78, SE = .37) than the subjects (n = 6) exposed to the low 
perceived consumer effort manipulation (M = 2.58, SE = .57).  This difference was 
significant t (12) = -4.92, p<.0001.  On average, subjects exposed to the high perceived 
reciprocity manipulation (n = 6) experienced higher perceived reciprocity (M = 5.21, SE 
= .32) than the subjects (n = 10) exposed to the low perceived reciprocity manipulation 
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(M = 1.80, SE = .38).  This difference was significant t (14) = -6.14, p<.0001.  On 
average, subjects exposed to the high perceived negative information manipulation (n = 
10) experienced higher perceived negative information (M = 6.25, SE = .24) than the 
subjects (n = 10) exposed to the low perceived negative information manipulation (M = 
2.85, SE = .48).  This difference was significant t (18) = -6.37, p<.0001. 
 Finally, three two-way factorial ANOVAs were performed as a test to ensure the 
three manipulated constructs did not influence each other.  For each ANOVA, one of the 
three manipulated constructs was defined as the measured dependent variable, and the 
other two were defined as independent variables each with two groups (high/low).  An 
interaction term was also defined between the two categorical independent variables in 
each model.  For all three models, the independent variables had neither main nor 
interaction effects with the dependent variables. For the model with negative information 
as the dependent variable and perceived firm effort and perceived firm reciprocity as the 
two independent variables, there was a non-significant main effect of both perceived firm 
effort, F (1,43) =.02, p = .89, and perceived firm reciprocity, F (1,43) = 1.24, p = .27. For 
the model with perceived firm reciprocity as the dependent variable and perceived firm 
effort and negative information as the two independent variables, there was a non-
significant main effect of both perceived firm effort, F (1,43) = .00, p = .96, and negative 
information, F (1,43) = .20, p = .24.  For the model with perceived firm effort as the 
dependent variable and perceived firm reciprocity and negative information as the two 
independent variables, there was a non-significant main effect of both perceived firm 
reciprocity, F (1,43) = .78, p = .69, and negative information, F (1,43) = .76, p = .39.   
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Test of the Model 
Method.  The data collection lasted seven days.  Undergraduate business students 
were recruited to participate in the study via an email distributed by the instructors.  
There were 305 completed surveys.  Students received extra credit for participating in the 
study. 
 Procedure.  As in Studies 1 and 2, data was collected via online questionnaires. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of eight scenarios designed to manipulate the 
high and low levels of perceived consumer effort, perceived firm reciprocity, and 
perceived firm-damaging information.  The manipulations were designed based on the 
conceptual definitions of the three constructs.  Table 18 provides the scenarios 
manipulating each of these variables at two levels (high/low).   
Table 18: Study 3, Manipulations for Antecedents of Transparency 
Variable Low High 
Consumer Effort The website was organized very 
intuitively and ABC Airlines made it 
very easy to find whatever information 
you were looking for on its website.  
Also, the information was easy to 
understand with the writing style and 
language that ABC used. 
The website wasn’t organized very 
intuitively and ABC Airlines didn’t 
make it very easy to find whatever 
information you were looking for on 
its website.  Also, the information 
provided wasn’t easy to understand 
with the writing style and technical 
language that ABC used. 
Reciprocity The airline didn’t provide a way to 
contact it. 
 
The airline provided a “Contact Us” 
page inviting you to contact them by 
filling out a quick web form or you 
could contact the company by phone 
(toll-free), email, physical mail, 
and/or by instant messenger.  
 
Firm-Damaging 
Information 
The airline provided pricing for its 
flights and an overview of the pros of 
flying with ABC airlines. 
The airline provided pricing details 
for not only ABC flights but also its 
competitors.  Additionally, the 
company provided an overview of 
the pros and cons of flying with 
ABC airlines. 
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The set up remained the same for each manipulation: 
Set up for all 8 conditions: 
You are planning to fly out of town to visit your friend sometime in 
the near future.  Your friend mentioned that ABC Airlines is one of the 
airlines that fly into the airport that is nearest to him/her.  You hadn’t 
flown this airline before.   
 
You were curious to find out how the seats are assigned and who is 
given priority for this particular airline.  You went to ABC’s website 
to see if you could learn more about the seat assignment process and 
whatever else you thought might be important to know before flying 
on this airline.   
 
The scenario’s set-up paragraph was then followed by the manipulations of the three 
antecedents.  For example, below is the full manipulation for the low consumer effort by 
high reciprocity by high firm-damaging information: 
“Please imagine that… 
 
You are planning to fly out of town to visit your friend sometime in 
the near future.  Your friend mentioned that ABC Airlines is one of the 
airlines that fly into the airport that is nearest to him/her.  You hadn’t 
flown this airline before.   
 
You were curious to find out how the seats are assigned and who is 
given priority for this particular airline.  You went to ABC’s website 
to see if you could learn more about the seat assignment process and 
whatever else you thought might be important to know before flying 
on this airline.   
 
The next page provides additional information regarding what you 
learned when you went to ABC Airlines' website”. 
 
“There were a few things you noticed while surfing ABC’s website: 
The website was organized very intuitively and ABC Airlines made it very easy to 
find whatever information you were looking for on its website.  Also, the information 
was easy to understand with the writing style and language that ABC used. 
The airline didn’t provide a way to contact it. 
The airline provided a “Contact Us” page inviting you to contact them by 
filling out a quick web form or you could contact the company by phone (toll-
free), email, physical mail, and/or by instant messenger.  
 153 
 
The airline provided pricing details for not only ABC flights but also its 
competitors.  Additionally, the company provided an overview of the pros and 
cons of flying with ABC airlines. 
You will be asked to recall these on the next page.” 
Subjects were exposed to the survey after the scenario which included a series of 
scale items to measure transparency, skepticism, trust, attitude toward the firm, and 
purchase intention to test H1 – H10.  Finally, subjects were exposed to the scale items 
intended to measure perceived firm motive to test H11a and H11b.  The scale items for 
perceived firm motive were adapted from an altruistic attribution scale intended to 
measure a consumer’s perception that a firm’s behavior is motived by either self-interest 
or other-interest (i.e. “society”) (Alcañiz, Cáceres, & Pérez, 2010).  This scale is 
consistent with this dissertation’s conceptualization of perceived firm motives.  Recall 
that perceived firm motives was conceptualized as the extent to which firm transparency 
is perceived as either other-serving (benefiting others besides the firm) or firm-serving 
(benefiting the firm).  It was proposed that transparency should have a stronger impact in 
reducing skepticism and increasing trust when consumers perceive the firm’s 
transparency as other-serving compared to when consumers perceive the firm’s 
transparency as firm-serving.  The motive scale items followed one of two directions to 
answering the questions depending on how the subject responded to the scale item, “this 
company is transparent”.  For example, for those subjects who selected either ‘somewhat 
disagree’, ‘disagree’, or ‘strongly disagree’, the direction was: 
 “You previously answered either ‘somewhat disagree’, ‘disagree’, or 
‘strongly disagree to the statement: ‘ABC Airlines is transparent’.  Why 
do you think ABC Airlines had this level of transparency on its website?” 
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For those subjects who selected either ‘somewhat agree’, ‘agree’, or ‘strongly agree’, the 
direction was: 
“You previously answered either ‘somewhat agree’, ‘agree’, or ‘strongly 
agree’ to the statement: ‘ABC Airlines is transparent’.  Why do you think 
ABC Airlines had this level of transparency on its website?” 
 
Responses were excluded from the analysis for those subjects who answered ‘neither 
agree nor disagree’ to the statement ‘this company is transparent’.  There were 94 
subjects who were excluded from the analysis due to answering the item ‘this company is 
transparent’ with ‘neither agree nor disagree’.  Of the 214 subjects remaining for the 
SEM analysis, 62% were 21 and under, 33% were 22 to 34 years old, 3% were 35 to 44 
years old, and 2% were 45 to 54 years old.  Each set-up was then followed by the 
perceived firm motives scale.  Example scale items included “This firm… had bad 
intentions toward customers/good intentions toward customers”, and “This firm 
had…bad motives that might hurt customers/good motives that might help customers”.   
Finally, subjects were exposed to the scales measuring transparency’s 
antecedents.  The measures for perceived consumer effort were adapted from 
product/information search literature (Srinivasan & Ratchford, 1991) and an example 
included “It seems like I would have to spend a lot of time searching on this company’s 
website for information that I wanted to know about this company”.  The measures for 
perceived reciprocity were adapted from the interactivity literature (Liu, 2003) and an 
example scale item included the following item “The company makes it difficult to offer 
feedback to it”.  The measures for firm-damaging information were based on this 
dissertation’s conceptual definition and an example included “This company provides 
only favorable information about itself or its products”.  The final scale items for each of 
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the three antecedents of transparency and the motive moderator are listed in Table 20.  
All variables were measured with 7-point Likert-type scales.   
Results.  Four procedures were conducted as a part of testing the full proposed 
model.  First, EFAs were conducted on all of the scales to ensure uni-dimensionality.  
Second, the manipulations were checked to ensure the scenarios were perceived as 
intended. Third, all scales in the model were tested through a measurement model to 
ensure the scales exhibited adequate validities and the overall measurement model 
exhibited adequate model fit indices.  Fourth, the full structural model was tested.   
For the EFAs, one reverse-scale item measuring perceived firm-reciprocity (“I 
feel like this company only wants to talk TO me rather than WITH me”) was dropped for 
having a communality estimate of .34 which is far below the .50 recommended threshold 
(Hair et al., 2006a).  The remaining scale items for all constructs were subjected to 
individual EFAs.  All scales loaded onto a single factor and internal reliability ranged 
from .88 (perceived firm-damaging information) to .98 (attitude toward the firm) for all 
constructs. 
 For the manipulation checks, all three manipulation checks worked as intended.  
The effectiveness of the manipulations was tested with a t test.  Levene’s test was non-
significant for each manipulation check indicating the variances between the two groups 
for each manipulation check were roughly equal.  On average, subjects exposed to the 
high perceived consumer effort manipulation (n = 121) experienced higher perceived 
consumer effort (M = 5.56, SE = .13) than the subjects (n = 92) exposed to the low 
perceived consumer effort manipulation (M = 3.32, SE = .16).  This difference was 
significant t (213) = 10.84, p<.0001.  On average, subjects exposed to the high perceived 
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reciprocity manipulation (n = 96) experienced higher perceived reciprocity (M = 4.70, SE 
= .18) than the subjects (n = 117) exposed to the low perceived reciprocity manipulation 
(M = 2.21, SE = .11).  This difference was significant t (213) = 11.33, p<.0001.  On 
average, subjects exposed to the high perceived negative information manipulation (n = 
142) experienced higher perceived negative information (M = 4.06, SE = .12) than the 
subjects (n = 71) exposed to the low perceived negative information manipulation (M = 
3.05, SE = .16).  This difference was significant t (213) = 5.02, p<.0001. 
 For the measurement model, all items were constrained to the constructs in which 
they were intended to measure. The chi-square was 910.18 (p <.0001) with 524 degrees 
of freedom.  Given the sample size (N = 214) and the number of observed variables (m = 
35), the model fit indices indicated a somewhat adequate fit to the data based on absolute 
(e.g. SRMSR = .04) and incremental indices (e.g. CFI = .95 and NFI = .89).  However, 
the model fit indices indicated a less than adequate fit to the data based on parsimony fit 
indices (e.g. .RMSEA = .06 and probability of close fit = .01).  The fit indices indicated 
the model could be improved. One item at a time was deleted from the model to improve 
model fit based on investigating the residuals for pairs of variables and the fit indices.  
For the final model, the chi-square was 291.91 (p<.0001) with 216 degrees of freedom 
and 24 variables.  The model fit indices indicated a much better fit to the data based on 
absolute (e.g. SRMSR = .02 and GFI = .90) and incremental indices (e.g. CFI = .99 and 
NFI = .95).  The model fit indices also indicated an excellent fit to the data based on 
parsimony fit indices (e.g. .RMSEA = .04 and probability of close fit = .86).  The means 
and other statistics for all scales in the model are presented in Table 19.  The final scale 
 157 
 
items from the measurement model are provided in Table 19 along with their factor 
loadings.  
Table 19: Study 3, Means for Final Scales 
Scale Mean Std Dev Mode Range 
Transparency 3.86 1.82 2 6 
Effort 4.59 1.86 6 6 
Reciprocity 3.33 1.99 1 6 
Negative 
Information 
3.73 1.47 5 6 
Skepticism 3.73 1.54 2 6 
Trust 3.92 1.49 4 6 
Attitude 3.56 1.42 5 5 
Purchase Intention 3.81 1.92 1 6 
Motive 4.23 1.56 4 6 
 
Table 20: Study 3, Factor Loadings for Measurement Model 
Variable 
Name 
Description Factor 
Loadings 
t value  
(Std. error) 
Consumer Effort  (Cronbach's Alpha = .92, CR = .95, AVE = .89 ) 
EFFORT1 It seems like I would have to spend a lot of time 
searching this company's website for information that 
I wanted to know about this company. 0.92 55.54 (.02) 
EFFORT2 It seems I would have to put in a lot of effort to learn 
about this company. 0.89 45.23 (.02) 
EFFORT3 It seems this company shares information about itself 
in such a way that I would have to try hard to learn 
about it. 0.86 38.52 (.02) 
Perceived Firm Reciprocity  (Cronbach's Alpha = .91, CR =.91 , AVE = .92) 
RECIPR1 This company seems to facilitate two-way 
communication between itself and customers. 0.98 27.72 (.03) 
RECIPR2 This company affords me the opportunity to 
communicate with it. 0.85 23.29 (.04) 
Perceived Firm-Damaging Information  (Cronbach's Alpha = .86, CR = .86, AVE = .82) 
NEGINFO3 This company seems to provide information that 
could be harmful to its reputation. 0.75 20.25 (.04) 
NEGINFO4 This company seems to provide information that 
could be harmful to its sales. 0.82 25.33 (.03) 
NEGINFO6  This company seems to provide negative information 
about itself or its products. 0.89 31.50 (.03) 
Perceived Firm Transparency  (Cronbach's Alpha = .92, CR = .93, AVE = .90 
TRANSP16 This company provides me with a learning 
opportunity about itself. 0.89 50.71 (.02) 
TRANSP18 This company enables me to know what it's doing. 0.89 50.95 (.02) 
TRANSP27 This company wants me to understand what it is 
doing. 0.93 70.03 (.01) 
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Variable 
Name 
Description Factor 
Loadings 
t value  
(Std. error) 
Skepticism  (Cronbach's Alpha = .83, CR = .84, AVE = .85) 
SKEP1 This company cares more about getting me to buy its 
product/service than it does about what's good for me.  
0.83 27.06 (.03) 
SKEP2 This company tries to trick customers into buying 
something.  0.87 30.92 (.03) 
Trust in firm(Cronbach's Alpha = .91, CR = .90, AVE = .91) 
TRST1 This company can be trusted. 0.94 56.54 (.02) 
TRST3 This company is truthful.  0.87 40.80 (.02) 
Attitude toward the firm (Cronbach's Alpha = .95, CR = .96, AVE = .94) 
ATT1 Bad: Good 0.93 85.21 (.01) 
ATT2 Unfavorable: Favorable 0.95 107.4 (.01) 
ATT3 Disagreeable: Agreeable 0.94 89.21 (.01) 
Purchase Intention (Cronbach's Alpha = .96, CR = .96, AVE = .95) 
PI1 I would be willing to buy from this company. 0.97 145.1 (.01) 
PI2 I will take this company into consideration the next 
time I buy a product/service like this. 0.93 82.08 (.01) 
PI3 I can imagine buying this company's product/service. 0.95 104.8 (.01) 
Perceived Firm Motive (Cronbach's Alpha = .93, CR = .94, AVE = .91) 
MOTIVE1 Bad intentions toward customers…Good intentions 
toward customers 0.95 88.04 (.01) 
MOTIVE2 Intended to take advantage of customers…Not 
intended to take advantage of customers 0.87 45.68 (.02) 
MOTIVE3 Bad motives that might hurt customers…Good 
motives that might help customers 0.91 60.53 (.02) 
Chi-Square (216, n = 214) = 291.91 (p<.0001), SRMSR = .02, GFI = .90, RMSEA = .04, 
 CFI = .98, NFI = .95 
 
Tests of validity.  Next, the constructs in the measurement model were then tested 
for convergent and discriminant validities prior to testing the full structural model.  All 
scales exhibited adequate convergent validity.  The factor loadings ranged from .75 to 
.97. Average variance extracted ranged from .82 to .95 which is above the recommended 
threshold of .50 (Hair et al., 2006c).  Cronbach’s coefficient alpha ranged from .85 to .96 
and composite reliability (CR) ranged from .84 to .96.  Cronbach’s alpha, composite 
reliability, and average variance extracted are provided in Table 21. 
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Discriminant validity was assessed between transparency and all of the other 
constructs in the proposed model.  AVE and confidence intervals around correlations 
were assessed.   The AVE for the constructs in the model were .90 (TRANSP), .91 
(TRST), .85 (SKEP), .94 (ATT), and .95 (PI).  Transparency shows good discriminant 
validity between it and the other variables.  The square of the correlations were less than 
the average variance extracted for all variable pairs indicating each of the constructs 
exhibit discriminant validity from the other constructs in the model.   Table 21 provides 
the Pearson’s correlations, squared correlations, and AVE for each construct.  The 
confidence intervals were assessed as a second test of discriminant validity.  None of the 
confidence intervals around the correlation estimates between the pairs of two factors 
included 1.0.    
Table 21: Study 3, Psychometric Properties of Constructs 
Pearson’s Correlations, AVE, and Squared Multiple Correlations 
 
TRANSP TRST SKEP ATT PI EFFORT RECIPR NEGINFO MOTIVE 
TRANSP 0.90 0.70 -0.57 0.81 0.81 -0.60 0.42 0.23 0.81 
TRST 0.49 0.91 -0.64 0.74 0.75 -0.48 0.39 0.25 0.79 
SKEP 0.33 0.41 0.85 -0.66 -0.61 0.48 -0.32 -0.33 -0.73 
ATT 0.65 0.55 0.44 0.94 0.86 -0.67 0.50 0.24 0.83 
PI 0.65 0.57 0.38 0.73 0.95 -0.60 0.45 0.27 0.81 
EFFORT 0.36 0.23 0.23 0.44 0.36 0.89 -0.30 -0.09* -0.57 
RECIPR 0.18 0.15 0.11 0.25 0.20 0.09 0.92 0.12 0.47 
NEGINFO 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.82 0.28 
MOTIVE 0.65 0.63 0.53 0.68 0.65 0.32 0.22 0.08 0.91 
Correlations above the diagonal; square of correlations below the diagonal; AVE on diagonal. 
* Correlations are not significant at p<.05. All other correlations significant at p<.05. 
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Test of Hypotheses.  All hypotheses were tested through a structural equation 
model
2
.  Recall that the model proposed in this dissertation includes a moderating 
variable which requires creating a construct in the SEM to represent the interaction term 
between Transparency and Motives.  The constrained and unconstrained methods for 
creating the interaction term were investigated.  The technique used for creating the 
transparency and motive interaction construct in the model followed the unconstrained 
method advocated and tested by Marsh et al. (Marsh, Wen, & Hau, 2004).  Marsh and 
colleagues found that a simpler, unconstrained path method resulted in just as good, if not 
better, fit indices as compared to the more complex and constrained path method 
approach advocated by Kenny and Judd, Ping, and others (Kenny & Judd, 1984; Ping Jr, 
1996). In the constrained path approach for a structural equation model with X, Z, and 
XZ constructs, path estimates and error terms for X and Z are constrained to the values 
associated with them in the initial measurement model.  The indicators for XZ are created 
by taking the cross product of each of the indicators from X and Z.  Thus XZ would have 
four indicators if X and Z both have two indicators (X1*Z1, X2*Z2, X1*Z2, and X2*Z1) 
and XZ would have nine indicators if X and Z both have three indicators.  The main 
concern with this method is that the indicators violate the assumption of multivariate 
normality, causing “erroneous” standard errors and chi-square statistics, even when the 
indicators are in mean-deviation form (Marsh et al., 2004).   
Another advantage to the Marsh et al. (2004) approach is the use of a “matched-
pair” strategy for creating the indicators of the interaction term.  With this method, only 
                                                             
 
2 Since the data was collected via an experimental design, the author also conducted supplemental analysis 
including ANOVA and MANOVA to investigate the effects the manipulated variables on the other 
independent variables in the model. The detailed analysis and findings is presented in Appendix B 
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three indicators are necessary to create XY when X and Y each have three indicators 
(X1*Y1, X2*Y2, and X3*Y3).   This is a better approach to the all possible cross-product 
combinations method (Kenny & Judd, 1984) which requires the XY to include all 
possible cross-product combinations, which introduces convergence and non-estimation 
problems (Marsh et al., 2004).  Overall, the advantage to using the unconstrained, 
matched-pair strategy is that it is much simpler for researchers to use, it provides a more 
robust method in terms of non-normality, and ultimately provides for similar or better fit 
indices when data strays from normality (Marsh et al., 2004).   
To create the SEM model to test the hypotheses, consistent with Marsh et al. 
(2004), first, all of the indicators were transformed into mean-deviation form via Z 
scores.  Skewness was < 1 and kurtosis was < 2 for all indicators indicating the data does 
not stray too far from non-normality.  Second, each of the three indicators for the 
transparency and motive interaction construct were created by taking the product of one 
transparency indicator and one motive indicator.  It does not matter which items from 
each scale are combined together so long as the constructs are one-dimensional (Marsh et 
al., 2004).  In keeping with previous research, the items combined were taken 
sequentially from each construct (Marsh et al., 2004).  In particular, the first transparency 
scale item was combined with the first motive scale to create the first 
transparency*motive item (TRANSPARENCY16*MOTIVE1).  The second transparency 
scale item was combined with the second motive scale item to create the second 
transparency*motive item (TRANSPARENCY18*MOTIVE2).  Finally, the third 
transparency scale item was combined with the third motive scale item to create the third 
transparency*motive item (TRANSPARENCY27*MOTIVE3).  Both the motive and the 
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motive*transparency interaction construct were placed in the model as exogenous 
constructs.   
The full structural equation model is presented in Figure 7 along with the 
standardized results for linear equations and their standard errors.  The chi-square was 
573.22 (p <.0001) on 297 degrees of freedom.  The model fit indices indicated an 
adequate fit to the data based on absolute (e.g. SRMSR = .07 and GFI = .89), 
parsimonious (e.g. RMSEA = .07), and incremental indices (e.g. CFI = .96 and NFI = 
.91).  As Figure 7 illustrates, all paths were significant with the exception of the paths 
from the two proposed interaction effects and the path from skepticism to purchase 
intention.  First is a discussion of the hypotheses predicting direct effects, followed by a 
discussion of the hypotheses predicting mediation and moderation. Table 22 provides a 
summary of the results for the test of hypotheses based on the structural equation model. 
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Figure 7: Study 3, Full Test of the Proposed Model 
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The direct effect hypotheses predicting consumer effort (H1), firm reciprocity 
(H2), and negative information (H3) as antecedents of transparency are all supported 
indicating they had a significant direct effect on transparency (EFFORT = -.52, p<.01; 
RECIPR = .38, p<.01; NEGINFO = .15, p<.01).  The hypotheses predicting transparency 
having direct effects on skepticism (H4), trust (H5), attitude toward the firm (H6), and 
purchase intention (H7) are supported (SKEP = -.20, p<.01, TRST = .24, p<.01, ATT = 
.65, p<.01, PI = .39, p<.01).   
The hypotheses predicting mediation (H8a,b and H9a,b) required a multi-step 
process.  For mediation to occur, the independent variable must have significant effects 
on both the mediating and dependent variables, and the mediating variable must have 
significant effects on the dependent variable.  In the multi-step process, first it is 
necessary to show that the independent variable has significant effects on the mediating 
and dependent variables (without the path from the mediator to the dependent variable in 
the model).  Then it is necessary to show that the effect of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable decreases when the path from the mediator to the dependent variable 
is introduced into the model (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  For full mediation, the path from 
the independent variable to the dependent variable will become non-significant once the 
mediating path is introduced into the model.  For partial mediation, the path from the 
independent variable to the dependent variable may still be significant when the 
mediating path is introduced but the effect must be reduced.  For partial mediation it is 
important to interpret the size of the indirect (or mediating) effect.  To calculate the 
indirect effect size, the path estimate from the independent variable to the mediator is 
multiplied by the path estimate from the mediator to dependent variable. A small effect 
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size is .01 - .08, a medium effect size is .09 - .25, and a large effect size is at least .25 
(Cohen, 1988).  Additionally, Hair et. al. (2006) note that effect sizes below .08 “do not 
add to substantive conclusions” and should not be interpreted.   
H8a, which predicts the impact of transparency on attitude toward the firm is 
partially mediated by skepticism, is supported.  In the model without the mediating path 
of skepticism to attitude, both paths from transparency to skepticism (β = -.28) and from 
transparency to attitude (β =.70) were significant (p<.01).  In the model with the 
mediating path, all three paths were significant (p<.01), and in particular the transparency 
to attitude path was reduced from .70 to .65 supporting partial mediation by skepticism.  
A bootstrap analysis was conducted which revealed that the 95% confidence interval for 
the size of the indirect effect excluded zero (.04, .15), which suggested a significant 
indirect effect (Preacher & Hayes, 2004).  
H8b, which predicts the impact of transparency on attitude toward the firm is 
partially mediated by trust, is supported.  In the model without the mediating path of trust 
to attitude, both paths from transparency to trust (β = .30) and from transparency to 
attitude (β =.73) were significant (p<.01).  In the model with the mediating path, all three 
paths were significant (p<.01), and in particular the transparency to attitude path was 
reduced from .73 to .65 supporting partial mediation by trust.  The bootstrap analysis 
revealed that the 95% confidence interval for the size of the indirect effect excluded zero 
(.12, .25), indicating a significant indirect effect (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). 
H9a, which predicts the impact of transparency on purchase intention is partially 
mediated by skepticism, is not supported.  The mediating path from skepticism to 
purchase intention was not significant in the structural model.  According to Baron and 
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Kenny (1986), the path from the mediator to the dependent variable must be significant in 
order to test its mediating effects.  As a result, skepticism is not a mediating variable 
between transparency and purchase intention since the path from skepticism to purchase 
intention was non-significant. 
H9b, which predicts the impact of transparency on purchase intention is partially 
mediated by trust, is supported.  In the model without the mediating path of trust to 
purchase intention, both paths from transparency to trust (β = .27) and from transparency 
to purchase intention (β =.41) were significant (p<.01).  In the model with the mediating 
path, all three paths were significant (p<.01), and in particular the transparency to 
purchase intention path was reduced from .41 to .39 supporting partial mediation by trust.  
The bootstrap analysis revealed that the 95% confidence interval for the size of the 
indirect effect excluded zero (.14, .32), suggesting a significant indirect effect (Preacher 
& Hayes, 2004).  
Regarding the moderating hypotheses, it was proposed that the impact of 
transparency on skepticism will be greater with perceptions of other-serving motive 
attributions than with perceptions of firm-serving motive attributions. Likewise, the 
impact of transparency on trust will be greater with perceptions of other-serving motive 
attributions than with perceptions of firm-serving motive attributions.  The moderating 
hypothesis predicting that perceived motives moderates the relationship of transparency 
on skepticism (H11a) is not supported (β = .08, p>.05).  The hypothesis predicting that 
perceived motives moderates the relationship of transparency on trust (H11b) is also not 
supported (β = -.01, p>.10).  A post-hoc analysis of the linear correlations between 
transparency and skepticism and transparency and trust at high (firm-serving) motives 
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and low (other-serving) motives was performed to better understand the interaction of 
transparency and motives.  For both firm and other-serving motives, transparency was 
correlated with skepticism and trust in the predicted directions.  As hypothesized in 
Chapter 4, the strength of the relationships is less when the motives for being transparent 
are perceived to be more firm-serving motives than other-serving motives.  However, the 
correlation between transparency and skepticism for subjects who perceived firm-serving 
motives was non-significant (r = -.09, p = .45) while the correlation between transparency 
and skepticism for subjects who perceived other-serving motives was significant (r =-.29, 
p<.01).  Both of the correlations between transparency and trust for subjects who 
perceived firm-serving motives and for those who perceived other serving motives were 
significant (firm-serving: r = .46, p<.0001 and other-serving: r = .49, p<.0001) and in the 
predicted direction.  One possible explanation for motives not being a moderator of the 
effects of transparency on skepticism and trust in the structural equation model is that 
motives are less important in the overall evaluation process of firms by stakeholders.  
What may matter most is whether or not a firm is or isn’t transparent rather than why a 
firm is or isn’t transparent.  A second possible explanation is that transparency motives 
were not salient enough to subjects as they responded to the survey since the scale items 
for perceived motives were presented after the scale items for skepticism, trust, attitude, 
and purchase intention.  A final possible explanation is that the right moderating motives 
were not captured in the scale items.   
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Table 22: Study 3, Results for Test of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Finding 
H1: Consumer perceived effort toward learning about a 
firm has a negative effect on perceptions of 
transparency. 
Supported 
H2: Perceived firm reciprocity has a positive effect on 
perceptions of transparency. 
Supported 
H3: Information provided by a firm that is perceived as 
firm-damaging has a positive effect on perceptions of 
transparency. 
Supported 
H4: Perceived firm transparency has a negative effect on 
consumer skepticism. 
Supported 
H5: Perceived firm transparency has a positive effect on 
trust. 
Supported 
H6: Perceived firm transparency has a positive effect on 
attitudes toward the firm. 
Supported 
H7: Perceived firm transparency has a positive effect on 
purchase intention. 
Supported 
H8a: The impact of transparency on attitude toward the 
firm is partially mediated by consumer skepticism. 
Supported 
H8b: The impact of transparency on attitude toward the 
firm is partially mediated trust. 
Supported 
H9a: The impact of transparency on purchase intention is 
partially mediated by consumer skepticism.  
Not Supported 
H9b: The impact of transparency on purchase intention is 
partially mediated by trust. 
Supported 
H10: Attitude toward the firm has a positive effect on 
purchase intention. 
Supported 
H11a: The influence of transparency on consumer 
skepticism is moderated by perceived firm motives. 
Not Supported 
 
H11b: The influence of transparency on trust is 
moderated by perceived firm motives. 
Not supported 
 
To summarize Study 3, the purpose of Study 3 was to test the hypotheses 
presented in Chapter 4 using scenarios in an airline context as stimuli and a structural 
equation model as the analysis method. The complete proposed model was tested with a 2 
 169 
 
(consumer effort: low, high) x 2 (perceived firm reciprocity: low, high) x 2 (damaging 
information: low, high) between subjects design.  Of the three antecedents, consumer 
effort had the greatest impact on perceptions of firm transparency (β = -.52, p<.01), 
followed by perceived firm reciprocity (β = .38, p<.01), and negative information (β = 
.15, p<.01).  This provides some insight into helping firms prioritize their transparency 
strategy with customers.  The findings here would suggest that firms with limited 
resources should first start with making it easy for customers to learn about the company 
and its products as those efforts will have the highest impact on perceptions of firm 
transparency.  Interestingly, of the three antecedents, negative information has the least 
impact on transparency, which is probably good news for firms as they would most likely 
be most resistant to sharing negative information about itself compared to other methods 
of transparency.  Study 3 also revealed that transparency has significant direct impact on 
reducing skepticism (β = -.20, p<.01), and increasing trust (β = .48, p<.01), attitude 
toward the firm (β = .65, p<.01), and purchase intention (β = .39, p<.01); and these 
impacts are of substantial magnitude.  Overall, Study 3 has shown that transparency is an 
important construct for firms in gaining more favorable attitudes and purchase intention 
from stakeholders. 
Next is Study 4, which tests the full structural equation model incorporating both 
a fictitious email and website into the stimuli design.  A more diverse sample in terms of 
age will also be used in Study 4 in addition to testing the model with different marketing 
communications stimuli.  
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Study 4 
The purpose of Study 4 is to further test the proposed model in a slightly more 
ecologically valid setting with a more diverse sample.  The scenarios used in Study 3 
were modified to develop 8 new airline scenarios for a 2 (consumer effort: low, high) x 2 
(perceived firm reciprocity: low, high) x 2 (damaging information: low, high) between 
subjects design.  In these new scenarios, ABC Airlines introduced a new in-flight service 
by sending out an email communication to its customers. The airline then referred 
customers to its website for additional information about the new in-flight service. 
Test of the Model 
Method.  The data collection lasted 14 days.  A more diverse age range of 
participants were solicited for participation including students and non-students.  
Undergraduate business students were recruited to participate in the study via an email   
by the instructors.  Students received extra credit for participating in the study.  The non-
students were recruited to participate in the study via an email and social media 
(Facebook and Linked In) notifications by the researcher to a convenience sample.  There 
were 341 completed surveys. 
 Procedure.  As in Studies 1, 2 and 3, data was collected via online questionnaires. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of eight scenarios designed to manipulate the 
high and low levels of perceived consumer effort, perceived firm reciprocity, and 
perceived firm-damaging information.  The manipulations were designed based on 
scenarios of Study 3 and the conceptual definitions of the three constructs.   
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 The experiment required subjects to first read an introduction about ABC Airlines 
in which they were asked to imagine they recently purchased an airline ticket to fly ABC 
Airlines.   
Introduction for all manipulations: 
“ABC Airlines is sending out an email to all of its customers to announce 
a new in-flight service that it will offer on all of its planes. One of the 
ways that ABC Airlines is marketing this new service is by sending out 
emails to all those customers who recently booked a flight.  Please 
imagine you are one of these customers.” 
 
Subjects were then asked to read an email from ABC Airlines to its customers in which 
the airline was introducing a new in-flight service.  The email was addressed to the 
subject by name in the salutation of the email.  The name was auto-populated from a 
previous page in which subjects were asked to provide their first name.  Therefore if the 
subject said his name was “John” then the email started with “Dear John”.  This part of 
the email was created to stimulate interest in the email and add personalization to it so as 
to increase ecological validity.  Following the salutation, each email consisted of the 
same first paragraph for all manipulations: 
“Thank you for recently booking a flight with ABC Airlines!  We thought 
we’d share with you an exciting new in-flight service that will be 
available on your next flight.   This new in-flight service will allow 
passengers the option to connect to different websites via APPS right 
from the touchscreen located at each seat.  We've provided a list of 
features on our website at www.abcairlines.com.” 
 
The second paragraph was intended to manipulate perceived firm reciprocity by 
manipulating the number of different ways ABC Airlines offered its customers a way to 
communicate with it.  For example, the high reciprocity condition included the following 
verbiage: 
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“Would you like to contact us?  We can address your questions and 
comments by email (newfees@abcairlines.com) or you can speak to a 
representative by calling our toll-free number (888-931-1ABC).  You may 
also chat with us instantly online by visiting our website 
(www.ABCairlines.com\instantchat).” 
 
Whereas the low reciprocity condition included the following verbiage: 
“Would you like to contact us?  We can address your questions and 
comments by email (newfees@abcairlines.com).” 
 
Following the reciprocity manipulation was verbiage constant to all manipulations: 
“We know you have many choices from which to choose for your next air 
travel.  We appreciate your business and look forward to flying with you 
soon. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
ABC Airlines” 
 
Finally, the email included a ‘P.S’ section intended to manipulate perceived firm 
damaging information.  In the low firm-damaging information, it was suggested that 
ABC Airlines provided on their website pros of flying with them and flight pricing:   
“P.S. 
You may also visit our website for: 
- A letter from the CEO summarizing the past year’s successes. 
- An overview of the pros of flying with ABC Airlines.  
- Flight prices for our flights.” 
 
In the high condition, it was suggested that ABC Airlines provided on their website pros 
and cons of flying with them and flight pricing for both ABC and its competitors: 
 “P.S. 
You may also visit our website for: 
- A letter from the CEO summarizing the past year’s successes (and failures 
too) for the company.   
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- An overview of the pros and cons of flying with ABC Airlines.  The 
overview provides what our customers like and dislike about our services.   
- Flight prices for not only our flights but also our competitors.  We’ll let 
you know when we’re not the cheapest flight available.” 
 
After reading the email, subjects were then asked to proceed to the company’s website to 
learn more about the new in-flight service:   
“Click the >> button for more information on the company's website about 
this new in-flight product.” 
The website stimuli were intended to manipulate perceived consumer effort.  The website 
was non-descript with the exception of an ABC Airlines logo at the top of each web page.  
The same content which discussed additional features of the in-flight service was 
provided for both high and low conditions: 
“Some applications (APPS) that will be available include those from 
social media, news, and entertainment sites.  
 
Other features include: 
   
 Unlimited access to any of the offered APP sites during your flight.  
 The ability to use all of the features within each APP. For example, 
in the Facebook APP you will be able to post status updates, send 
emails, etc. just as you would from your computer. 
 A modest cost of $3.99, which is less than purchasing in-flight Wi-
Fi. 
 Availability by the time you are scheduled to fly with ABC 
Airlines.” 
 
However, for the low perceived consumer effort condition, the content was presented in 
bullet form, on a single page, and in a larger, more readable font (as seen above).  For the 
high perceived consumer effort condition, the content was presented in paragraph form, 
across several web pages (to mimic search and click behaviors on a real website), in 
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small font (to mimic ‘fine print’), and presented at the very bottom of the web page (to 
mimic search and scroll behaviors on a real website). 
Finally, subjects completed the survey after subjects were presented with the web pages 
for the new in-flight service.  
Procedure for test of full model.  Four procedures were conducted as a part of 
testing the full proposed model.  First, EFAs were conducted on all of the scales to ensure 
uni-dimensionality.  Second, the manipulations were checked to ensure the scenarios 
were perceived as intended. Third, all scales in the model were tested through a 
measurement model to ensure the scales exhibited adequate validities and the overall 
measurement model exhibited adequate model fit indices.  Fourth, the full structural 
model was tested.   
For the EFAs, each scale loaded onto a single factor and internal reliability ranged 
from .78 (skepticism) to .93 (attitude toward the firm, purchase intention, trust) for all 
constructs. 
 For the manipulation checks, all three manipulation checks worked as intended.  
The effectiveness of the manipulations was tested with a t test.  Levene’s test was non-
significant for each manipulation check indicating the variances between the two groups 
for each manipulation check were roughly equal.  On average, subjects exposed to the 
high perceived consumer effort manipulation (n = 149) experienced higher perceived 
consumer effort (M = 4.29, SE = .12) than the subjects (n = 149) exposed to the low 
perceived consumer effort manipulation (M = 3.89, SE = .11).  This difference was 
significant t (296) = 2.47, p<.05.  On average, subjects exposed to the high perceived 
reciprocity manipulation (n = 145) experienced higher perceived reciprocity (M = 4.93, 
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SE = .10) than the subjects (n = 155) exposed to the low perceived reciprocity 
manipulation (M = 4.49, SE = .09).  This difference was significant t (298) = 3.11, p<.01.  
On average, subjects exposed to the high perceived negative information manipulation (n 
= 150) experienced higher perceived negative information (M = 4.04, SE = .09) than the 
subjects (n = 145) exposed to the low perceived negative information manipulation (M = 
3.26, SE = .10).  This difference was significant t (293) = 5.78, p<.0001. 
 Three two-way factorial ANOVAs were also performed as a test to ensure the 
three manipulated constructs did not influence each other.  For each ANOVA, one of the 
three manipulated constructs was defined as the measured dependent variable, and the 
other two were defined as independent variables each with two groups (high/low).  An 
interaction term was also defined between the two categorical independent variables in 
each model.  For all three models, the independent variables had neither main nor 
interaction effects with the dependent variables. For the model with negative information 
as the dependent variable and perceived firm effort and perceived firm reciprocity as the 
two independent variables, there was a non-significant main effect of both perceived firm 
effort, F (1,327) =.52, p = .47, and perceived firm reciprocity, F (1,327) = .19, p = .67. 
For the model with perceived firm reciprocity as the dependent variable and perceived 
firm effort and negative information as the two independent variables, there was a non-
significant main effect of both perceived firm effort, F (1,333) = 2.8, p = .12, and 
negative information, F (1,333) = .26, p = .61.  For the model with perceived firm effort 
as the dependent variable and perceived firm reciprocity and negative information as the 
two independent variables, there was a non-significant main effect of both perceived firm 
reciprocity, F (1,330) = .04, p = .84, and negative information, F (1,330) = 1.13, p = .29.   
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 Like Study 3, the motives scale items were presented to subjects who responded 
to the statement, ‘this company is transparent” with either a ‘strongly agree’, ‘somewhat 
agree’, ‘agree’, ‘disagree’, ‘somewhat disagree’, or ‘strongly disagree’.  Subjects who 
responded to this statement with ‘neither agree nor disagree’ were removed from the 
analysis of the measurement and structural model.  There were 100 subjects who were 
excluded from the analysis due to answering the item ‘this company is transparent’ with 
‘neither agree nor disagree’.  Of the 201 subjects remaining for the SEM analysis, 32% 
were 21 and under, 45% were 22 to 34 years old, 9% were 35 to 44 years old, 6% were 
45 to 54 years old, 5% were 55 to 64 years old, and 3% were 65 and older.  The goal for 
Study 4 (to test the model with a sample that has a more diverse age range compared to 
Study 3) was accomplished.  The sample for Study 4 is much more diverse compared to 
that of Study 3.  For Study 3, 62% of the sample was 21 and under, compared to Study 4 
which had only 32% of the sample 21 and under.  Table 23 provides a comparison of the 
age ranges between Studies 3 and 4. 
Table 23: Studies 3 and 4, Age Range of Study Participants 
Age Range 
Study 3 
Percent 
Study 4 
Percent 
21 and under 62% 32% 
22 to 34 33% 45% 
35 to 44 3% 9% 
45 to 54 2% 6% 
55 to 64 0 5% 
65 and over 0 3% 
 
For the measurement model, all items were constrained to load on the constructs 
they were intended to measure. The chi-square was 270.93 (p <.0001) with 216 degrees 
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of freedom.  Given the sample size (N = 189) and the number of observed variables (m = 
24), the model fit indices indicated a good fit based on absolute (e.g. SRMSR = .03 and 
GFI = .89) and incremental indices (e.g. CFI = .98 and NFI = .93).  The model fit indices 
indicated a very good fit to the data based on parsimony fit indices (e.g. .RMSEA = .04 
and probability of close fit = .90).  The means for each of the scales is provided in Table 
24.  The final scale items from the measurement model are provided in Table 25 along 
with their factor loadings.  
Table 24: Study 4, Means for Final Scales 
Scale Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Effort 4.05 1.52 1 7 
Reciprocity 4.78 1.38 1 7 
Negative Information 3.78 1.35 1 7 
Transparency 5.29 1.30 1 7 
Skepticism 3.31 1.46 1 7 
Trust 4.71 1.31 1 7 
Attitude 4.50 1.10 1 6 
Purchase Intention 4.89 1.43 1 7 
Motive 4.95 1.43 1 7 
 
Table 25: Study 4, Factor Loadings for Measurement Model 
Variable 
Name 
Description Factor 
Loadings 
t value  
(Std. error) 
Consumer Effort  (Cronbach's Alpha = .92, CR = .95, AVE = .89 ) 
EFFORT1 It seems like I would have to spend a lot of time searching 
this company's website for information that I wanted to know 
about this company. 0.89 42.13 (.02) 
EFFORT2 It seems I would have to put in a lot of effort to learn about 
this company. 0.93 51.21 (.02) 
EFFORT3 It seems this company shares information about itself in such 
a way that I would have to try hard to learn about it. 
0.84 31.46 (.03) 
Perceived Firm Reciprocity  (Cronbach's Alpha = .82, CR =.91 , AVE = .86) 
RECIPR1 This company seems to facilitate two-way communication 
between itself and customers. 0.93 28.81 (.03) 
RECIPR2 
 
 
This company affords me the opportunity to communicate 
with it. 
0.78 19.56 (.04) 
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Variable 
Name 
Description Factor 
Loadings 
t value  
(Std. error) 
Perceived Firm-Damaging Information  (Cronbach's Alpha = .84, CR = .91, AVE = .80) 
NEGINFO3 This company seems to provide information that could be 
harmful to its reputation. 0.89 25.27 (.03) 
NEGINFO4 This company seems to provide information that could be 
harmful to its sales. 0.84 22.55 (.04) 
NEGINFO6  This company seems to provide negative information about 
itself or its products. 0.68 14.25 (.05) 
Perceived Firm Transparency (Cronbach's Alpha = .87, CR = .95, AVE = .87) 
TRANSP16 This company provides me with a learning opportunity about 
itself. 0.82 28.29 (.03) 
TRANSP18 This company enables me to know what it's doing. 0.93 58.46 (.02) 
TRANSP27 This company wants me to understand what it is doing. 0.87 39.77 (.02) 
Skepticism  (Cronbach's Alpha = .79, CR = .88, AVE = .82) 
SKEP1 This company cares more about getting me to buy its 
product/service than it does about what's good for me.  
0.78 20.90 (.04) 
SKEP2 This company tries to trick customers into buying something.  0.86 27.22 (.03) 
Trust in firm(Cronbach's Alpha = .93, CR = .97, AVE = .95) 
TRST1 This company can be trusted. 0.96 81.38 (.01) 
TRST3 This company is truthful.  0.94 69.99 (.01) 
Attitude toward the firm (Cronbach's Alpha = .93, CR = .97, AVE = .92) 
ATT1 Bad: Good 0.91 56.98 (.02) 
ATT2 Unfavorable: Favorable 0.95 80.69 (.01) 
ATT3 Disagreeable: Agreeable 0.90 51.04 (.02) 
Purchase Intention (Cronbach's Alpha = .93, CR = .96, AVE = .90) 
PI1 I would be willing to buy from this company. 0.93 63.12 (.01) 
PI2 I will take this company into consideration the next time I 
buy a product/service like this. 0.89 47.96 (.02) 
PI3 I can imagine buying this company's product/service. 0.87 40.91 (.02) 
Perceived Firm Motive (Cronbach's Alpha = .91, CR = .95, AVE = .88) 
MOTIVE1 Bad intentions toward customers…Good intentions toward 
customers 0.90 44.11 (.02) 
MOTIVE2 Intended to take advantage of customers…Not intended to 
take advantage of customers 0.86 35.19 (.02) 
MOTIVE3 Bad motives that might hurt customers…Good motives that 
might help customers 0.87 37.21 (.02) 
Chi-Square (216, n = 169) = 270.93 (p<.0001), SRMSR = .03, GFI = .89, RMSEA = .04, 
 CFI = .98, NFI = .93 
 
 
(table 25 continued) 
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Tests of validity.  Next, the constructs in the measurement model were tested for 
convergent and discriminant validities prior to testing the full structural model.  All scales 
exhibited adequate convergent validity.  The factor loadings ranged from .68 to .96. 
Average variance extracted ranged from .80 to .95 which is above the recommended 
threshold of .50 (Hair et al., 2006c).  Cronbach’s coefficient alpha ranged from .79 to .93 
and composite reliability (CR) ranged from .87 to .97.  Cronbach’s alpha, composite 
reliability, and average variance extracted are provided in Table 26. 
Discriminant validity was assessed between transparency and all of the other 
constructs in the proposed model.  AVE and confidence intervals around correlations 
were assessed.   The AVE for the constructs in the model were .87 (TRANSP), .95 
(TRST), .82 (SKEP), .92 (ATT), .90 (PI), .89 (EFFORT), .86 (RECIPR), .80 
(NEGINFO), and .88 (MOTIVE).  Transparency shows good discriminant validity 
between it and the other variables.  The square of the correlations were less than the 
average variance extracted for all variable pairs indicating each of the constructs exhibit 
discriminant validity from the other constructs in the model.   Table 26 provides the 
Pearson’s correlations, squared correlations, and AVE for each construct.  The 
confidence intervals were assessed as a second test of discriminant validity.  None of the 
confidence intervals around the correlation estimates between the pairs of two factors 
included 1.0.    
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Table 26: Study 4, Psychometric Properties of Constructs 
Pearson’s Correlations, AVE, and Squared Correlations 
  TRANSP TRST SKEP ATT PI EFFORT RECIPR NEGINFO MOTIVE 
TRANSP 0.87 0.69 -0.49 0.69 0.69 -0.49 0.55 -.02* 0.64 
TRST 0.48 0.95 -0.59 0.75 0.68 -0.44 0.56 .00* 0.74 
SKEP 0.24 0.35 0.82 -0.68 -0.59 0.44 -0.35 .08* -0.59 
ATT 0.48 0.56 0.46 0.92 0.73 -0.49 0.52 -0.08* 0.70 
PI 0.48 0.46 0.35 0.53 0.90 -0.41 0.58 -.07* 0.67 
EFFORT 0.24 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.17 0.89 -0.38 .08* -0.47 
RECIPR 0.30 0.31 0.12 0.27 0.34 0.14 0.86 -.08* 0.56 
NEGINFO 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.80 -.07* 
MOTIVE 0.41 0.55 0.35 0.49 0.45 0.22 0.31 0.00 0.88 
Correlations above the diagonal; square of correlations below the diagonal; AVE on diagonal. 
* Correlations are not significant at p<.05. All other correlations significant at p<.05. 
 
Test of Hypotheses.  All hypotheses were tested through a structural equation 
model
3
.   
The full structural equation model is presented in Figure 8 along with the 
standardized results for linear equations and their standard errors.  The chi-square was 
457.52 (p <.0001) on 297 degrees of freedom.  The model fit indices indicated an 
adequate fit to the data based on absolute (e.g. SRMSR = .05), parsimonious (e.g. 
RMSEA = .05 and probably of close fit =.26), and incremental indices (e.g. CFI = .96 
and NFI = .90).  As Figure 8 illustrates, all paths were significant with the exception of: 
the path from negative information to transparency, the paths from the two proposed 
interaction effects, and the paths from skepticism and trust to purchase intention.  
Compared to Study 3, the model from Study 4 has two additional paths that are non-
                                                             
 
3 Since the data was collected via an experimental design, the author conducted ANOVA and MANOVA 
analyses to better understand the impact of the manipulations on the dependent variables in the model.  
This analysis is presented in Appendix C. 
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significant (from negative information to transparency and from trust to purchase 
intention).  The different findings between Studies 3 and 4 are most likely attributed to 
the difference in sample and to the difference in stimuli.   
First is a discussion of the hypotheses predicting direct effects, followed by a 
discussion of the hypotheses predicting mediation and moderation. Table 27 provides a 
summary of the results for the test of hypotheses based on the structural equation model. 
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Figure 8: Study 4, Full Test of the Proposed Model 
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The direct effect hypotheses predicting consumer effort (H1) and firm reciprocity 
(H2) as antecedents of transparency are supported indicating they had a significant direct 
effect on transparency (EFFORT = -.30, p<.01; RECIPR = .62, p<.01).  Compared to 
Study 3, the path estimate for effort on transparency has decreased (Study 3, EFFORT =  
-.52, p<.01) whereas the path estimate for reciprocity on transparency has increased 
(Study 3, RECIPR = .38, p<.01).  The hypothesis predicting negative information (H3) as 
an antecedent of transparency is not supported (β  = .04, p>.05), which is in contrast to a 
significant path estimate in Study 3 (Study 3, NEGINFO = .15, p<.05). 
The hypotheses predicting transparency having direct effects on skepticism (H4), 
trust (H5), attitude toward the firm (H6), and purchase intention (H7) are supported (SKEP 
= -.25, p<.01, TRST = .47, p<.01, ATT = .27, p<.01, PI = .39, p<.01).  The major 
difference in these path estimates between Studies 3 and 4 is that the path estimate from 
transparency to attitude has been significantly reduced (Study 3, ATT = .65, p<.01).   
The hypotheses predicting mediation (H8a,b and H9a,b) required the same multi-
step procedure (Baron & Kenny, 1986) as in Study 3.  H8a, which predicts the impact of 
transparency on attitude toward the firm is partially mediated by skepticism, is supported.  
In the model without the mediating path of skepticism to attitude, both paths from 
transparency to skepticism (β = -.30) and from transparency to attitude (β  =.30) were 
significant (p<.01).  In the model with the mediating path, all three paths were significant 
(p<.01), and in particular the transparency to attitude path was reduced from .30 to .27 
supporting partial mediation by skepticism.  The bootstrap analysis revealed that the 95% 
confidence interval for the size of the indirect effect excluded zero (.14, .27), which 
suggested a significant indirect effect (Preacher & Hayes, 2004).   
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H8b, which predicts the impact of transparency on attitude toward the firm is 
partially mediated by trust, is supported.  In the model without the mediating path of trust 
to attitude, both of the paths from transparency to trust (β = .47) and from transparency to 
attitude (β =.40) were significant (p<.01).  In the model with the mediating path, all three 
paths were significant (p<.01), and in particular the transparency to attitude path was 
reduced from .40 to .27 supporting partial mediation by skepticism.  The bootstrap 
analysis showed that the 95% confidence interval for the size of the indirect effect 
excluded zero (.24, .43), which suggested a significant indirect effect (Preacher & Hayes, 
2004).  
H9a, which predicts the impact of transparency on purchase intention is partially 
mediated by skepticism, and H9b, which predicts the impact of transparency on purchase 
intention is partially mediated by trust, are not supported.  The mediating paths from 
skepticism to purchase intention and trust to purchase intention were not significant in the 
structural model.  According to Baron and Kenny (1986), the path from the mediator to 
the dependent variable must be significant in order to test its mediating effects.  As a 
result, neither skepticism nor trust is a mediating variable between transparency and 
purchase intention. 
The moderating hypothesis predicting that perceived motives moderates the 
relationship of transparency on skepticism (H11a) is not supported (β = .07, p>.10).  The 
hypothesis predicting that perceived motives moderates the relationship of transparency 
on trust (H11b) is also not supported (β = -.04, p>.10).  The unsupported moderating 
hypotheses in this study are consistent with the findings from Study 3.  A post-hoc 
analysis of the linear correlations between transparency and skepticism and transparency 
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and trust at high (firm-serving) motives and low (other-serving) motives was investigated 
to better understand the interaction of transparency and motives.  For both firm and other-
serving motives, transparency was correlated with skepticism and trust in the predicted 
directions.  As hypothesized in Chapter 4, the strength of the relationships is less when 
firm-serving motives are perceived compared to other-serving motives.  Unlike in Study 
3 where the correlation between transparency and skepticism for subjects who perceived 
firm-serving motives was non-significant (r = -.09, p = .45), in Study 4 the correlation 
was significant (r = -.24, p<.01).  The correlation between transparency and skepticism 
for subjects who perceived other-serving motives was also significant (r = -.62, p<.001).  
Both of the correlations between transparency and trust for subjects who perceived firm-
serving motives and for those who perceived other serving motives were significant 
(firm-serving: r = .66, p<.0001 and other-serving: r = .71, p<.0001) and in the predicted 
direction.   
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Table 27: Study 4, Results for Test of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Finding 
H1: Consumer perceived effort toward learning about a 
firm has a negative effect on perceptions of 
transparency. 
Supported 
H2: Perceived firm reciprocity has a positive effect on 
perceptions of transparency. 
Supported 
H3: Information provided by a firm that is perceived as 
firm-damaging has a positive effect on perceptions of 
transparency. 
Not Supported 
H4: Perceived firm transparency has a negative effect on 
consumer skepticism. 
Supported 
H5: Perceived firm transparency has a positive effect on 
trust. 
Supported 
H6: Perceived firm transparency has a positive effect on 
attitudes toward the firm. 
Supported 
H7: Perceived firm transparency has a positive effect on 
purchase intention. 
Supported 
H8a: The impact of transparency on attitude toward the 
firm is partially mediated by consumer skepticism. 
Supported 
H8b: The impact of transparency on attitude toward the 
firm is partially mediated trust. 
Supported 
H9a: The impact of transparency on purchase intention is 
partially mediated by consumer skepticism.  
Not Supported 
H9b: The impact of transparency on purchase intention is 
partially mediated by trust. 
Not Supported 
H10: Attitude toward the firm has a positive effect on 
purchase intention. 
Supported 
H11a: The influence of transparency on consumer 
skepticism is moderated by perceived firm motives. 
Not Supported 
 
H11b: The influence of transparency on trust is 
moderated by perceived firm motives. 
Not supported 
 
To summarize Study 4, the purpose of Study 4 was to test the hypotheses 
presented in Chapter 4 using slightly more ecologically valid scenarios with a more 
diverse sample.  The complete proposed model was tested with a 2 (consumer effort: low, 
high) x 2 (perceived firm reciprocity: low, high) x 2 (damaging information: low, high) 
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between subjects design with stimuli that incorporated a mix of marketing 
communications methods (an email and a website).  Unlike Study 3 where consumer 
effort had the greatest impact on perceptions of firm transparency (β  = -.52, p<.01), 
followed by perceived firm reciprocity (β = .38, p<.01), and negative information (β = 
.15, p<.01), this finding was not replicated in Study 4.  Perceived firm reciprocity (β = 
.62, p<.01) had the greatest impact on perceptions of firm transparency, followed by 
perceived consumer effort (β = -.30, p<.01).  Negative information had a non-significant 
impact on transparency (β = .04, p>.10).  One possible explanation to account for the 
non-significant relationship of negative information on transparency is that this older 
sample may require a stronger indication that firms are willing to provide negative 
information in order to impact transparency.  The negative information manipulation 
included ABC Airlines providing both ‘pros and cons’ of its services.  Perhaps providing 
both pros and cons suggested to this sample that ABC Airlines wanted to provide 
information in a purposeful way such that good information would cancel out the bad 
information.  It is possible this older sample would perceive firm transparency if ABC 
Airlines only provided the cons rather than providing both pros and cons.  
Study 4 also revealed that transparency has significant direct impact on reducing 
skepticism (β = -.25, p<.01), and increasing trust (β = .47, p<.01), attitude toward the 
firm (β = .27, p<.01), and purchase intention (β = .39, p<.01); and these impacts are of 
substantial magnitude.  Overall, Study 4 has shown that transparency is an important 
construct for firms in gaining more favorable attitudes and purchase intention from 
stakeholders. 
 
 188 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter focused on testing the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4 and 
illustrated in Figure 2 via two data collections.  The first data collection (Study 3; study 
numbers continue from the previous chapter) served to test the complete proposed model 
in Chapter 4 using scenarios as the stimuli.  The second data collection (Study 4) tested 
the model with a slightly more ecologically valid manipulation of the constructs.  It also 
tested the full model across two different stimuli which combined two often-used 
corporate marketing communications methods, email and a website.  
Overall, Studies 3 and 4 resulted in confirming the significant impact that 
perceived firm transparency has on stakeholder attitudes and purchase intention.  These 
studies also provided two key ways in which firms can increase perceptions of 
transparency: 1) by making it easy for stakeholders to learn about the company, and 2) by 
providing multiple ways to communicate with the company.  The third antecedent, 
providing information perceived as firm-damaging may impact perceptions of 
transparency, but additional research is required to provide conclusive findings since 
Studies 3 and 4 show divergent findings.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
General Discussion 
In the last few years alone, calls for transparency by consumers have grown 
louder. No longer are consumers willing to sit back and allow firms to make ‘closed 
door’ decisions that benefit the company (and its executives) at the expense of 
consumers, society, and the environment.  Firms who are proactive have begun to heed 
these calls and making transparency a central and key part of the value proposition they 
offer to the marketplace. The experiences of some of these early adopters of the idea of 
being transparent with one’s customers has been very positive from the firm’s 
perspective, especially in terms of customer appreciation, increased sales, profits, and 
loyalty. A good example of a firm that places transparency as one of its key values is 
Zappos.com. 
Zappos.com, is one business that understands the value of transparency.  
Zappos.com, an online shoe and handbag retailer operates with transparency in mind, and 
it is one of the company’s 10 “core family values”.  The company notes that 
“Fundamentally, we believe that openness and honesty make for the best relationships 
because that leads to trust and faith” (Zappos.com, 2012).  And the company acts on this 
core value.  As one example, on April 26, 2010, Zappos.com launched a live webcast of 
its internal “All Hands” quarterly employee meeting.  The live broadcast included several 
hours of video to include pre-meeting, meeting, and happy hour activities.  On the 
Zappos.com blog, an employee blogger wrote: “We invited the world to tune in live to 
our 'internal' meeting. For those who know the basics of how Zappos.com is run, you 
 190 
 
probably know that we're all about transparency so it only made sense to invite anyone 
and everyone to sit in on our largest meeting of the quarter” (Zappos.com, 2010).  The 
company took this effort of transparency further by posting a copy of the webcast on its 
website as permanent archived material for all to see.  As another example of the ways 
Zappos.com exhibits transparency, the company’s CEO, Tony Hsieh, created a special 
website, called Zappos Insights, where visitors can learn not only about the company but 
also about how to recreate the Zappos transparency culture.  As this dissertation shows, 
Transparency is rewarded with decreased skepticism, and increased trust, attitude toward 
the firm, and purchase intention.  In the case of Zappos, the company has been rewarded 
for its transparency.  Zappos.com, Inc. was recognized in 2009, 2010 and 2011 by 
FORTUNE Magazine as one of the "100 Best Companies to Work For", was one of only 
40 U.S. companies named a J.D. Power 2011 Customer Service Champion, and was 
valued at $1.2 B in 2009 when it was acquired by Amazon.com (in part for its best-in-
class culture).  
From an academic perspective, this dissertation begins to answer the call for a 
greater understanding of transparency.  The American Marketing Association (AMA) has 
called for increased transparency noting firms should create a “spirit of openness” (AMA, 
2010).  This dissertation advanced the marketing literature for this construct by drawing 
from other streams including finance, accounting, information technology, political 
science, management, public health, and communications to provide a succinct definition 
for this construct.   
Not all firms have heeded the calls for greater transparency and this dissertation 
sheds some light on the favorable impacts of what transparency can offer them.  The 
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overwhelming lack of firms listening to these calls for transparency has resulted in the 
rise of consumer activist organizations to restore the balance of information symmetry 
(and thus power between firms and their stakeholders).  One such organization, 
Adbusters.org, is a non-profit, anti-consumerist global organization with the mission “to 
change the way information flows, the way corporations wield power, and the way 
meaning is produced in our society” (Adbusters, 2012).  This organization was born from 
the lack of citizens having the same access to information flows as businesses.  
Adbusters.org wants “folks to get mad about corporate disinformation, injustices in the 
global economy, and any industry that pollutes our physical or mental commons”.  One 
way that Adbusters.org tries to restore the balance of information asymmetry is by 
exposing “corporate propaganda” through global media campaigns and encouraging 
consumers to move from “spectator” to “participant” through activism (Adbusters, 2012).  
Firms that do not heed the call for transparency risk attention from such groups as 
adbusters.org and others. 
Financial institutions, government, and big businesses that do not listen to the call 
for increased transparency are subject to paying a steep price.  As this dissertation shows, 
transparent firms decrease skepticism, and increase trust, attitude toward the firm, and 
purchase intention.   Those perceived as non-transparent firms may be at risk of 
becoming the focus of an attack from activist organizations (and consequently risk 
negative publicity resulting from that attack).  One such activist organization is the global 
movement, Occupy, in which concerned citizens have revolted through peaceful 
demonstrations and media campaigns at the lack of information symmetry and the power 
that big business has over government.  The movement cites its first principle of 
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solidarity as “Engaging in direct and transparent participatory democracy” (Occupy, 
2011) as one way to avert major financial and societal crises.  The Occupy movement (of 
which the originating idea came from Adbusters.org through voicing the idea of such a 
movement in its magazine) has targeted Wall Street, government, big business, and 
educational institutions for improved transparency.  In November 2011, Occupy focused 
on Harvard as one firm deserving of its attention for its lack of transparency regarding its 
investment strategies (Devaney, 2011).  
The work completed in this dissertation is an important first step toward providing 
evidence to marketers that being open and forthright with stakeholders provides 
measureable, favorable impact to the firm.  Specifically, this research accomplished the 
first major milestone in the marketing literature toward understanding transparency.  This 
research is important because it sheds light on a construct that has become extremely 
relevant and important in today’s business environment. Coupled with technological 
advances that allow individuals tremendous access to information about firms from 
various sources other than the firm, and the actions of firms that has led to the financial 
meltdown, there is a genuine felt need among consumers that firms should be more 
transparent.  However, there are a lot of interpretations to the word transparency and this 
thesis consolidates and makes sense of the differing opinions as to what transparency 
means and its implications.   
In particular, this dissertation focused on understanding perceived firm 
transparency, developing a measure of transparency, and empirically testing antecedents 
and consequences of transparency.  Through a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
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research, perceived firm transparency was shown to reduce stakeholder skepticism, and 
increase stakeholder trust, favorable attitudes, and purchase intention.   
This section is organized as follows.  First, drawing from the work conducted in 
Chapters 2 and 3, is a discussion of what it means for a firm to be perceived as 
transparent.  Second, drawing from the work conducted in Chapter 6, is a discussion of 
the implications of consumer perceptions of firm transparency.  Third is a discussion of 
the managerial implications and specifically what managers can do to influence 
perceptions of transparency. Fourth is a discussion of the limitations of the research 
conducted in this dissertation.  Fifth and finally is a discussion of important future 
research based on the initial transparency findings of this dissertation. 
The Meaning of Firm Transparency 
Prior to the work conducted in this literature, there was no unitary agreement as to 
what it meant for a firm to be transparent.  The definition provided here, the extent to 
which a stakeholder perceives a firm’s conduct is forthright and open regarding matters 
relevant to the stakeholder, provides a solid foundation from which both academics and 
practitioners can advance transparency theories and propose other antecedents and 
consequences of perceived firm transparency beyond those investigated here.  At its core, 
transparency means that a firm is perceived to be open and forthright with stakeholders, 
granting access to, at a minimum, information that allows stakeholders to better 
understand the company, its products, and reasons for certain actions and decisions.  A 
firm that makes a conscious decision to be transparent believes stakeholders will reward 
the behavior of providing an ‘insider’ view into the company.  This dissertation shows 
that firms are rewarded by stakeholders when they perceive a firm is being transparent; 
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and those rewards come in the form of decreased skepticism and increased favorable 
attitudes toward the firm, trust, and purchase intention.   
Transparency also provides firms with an opportunity to represent themselves as 
having human qualities and as ‘real people’ rather than strictly persuasion agents.  
Transparency offers firms a way to interact with stakeholders removing unnecessary 
strong-arming and excessive persuasion tactics.  Interestingly, this dissertation showed 
that a firm’s motives for being transparent do not affect the favorable impacts 
transparency has on trust and skepticism.   That is, transparency will decrease skepticism 
and increase trust regardless of whether a firm’s motive for being transparent is perceived 
as being for self-serving reasons (i.e. as method to persuade consumers into buying 
something) or for other-serving reasons (i.e. as a method to help consumers make more 
informed choices).  This is a favorable finding for firms because it shows that it is better 
to be transparent than not, even if their actions are perceived to be motivated by pressure 
from competitors or customers.  The findings here suggest there are no additional benefits 
to the firm to change their perceptions (through targeted messaging or otherwise) to 
persuade them that the firm is being transparent for other-serving motives.  
Implications of Firm Transparency 
The approach-avoidance model (Knowles & Linn, 2004) of persuasion implies 
there are two ways that firms can create change with the target of persuasion.  The 
approach or “Alpha” strategy creates change by increasing the attractiveness of the offer 
to the target of persuasion.  For Alpha strategies to create change, the message or offer 
must be compelling enough to outweigh the resistance to change.  Alpha strategies are 
those that make messages more persuasive which include tactics such as: providing extra 
incentives (such as bonus offers), increasing source credibility, and emphasizing product 
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scarcity, to name a few.  However, these strategies can be ineffective when consumers 
are aware of them because they may use their persuasion knowledge to avoid such 
persuasive tactics (Campbell & Kirmani, 2008).  Additionally, since Alpha strategies are 
implemented with the goal of selling something rather than building relationships and 
creating customers for life, companies implementing Alpha strategies are at risk of 
unsatisfied customers who will not buy from them again, and many other potential 
negative consequences.    
The literature is much less robust in terms of Omega strategies compared to Alpha 
strategies (Knowles & Linn, 2004).  The target of persuasion must be receptive to the 
message in order to invoke change; Omega strategies increase such receptivity.   The 
avoidance or “Omega” strategy creates change by decreasing resistance and increasing 
receptivity toward the persuasive message.  Omega strategies include such tactics as 
directly addressing concerns, building confidence that it’s ok to remove resistance to the 
message, and redefining the relationship as a dyadic, cooperative interaction and 
conversation rather than a one-way persuasive message (Knowles & Linn, 2004).  This 
dissertation showed that transparency, in which firms are open and forthright with 
stakeholders, are more likely to do all of these things – directly address concerns, remove 
resistance to the message, and redefine the relationship as cooperative rather than 
antagonistic – compared to firms that are lacking transparency.  A transparent firm is 
capable of decreasing resistance toward the message by redefining the relationship as 
more consultative and less persuasion-oriented by making it easy for consumers to learn 
about it (H1) and by providing ways for stakeholders to have two-way conversations 
(H2).  A transparent firm decreases resistance in other ways as well such as by decreasing 
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skepticism (H4) and increasing trust (H5).  With transparency most likely comes other 
benefits to the firm beyond what was investigated in this dissertation including more 
satisfied customers with a potentially high lifetime value, positive word of mouth, and 
many other favorable consequences to the firm, to customers, and to society at large. 
This dissertation found that consumers reward transparent firms in four ways.  
First, transparent firms are rewarded with a reduction in skepticism toward the firm’s 
actions.  Consumers engaged with transparent firms are less skeptical and less on guard 
of persuasion attempts.  Transparency implies that the firm has nothing to hide (or at least 
will provide consumers with an acceptable level of opportunity to learn about it).  
Reduced skepticism has an added benefit such that when consumers are less skeptical, 
they are more open to listening to the firm’s messages, and less inclined to resist it. 
Second, transparent firms are rewarded with increased trust.  Consumers engaged with 
transparent firms are more trusting of them.  This means that consumers are more willing 
to rely on what the firm says as being true and, consequently, more willing to take the 
firm’s marketing messages into consideration in their decision-making processes.  Thus, 
while transparency decreases consumers’ persuasion defenses, at the same time 
transparency also makes them more vulnerable and open to the firms’ marketing 
persuasion messages.  Third, transparent firms are rewarded with more favorable 
attitudes.  Consumers engaged with transparent firms have favorable attitudes toward 
them – and attitude toward the firm has a direct and significant impact on purchase 
intention.  Thus, transparent firms are rewarded with increased purchase intention.  
Transparency implies that firms will go the “extra mile” to ensure consumers are well-
informed (by providing information meaningful to the consumer and reciprocal 
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communication opportunities), and this research shows that a firm’s extra effort is 
rewarded with in-kind purchase intention behaviors from consumers.  
From a more global perspective, transparency has the potential to build goodwill 
and redefine the interaction between firm and stakeholders as cooperative rather than 
antagonistic.  Over time, the level of skepticism and distrust should decrease as more 
firms engage in transparency efforts.  And, as more firms see the favorable impact of 
transparency, this should stimulate even more firms to be more transparent.  
Transparency brings with it a higher standard of decision making taking into account that 
transparent firms are those that communicate with stakeholders and offer insights about 
decision-making strategies.  Transparent firms are those that recognize decisions will be 
exposed and thus, it is wise to make the best decisions balancing what is best for both the 
firm and its stakeholders. 
Managerial Implications 
There are several other key implications of this research for managers.  First, this 
research shows that there is an alternate, more ethical strategy divergent from covert and 
sneaky marketing by which to engage stakeholders.  This research should provide enough 
evidence of the benefits of perceived firm transparency for managers to consider 
implementing transparency processes and tactics within the firm.  Beyond impacting 
trust, skepticism, and attitudes toward the firm is the idea that transparency can bring 
more global benefits to the firm. From a marketing strategy perspective, transparency 
may provide a competitive advantage to firms when industry transparency is low and 
when it is difficult for stakeholders to make quality assessments of the firm’s 
product/service.  From a supply chain perspective, transparency affords firms an 
opportunity to build lasting relationships with all businesses in its supply chain and 
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partner to develop the best quality products.  From an internal perspective, transparency 
provides an opportunity to attract and retain the best quality employees, and build high 
levels of moral and employee engagement.  From a legal perspective, transparency allows 
firms to stay unregulated and out of the eye of the Federal Trade Commission and other 
policy makers looking out for the best interest of consumers and of society at large.  
Finally, transparency affords firms an opportunity to attract better quality investment 
opportunities, gain a better reputation, and a legacy for being an equitable brand.   
Specifically, this research provides a few ways that managers can implement 
transparency tactics.  One way that managers can increase perceptions of transparency is 
by making it easy for stakeholders to learn about the company and its products.  From a 
website perspective, small changes to the content layout may increase perceptions of 
transparency.  For example, in Study 4, the low effort web pages were designed with the 
content in bullet form (rather than in paragraph form), on a single page (rather than 
multiple pages), and in a larger easy-to-read font (12 point font rather than 8.5 point 
font).  With regard to font size, managers may even want to consider adding the ability 
for web visitors to set their own font size.  Although this was not tested as a part of the 
effort manipulation here, it is reasonable to suggest this would favorably impact 
perceptions of transparency. 
An alternate way that managers can increase perceptions of firm transparency is 
by offering stakeholders multiple options for reciprocal communication.  For example, in 
Study 4, the high reciprocity emails communicated to email recipients that they could 
contact the company by email, by toll-free phone, and/or by instant chat.  Most managers 
already have multiple contact methods in place for stakeholders. Therefore managers can 
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quickly and simply increase perceptions of transparency with stakeholders by promoting 
that these multiple contact methods exist by adding the methods to emails, web pages, 
phone answering machines, advertisements, etc. 
Interestingly, this dissertation found a non-significant impact of firm-damaging 
information on perceived firm transparency in Study 4, but not in Study 3.  Recall that 
firm-damaging information was manipulated in Study 4 by stating at the bottom of ABC 
Airlines’ email that subjects can find on the company’s website: a letter from the CEO 
summarizing the company’s successes (and failures), an overview of the pros and cons of 
fling with ABC Airlines, and pricing information for both ABC Airlines and its 
competitors.  One potential reason for the non-significant finding is that what was 
presented as firm-damaging information was expected by subjects to be included on the 
website and thus the act of providing this information was not perceived as a transparent.  
Perhaps it is necessary for stakeholders to perceive information that is provided by a firm 
as unusual or unexpected in order for it to impact perceptions of firm transparency (or 
even for transparency to become salient). Therefore rather than the information being 
perceived as ‘firm-damaging’, what may matter instead is the perception that the 
information shared by the firm is unique and or unexpected.  This is consistent with the 
discussion on disconfirmation of expectations in Chapter 4 in which it was suggested that 
expectations may need to be disconfirmed in order for firm actions to make salient 
perceptions of firm transparency.  On the other hand (also as discussed in Chapter 4), it is 
possible that providing successes and failures, pros and cons, and competitor pricing was 
unexpected by subjects, but not sufficiently discrepant outside of a certain boundary or 
threshold for transparency.  
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Limitations 
 The major limitation of this research is the use of scenarios.  Although the 
scenario used in Study 4 is slightly more ecologically valid, the findings may not 
accurately represent attitudes and behaviors in a real-world context.  For example, Study 
4 instructs subjects that they will view a company’s website, but instead they viewed a 
‘stripped’ version of a webpage which excluded graphic design and extraneous content, 
which is what would be expected on a real website.  The lack of graphical appeal may 
have impacted subjects’ responses.  Future research should include testing the model in 
the context of a real website.  A second major limitation is the use of student subjects.  
The scale and model were fully tested using student subjects (with the exception of Study 
4).  Therefore it would be inappropriate to generalize the findings of this dissertation to a 
wider age (and education) demographic. A third limitation is the use of one primary 
industry (the airline industry) with which to test the scale and theoretical model.  
Although multiple industries were used in  
Future Research 
 The literature stream following the work in this dissertation has the potential to be 
plentiful.  In addition to testing the model with different samples, within different 
industries, and across additional marketing communications media, there are numerous 
questions that stem from this research: 
1. When is transparency most important? 
2. When is transparency most naturally valued? 
3. Can consumers be induced to care about transparency? 
4. Can a highly non-transparent firm change to become perceived as more 
transparent (and have resulting effects on consumer skepticism, trust, attitude 
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toward the firm and purchase intention) or will such behavior be discounted?  
What will it take for a highly non-transparent firm to become perceived as 
transparent? 
5. What are the negative consequences of transparency to firms? 
6. What are the negative consequences of transparency to consumers?   
7. Will transparency increase (rather than decrease) consumer ambiguity and 
uncertainty in some circumstances? 
 
Finally, additional research is warranted to better understand the relationship of 
perceived firm-damaging information on transparency.  Studies 3 and 4 resulted in mixed 
findings.  Study 3 showed a small impact on transparency and Study 4 showed a non-
significant impact on transparency.  Future research should provide some clearer 
direction on what specific information may be perceived as negative and how to best 
frame that information in the context of other positive information within the marketing 
medium. 
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APPENDIX A 
Survey for Study 1, Phases 2 and 3 
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APPENDIX B 
Study 3, Supplemental Analysis 
 
Supplemental analyses.  Additional supplemental MANOVA analyses were 
conducted with the same dataset used to test the hypotheses in Study 3. The purpose was 
to investigate whether a second analysis approach would provide corroborating evidence, 
to that found through SEM, as to the effects of effort, reciprocity, and negative 
information on perceptions of transparency (H1-H3).  MANOVA is typically a more 
common analysis method in experimental design studies when investigating the effects of 
a manipulation on other variables.  MANOVAs were performed with transparency, 
skepticism, trust, attitude, and PI in the model as dependent variables; and effort, 
reciprocity, and negative information in the model as independent variables.  For the 
effort MANOVA, the Omnibus test was significant, Λ = .46, F (5, 205) = 48.03, p<.0001.  
In support of H1, the effort manipulation had a significant effect on perceptions of 
transparency, F (1, 209) = 216.71, p<.0001.  For the reciprocity MANOVA, the Omnibus 
test was significant, Λ = .89, F (5, 205) = 4.83, p=.0003.  In support of H2, the reciprocity 
manipulation had a significant effect on perceptions of transparency, F (1, 209) = 11.00, 
p<.01.  For the negative information MANOVA, the Omnibus test was marginally 
significant, Λ = .95, F (5, 205) = 1.98, p<.08.  Because the p-value approached 
significance, ad hoc ANOVA tests were performed for H3.  In support of H3, the negative 
information manipulation had a significant effect on perceptions of transparency, F (1, 
209) = 5.52, p<.05.   
A second purpose of the supplemental analyses was to test whether the 
manipulations impacted other variables in the model beyond transparency.  This will help 
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clarify whether the variance in the dependent variables is due strictly to other variables 
hypothesized to influence them, or whether the variance can be partially attributed to one 
of the three manipulated dependent variables.  Specifically, MANOVA and Sobel 
mediation tests were conducted to better understand which dependent variables in the 
model beyond transparency (skepticism, trust, attitude toward the firm, and/or purchase 
intention) were directly affected by the manipulated independent variables in the model 
(consumer effort, firm reciprocity, and negative information) and if any were partially 
mediated by transparency. 
For perceived effort, the perceived effort manipulation had direct effects on 
skepticism F (1, 209) = 50.78, p<.0001, trust F (1, 209) = 51.48, p<.0001, attitude, F (1, 
209) = 144.22, p<.0001, and purchase intention F (1, 209) = 144.25, p<.0001.  A 
bootstrap analysis was conducted to investigate if any of these direct relationships were 
mediated by transparency.  The bootstrap analysis revealed that all of these direct 
relationships also had indirect effects through transparency, and the 95% confidence 
interval for the size of the indirect effects excluded zero, suggesting all indirect effects 
were significant (.11 - .31; -.39 - -.22; -.36 - -.20; and -.52 - -.30 respectively) (Preacher 
& Hayes, 2004). The mediation supports the structural equation model. 
For reciprocity, the perceived reciprocity manipulation had direct effects on 
skepticism F (1, 209) = 8.01, p=.0051, attitude, F (1, 209) = 12.21, p=.0006, and 
purchase intention F (1, 209) = 10.48, p=.001.  The bootstrap analysis revealed that all of 
these direct relationships also had indirect effects through transparency, and the 95% 
confidence interval for the size of the indirect effects excluded zero, suggesting all 
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indirect effects were significant (-.26 - -.29; .17 - .30; and .24 - .43 respectively) 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2004). The mediation supports the structural equation model. 
For negative information, the perceived negative information manipulation had 
direct effects on skepticism F (1, 209) = 7.09, p=.008, trust F (1, 209) = 7.29, p=.007, 
attitude, F (1, 209) = 5.93, p=.02, and purchase intention F (1, 209) = 3.85, p=.05.  A 
bootstrap analysis was conducted to investigate if any of these direct relationships were 
mediated by transparency.  The bootstrap analysis revealed that all of these direct 
relationships also had indirect effects through transparency, and the 95% confidence 
interval for the size of the indirect effects excluded zero, suggesting all indirect effects 
were significant (-.25 - -.08; .10 - .32; .12 - .34; and .16 - .46 respectively) (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2004). The mediation supports the structural equation model. 
To summarize the supplemental analyses, the MANOVAs corroborated the 
findings from the SEM analysis for H1 – H3.  The MANOVAs confirmed that effort, 
reciprocity, and negative information, have significant effects on perceptions of 
transparency.  The MANOVAs also shed light on what specifically managers can do to 
change perceptions of transparency by moving from low to high levels of effort, 
reciprocity, and negative information.  For example, with regard to H1, whereas the SEM 
findings only confirmed that there is a direct linear relationship between effort and 
transparency, the MANOVAs provided confirmation that the high conditions for each 
manipulated variable resulted in higher perceptions of transparency compared to the low 
conditions.  The supplemental mediation bootstrap analyses also confirmed the SEM 
mediation structure. 
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APPENDIX C 
Study 4, Supplemental Analysis 
 
Supplemental analyses.  Similar to Study 3, additional supplemental MANOVA 
and mediation analyses were conducted using the same dataset used to test the 
hypotheses in Study 4. The purpose was to investigate whether a second analysis 
approach would provide corroborating evidence, to that found through SEM, as to the 
effects of effort, reciprocity, and negative information on perceptions of transparency 
(H1-H3).   
For the effort MANOVA, the Omnibus test was significant, Λ = .91, F (5, 193) = 
3.75, p=.003.  In support of H1, the effort manipulation had a significant effect on 
perceptions of transparency, F (1, 197) = 10.55, p=.001.   
For the reciprocity MANOVA, the Omnibus test was not significant, Λ = .99, F 
(5, 193) = .27, p=.93.  Thus, this was not in support of H2.  For H2, an additional ANOVA 
confirmed that the reciprocity manipulation did not have a significant effect on 
perceptions of transparency, F (1, 197) = 0.17, p = .68.  This was an unexpected finding 
given the significant and large path estimate in the structural equation model (β = .62, 
p<.01).  However, the findings from the SEM should not be discounted.  A structural 
equation model analysis provides insight on the linear relationships between and among 
variables, therefore the conclusion that can be made is reciprocity has a positive linear 
impact on perceptions of transparency.  This is different from an analysis of variance 
which provides insight into the mean differences in a dependent variable (perceptions of 
transparency) at different levels of an independent variable (reciprocity: high/low).  A 
non-significant p value for an ANOVA suggests that the high and low conditions for the 
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manipulated independent variables resulted in about the same level of attitudes for the 
dependent variable (and thus about equal means for the dependent variable for each level 
of the independent variable).  However, this does not discount the potential for a linear 
relationship between the two constructs.  Here, an investigation of the means was 
conducted to better understand the relationship between reciprocity and transparency.  
The transparency mean for the high reciprocity condition was 5.26 and the transparency 
mean for the low reciprocity condition was 5.33. Upon close examination, the 
transparency means for the two levels of reciprocity were 1) very close together, 
confirming why a non-significant ANOVA resulted, 2) both skewed to high levels of 
perceived transparency (> 5.0), and most interestingly 3) the means were opposite of 
what was expected.  The skewness toward the top end of the scale for both high and low 
manipulations indicates that the reciprocity manipulations were not strong enough 
between the two to impact perceptions of transparency at the different levels of 
reciprocity.  Recall the manipulation included a statement in ABC’s email that read for 
the low condition:  
“We can address your questions and comments by email 
(newfees@abcairlines.com)”.   
 
Whereas in the high condition the email read:  
“We can address your questions and comments by email 
(newfees@abcairlines.com) or you can speak to a representative by 
calling our toll-free number (888-931-1ABC).  You may also chat 
with us instantly online by visiting our website.” 
 
One possible explanation for the non-significant ANOVA and the skew in mean 
to above 5.0 for both conditions is that providing just one contact method will favorably 
impact perceptions of transparency, and as evidence of the means for the two groups, 
 228 
 
perceptions of transparency are influenced to about the same extent whether one contact 
method is provided or multiple.  Since this was not the finding from Study 3, this 
conclusion may be attributed to the change in stimuli, to the sample used (broader age 
range), or to a combination of both. Regarding the flip in means in which the low 
reciprocity condition had a slightly higher mean, technically speaking the means should 
not be interpreted due to the non-significant p-value for the ANOVA.  However, if this 
were to occur again with significance, a possible explanation for this finding would be 
that, those in the high reciprocity condition found it odd that this email contained 
numerous contact methods and thus backfired on perceptions of transparency.   
Table 28, which provides a transparency mean by reciprocity mean matrix, shows 
that generally, there is a linear relationship between reciprocity and transparency.  As the 
scale average for reciprocity increases, so do perceptions of transparency.  This provides 
additional evidence of the linear relationship found in the SEM. 
Table 28: Study 4, Transparency by Reciprocity Means 
 Transparency Scale Average 
Reciprocity Scale 
Average 
N Mean 
1 4 2.83 
1.5 2 5 
2 8 3 
2.5 8 3.79 
3 6 4.89 
3.5 10 4.9 
4 23 4.84 
4.5 20 5.07 
5 40 5.38 
5.5 18 5.87 
6 47 5.94 
6.5 5 6.47 
7 10 6.43 
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For the negative information MANOVA, the Omnibus test was significant, Λ = 
.93, F (5, 193) = 2.84, p=.02.  In support of H3, the effort manipulation had a significant 
effect on perceptions of transparency, F (1, 197) = 10.89, p=.001.  The transparency 
mean was 4.93 for the low negative information condition, and was 5.57 for the high 
negative information condition.  Although the manipulations were strong enough 
influence to different levels of transparency perceptions, the SEM showed no linear 
relationship between negative information and perceptions of transparency.  Table 29 
shows how the means for transparency increase as the means for negative information 
increase and this further illustrates a definitive linear trend. 
Table 29: Study 4, Means for Negative Information by Transparency Scale 
Averages 
 Transparency Scale 
Negative 
Information Scale 
N Mean 
1.00 7 5.29 
1.33 2 6.33 
1.67 6 4.94 
2.00 18 5.41 
2.33 6 4.67 
2.67 6 5.56 
3.00 16 5.21 
3.33 12 4.72 
3.67 19 5.44 
4.00 31 5.08 
4.33 9 5.33 
4.67 19 5.49 
5.00 18 5.69 
5.33 4 4.75 
5.67 8 5.92 
6.00 7 5.29 
6.33 2 6 
6.67 1 5 
7.00 3 4 
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A second purpose of the supplemental analyses was to test whether the 
manipulations impacted other variables in the model beyond transparency.  This will help 
clarify whether the variance in the dependent variables is due strictly to other variables 
hypothesized to influence them, or whether the variance can be partially attributed to one 
of the three manipulated dependent variables.  Specifically, MANOVA and Sobel 
mediation tests were conducted to better understand which dependent variables in the 
model beyond transparency (skepticism, trust, attitude toward the firm, and/or purchase 
intention) were directly affected by the manipulated independent variables in the model 
(consumer effort, firm reciprocity, and negative information) and if any were partially 
mediated by transparency. 
For perceived effort, the perceived effort manipulation had direct effects on 
skepticism F (1, 197) = 17.93, p<.0001, trust F (1, 197) = 15.72, p=.0001, attitude, F (1, 
197) = 14.24, p=.0002, and purchase intention F (1, 197) = 9.45, p=.002.  A bootstrap 
analysis was conducted to investigate if any of these direct relationships were mediated 
by transparency.  The bootstrap analysis revealed that all of these direct relationships also 
had indirect effects through transparency, and the 95% confidence interval for the size of 
the indirect effects excluded zero, suggesting all indirect effects were significant (.11 - 
.28; -.42 - -.23; -.32 - -.18; and -.44 - -.25 respectively) (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). The 
mediation supports the structural equation model. 
The additional analyses were not conducted for reciprocity due to the non-
significant Omnibus test.  For negative information, the perceived negative information 
manipulation had direct effects on skepticism F (1, 197) = 7.88, p=.005, trust F (1, 197) = 
4.05, p=.05, attitude, F (1, 197) = 8.43, p=.004, and purchase intention F (1, 197) = 6.34, 
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p=.01.  A bootstrap analysis was conducted to investigate if any of these direct 
relationships were mediated by transparency.  In support of the SEM finding of a non-
significant path from negative information to transparency, the bootstrap analysis 
revealed that none of these direct relationships had indirect effects through transparency, 
and the 95% confidence interval for the size of the indirect effects included zero, 
suggesting all indirect effects were non-significant (-.11- -.09; -.09 - .14; -.08 - .12; and - 
.11 - .17 respectively) (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). The mediation supports the findings 
from structural equation model. 
In summary, the supplemental MANOVAs corroborated the findings from the 
SEM analysis for H1.  The MANOVA for H2 indicated the conditions were not strong 
enough to show differences in perceptions of transparency between the two reciprocity 
groups.  The findings for the MANOVA for H3 indicated that negative information has an 
impact on transparency.  This was in support of the SEM findings from Study 2, but in 
contrast to the SEM findings from Study 4.  The mediation analyses, however, all 
supported the structural equation model. 
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